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Abbreviations 
 
AWSW = August Wilhelm von Schlegel’s Sämmtliche Werke. Edited by Eduard Böcking. 
Leipzig: Weidmann, 1846-1847. 12 volumes. 
 
FA = Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Sämtliche Werke. Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche. 
Edited by Dieter Borchmeyer et. al. Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker, 1985—. 
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Hans Michael Baumgartner et. al. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1976—. 
 
Inferno/Purgatorio/Paradiso = Dante. The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri. Edited 
and translated by Robert M. Durling and Ronald L. Martinez. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996-2013. 3 volumes.1  
 
KAV = August Wilhelm Schlegel: Kritische Ausgabe der Vorlesungen. Edited by Ernst 
Behler and Frank Jolles. Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1989—.  
 
KFSA = Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe. Edited by Ernst Behler, Jean Jacques 
Anstett, Hans Eichner (München: F. Schöningh, 1958—. 
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SBD = F.W.J. Schelling, Briefe und Dokumente, ed. Horst Fuhrmans. Bonn: Bouvier, 
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Schriften = Novalis Schriften: Die Werke Friedrich von Hardenbergs. Edited by Paul 
Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960 —. 
 
SW = Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schellings Sämmtliche Werke. Edited by Karl 
Friedrich August Schelling. Stuttgart, Augsburg: Cotta, 1856-1861. 14 volumes. 
 
WA = Goethes Werke. Weimar: Böhlau, 1887-1919. 133 volumes. 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 I draw on the Italian text of these editions, but translations, unless noted otherwise, are my own. 
 
 
 
2 
Introduction 
 
In winter 1799, in the German university town of Jena, there convened at Leutragasse 5 a 
small community of friends, rivals, lovers, and intellectuals who together wended their 
way through Dante’s Commedia. By New Year’s, 1800, they had covered some fifty 
percent of the poem, which is to say they had already coursed through Hell and climbed 
to the third of Mount Purgatory’s seven terraces, where the wrathful like Marco 
Lombardo dwelt. With the discipline of monks, these German dantisti gathered in the 
evening, plied their Italian on the Commedia, and retreated to their cells, only to resume 
their labors on the next evening. Among these readers were the trailblazing figures in two 
overlapping sectors of modern German intellectual history: the artistic movement known 
as Romanticism and the philosophical school known as German idealism.  
 A.W. Schlegel and his brother Friedrich Schlegel, who would publish the most 
influential organ of Romantic art theory, the Athenäum (1798-1800), were regarded in 
this community as cognoscenti in all matters related to Dante. Among their students were 
a revolutionary and a novelist, Caroline Schlegel and Dorothea Veit respectively, both of 
whose connections to German intellectual life ran far and wide. The protean philosopher 
Friedrich Schelling, who arrived in Jena in 1798 and would articulate the Romantic 
Naturphilosophie, rounded out the class. This Who’s Who of Romantic Dante readers, 
however, does not account for figures on the periphery of the circle who visited and 
corresponded with the Schlegel household during the winter of 1799. Indeed, that list 
would include no one less than Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 
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Friedrich Schleiermacher, Ludwig and Amalie Tieck, and the poet Friedrich von 
Hardenberg (Novalis). 
 To be sure, compiling a list of prominent readers of a poet as widely read as 
Dante is no difficult task. But a series of factors marks this group as worthy of special 
attention. First of all, at the end of the eighteenth century, when the early German 
Romantics commenced their study of Dante, there had existed a full German translation 
of the Commedia for a mere three decades; indeed, A.W. Schlegel himself counts as one 
of the first and certainly most significant translators of the poem. Dante’s status as an 
incontestably canonical poet, in other words, ought not be judged a presupposition of 
eighteenth-century literary sensibility, for the foundation of his European canonicity 
owes in no small measure to the efforts of the German Romantics in the first place. A 
quite different but equally important reason why the Romantic engagement with Dante 
merits our attention is, as I have suggested above, its communal nature. In an 
uncommonly fulsome way, we can speak of a Romantic reception of Dante, as opposed to 
a merely Schlegelian or a Schellingian reception, precisely because the Commedia 
impelled a communal intellectual enterprise, indeed a preeminent instance of Romantic 
Symphilosophie that was sustained intensively for several months and sporadically for a 
few years. Finally, one of the most compelling reasons for a discerning account of the 
Romantic Dante phenomenon boils down to historical contingency: contrary to what 
many readers might well suppose — namely, that the Romantic reception of Dante ought 
to be understood in conjunction with their many conversions to Catholicism and political 
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conservatism — this reading of Dante occurred precisely at the corona of Romantic 
theory and poetry.  
 In fact, in the winter that Dante was read, Friedrich Schlegel had just published 
Lucinde and was at work on the summative statement of Romantic poetics, Das Gespräch 
über die Poesie, while Schelling, in addition to projecting poetic work with Goethe, was 
putting the finishing touches on his seminal philosophical tract, Das System des 
transzendentalen Idealismus. At the same time, moreover, the so-called Atheismusstreit 
over Fichte’s heterodoxy embroiled Jena, Schleiermacher’s hugely influential speeches 
on religion appeared, and the weight of Spinoza’s philosophy hit the Romantic circle in 
full force. It is the cardinal goal of this dissertation to show that the communal reception 
of Dante, hardly just a divertimento di notte, came to shape the Romantics’ attempts to 
receive and process the confluence of literary and philosophical discourses at the end of 
the eighteenth century. 
 But don’t we already know that Dante was a crucial figure to the Romantics? 
After all, the seminal histories of the period — those written in the decades around the 
turn of the twentieth century — all allude to the Romantics’ interest in Dante at least in 
passing.2 And the very epithet Romantik would seem to presuppose the Romantics’ 
reception of canonical western European writers. I would contend, however, that 
presuppositions of this sort have forestalled efforts to arrive at a sufficiently differentiated 
understanding of a phenomenon like the Romantic reception of Dante. Indeed, nothing 
                                                           
2 Rudolf Haym, Die romantische Schule (Berlin: Gaertner, 1870), Ricarda Huch, Blütezeit der Romantik 
(Leipzig: Haessel, 1899), Oskar Walzel, Deutsche Romantik (Leipzig: Teubner, 1908). 
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would seem to validate this contention more forcefully than the recent statement of a 
group of scholars who, when organizing a conference on Dante’s reception in the 
twentieth century, asserted the historical priority of their topic by disparaging Romantic 
treatments of Dante as “a-critical […] Kitsch tribute.”3 Extreme though this formulation 
might be, its assumption of an undifferentiated Romantic veneration of Dante is hardly 
uncommon. One of the foremost contemporary scholars of the Commedia, Robert 
Hollander, has dismissed European Romantic adaptations of the poem as reducible to a 
bit of Goethean Sturm und Drang, while one of the twentieth century’s most erudite 
scholars of German Romanticism, Ernst Behler could muster no more than platitudes 
when summing up the Romantics’ interaction with Dante.4  
 In fairness, the Romantics did write “romantically” about Dante. In F. Schlegel’s 
words, Dante was the “heilige[r] Stifter und Vater der modernen Poesie.”5 According to 
A.W. Schlegel, he was one of the “riesenhaften Schatten der Vorwelt, für die es jetzt an 
der Zeit ist, wieder aufzuerstehen.”6 Schelling wrote that where religion and poetry 
intersect, Dante stands as “Hohepriester und weiht die ganze moderne Kunst für ihre 
                                                           
3 This quote is drawn from the call for papers for a 2009 conference, “Metamorphosing Dante,” in which 
the organizers sought submissions that would treat twentieth and twenty-first-century manipulations of 
Dante. They defined the parameters of their conference in the CFP by drawing a distinction between the 
substantive and oblique adaptations of the twentieth century and the “kitsch tribute” of the Romantics. 
Results of the conference have been published in Metamorphosing Dante: Appropriations, Manipulations, 
and Rewritings in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, ed. Manuele Gragnolati, Fabio Camilletti, and 
Fabian Lampart (Wien: Turia + Kant, 2011).  
4 Hollander, “Dante and his Commentators” in The Cambridge Companion to Dante (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 232. Behler writes quite blandly that “Dante became a guiding figure 
for early German Romanticism and the attempt to develop a self-conscious modern style of literature.” 
Dante Encyclopedia, ed. Richard Lansing (New York: Routledge, 2010), 266. 
5 KFSA II, 297.  
6 KAV II/1, 148.  
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Bestimmung ein.”7 The Commedia, F. Schlegel thought, was “das einzige System der 
transzendentalen Poesie, immer noch das höchste seiner Art,” for “in Einem ungeheuren 
Gedicht,” the poet had encompassed “seine Nation und sein Zeitalter.”8 A.W. Schlegel 
deemed it nothing less than a “Darstellung des Universums.”9 And Schelling, with 
perhaps the most superlative of remarks, wrote that Dante’s poem stood so sealed off 
unto itself that it represented “nicht ein einzelnes Gedicht, sondern die ganze Gattung der 
neueren Poesie”; indeed, as an “eigene Welt” it demanded also its “eigne Theorie.”10 To 
the contemporary ear, statements like these of course have a ring of the ridiculous; but to 
dismiss them as acritical kitsch is to dismiss the substance of Romantic criticism for 
being Romantic.    
 Fortunately, the scholarly landscape is not entirely bleak — far from it, in fact. 
The inquisitive reader (provided she reads Italian or German) can quite readily leaf 
through any number of by now influential studies on the German reception of Dante. 
These include Giovanni Scartazzini’s Dante in Germania (1881-1883), Emil Sulger-
Gebing’s Dante in der deutschen Literatur bis zum Erscheinen der ersten vollständigen 
Übersetzung der Divina Commedia 1767/69 (1895), Arturo Farinelli’s Dante. Spagna — 
Francia — Inghilterra — Germania (1922), Werner Friedrich’s Dante’s Fame Abroad 
(1950), and most recently, Eva Hölter’s “Der Dichter der Hölle und des Exils.” 
                                                           
7 SW V, 152.  
8 KFSA II, 206, 297. 
9 KAV II/1, 148.  
10 SW V, 152-53. 
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Historische und systematische Profile der deutschsprachigen Dante-Rezeption (2002).11 
From among the impressively comprehensive scholarship, the character of which is 
largely indexical and notational rather than interpretive and synthesizing,12 there emerge 
however only three genuine accounts of the Romantic reception of Dante: Erich 
Auerbach’s “Entdeckung Dantes in der Romantik” (1929), Clara-Charlotte Fuchs’s 
“Dante in der deutschen Romantik” (1933), and Christian Senkel’s “Absolutes in 
poetischer Entfaltung” (2005). Each of these essentially article-length studies has 
considerable merits, in particular that of Fuchs,13 yet two of them were written nearly one 
century ago. In any field, so long a silence would warrant new investigation, but this is 
especially true of German Romanticism. For in the last several decades, the publication 
of new critical editions (containing the writings of F. Schlegel, Novalis, Schelling) as 
well as the sweeping historical-philosophical reinterpretations of Romanticism 
undertaken by Manfred Frank and Frederick Beiser have dramatically altered our 
understanding of Romantic thought. Indeed, any account of the Romantics as readers of 
the Commedia remains incomplete without registering such substantive revisions in the 
scholarship on German Romanticism.14   
                                                           
11 For more detailed accounts of these sources, it is worth consulting Hölter, Der Dichter der Hölle und des 
Exils (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002), 11-16. 
12 There are of course exceptions to the annals of reception history, most of which analyze the relationship 
of a particular Romantic poet to Dante in an article-length study. One important example is Irmgard Osols-
Wehden, Pilgerfahrt und Narrenreise: der Einfluss der Dichtungen Dantes und Ariosts auf den 
frühromantischen Roman in Deutschland (Hildesheim: Weidmann, 1998). Osols-Wehden is almost unique 
in that she devotes a monograph, and not just an article, to the phenomenon. I single out her book 
especially because, in its attention to Tieck, it attends to a Romantic poet whom this dissertation omits. 
13 At 70 pages, Fuchs’s study is more than three times as long as those of Auerbach and Senkel, yet still 
leaves much room for interpretation.  
14 Senkel’s account centers on the Schlegel brothers and Schelling from a religious-theological perspective.   
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 My aim in this dissertation lies in showing how the Dante reception around 1800 
constitutes a vital thread in the narrative of the Frühromantik, with effects that still 
resonate in Goethe’s Faust II some three decades later. Specifically, I argue that Dante’s 
Commedia, as it was read, interpreted, and adapted around 1800, came to function as a 
complex and fecund model for the Romantics’ ambitious project of creating a new 
mythology. For all its Romantic trappings, this loosely defined project promulgated the 
promise of cultural transformation on the basis of artistic education and, in this way, 
largely recapitulated the doctrine of autonomous art as formulated by Schiller and Goethe 
in Weimar.15 To the extent, however, that the new mythology proposed the creation of a 
single, unified aesthetic culture on the basis of the convergence of realist and idealist 
philosophy, it adopted a more prescriptive approach to art that necessarily demanded its 
own design. In its encyclopedic scope, its synthesis of art and science, as well as its 
harmony of allegory and history, the Commedia represented to the Romantic theorists of 
the new mythology a uniquely apt poetic exemplar for the eidolon they had envisioned.16 
Subsequent chapters in this dissertation will examine how the foundations for Romantic 
mythological discourse were laid via the Dante studies of A.W. Schlegel; how the 
theoretical focus of the project was sharpened and delineated by Friedrich Schlegel; how 
                                                           
15 On the emergence of the Romantic new mythology from the Enlightenment, see Stefan Matuschek,  
“Was heißt ‘Mythologisieren’? Oder: Warum und wie sich die romantische Neue Mythologie der 
Aufklärung verdankt,” in Romantik und Revolution. Zum Reformpotential einer unpolitischen Bewegung, 
ed. Klaus Ries (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag, 2012), 71-82. 
16 In making this point, I concur with Senkel, who writes that the Commedia never became an “Operator für 
Schlegels Textreligion” in the same way it did for example for Stefan George or Rudolf Borchardt; which 
is to say, the Commedia would not itself serve as the new mythology. Inasmuch as I regard the Commedia 
as a pardigmatic model for the project for a new mythology, however, I must disagree with his judgment 
that “Dante nicht als Urbild einer neuen Dichtung, sondern eher als früher Rivale gesehen wird [...].” See 
Senkel, “Absolutes in poetischer Entfaltung. Dantes Commedia und die frühromantische Religionspoetik,” 
in Romantische Religiösität, ed. Alfred von Bormann (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005), 53ff.  
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Novalis availed himself of the Commedia in order to unite subject and object in a mythic 
novel; and how, on the periphery of the Romantic poetic school, Schelling and Goethe 
both appealed to the Commedia in their elaborate efforts to produce a mythology of 
nature.  
 In the first chapter, however, we will bid Dante adieu until we have mapped the 
infrastructure of the scene in which his arrival proved so transformative. To show 
precisely how Dante opened new avenues for the Romantic project of writing a new 
mythology, it will be important to chart the project’s philosophical and historical 
catalysts. To that end, I will offer first an account of Romantic myth as an innovative 
aesthetic response to the dilemmas in late 18th-century philosophy. Second, I will account 
for the utopian-political impulse that impelled the Romantic quest for the formulation of 
a new mythology. An exploration of both aspects will lead us back once again to Dante. 
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1  
The Romantic Project of a New Mythology 
 
The Realism of Romantic Mythology 
After a century in which German intellectuals, exemplified by Leipzig’s literary dictator, 
Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700-1766), had measured themselves and the German 
Volk against the culture of French absolutism, there emerged in the final decades of the 
eighteenth century a vastly different panorama of European and German modernity: the 
French monarchy had crumbled nearly overnight; the Rationalist metaphysical system of 
Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754), absolutist in its theory 
of the divinely ordained perfection of the world, had been dethroned by the rigorous new 
epistemology of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), which was in turn radicalized by Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814); and meanwhile, the aesthetic principles of French 
classicism that had long dictated the ideals of German taste were discarded and surpassed 
by the theories of Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768), Gotthold Ephraim Lessing 
(1729-1781), Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), and above all, Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe (1749-1832). German Romantics of course welcomed much in the way of these 
changes: Friedrich Schlegel’s (1772-1829) famous dictum that the French Revolution, 
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, and Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister constituted the three great 
tendencies of the age, suggests as much.17 But as the century drew to a close, it became 
                                                           
17 KFSA II, 198. 
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increasingly evident to the Romantics in the Jena circle that recent ripples had wrought 
troubling consequences. Indeed, the Romantics’ various publications and lectures began 
to articulate the clear conviction that the politics, philosophy, and poetics of the modern 
European West had been deeply riven by processes of historical and cultural 
fragmentation.18 After the Reformation had severed the unity of Christendom, the 
Enlightenment had nearly eradicated religion from European soil. The initial promise of 
the Revolution had devolved into chaos, bringing dissolution rather than democracy, and 
the philosophy of Kant and Fichte, despite its initial promises of intellectual revolution, 
had also divested nature of its glory (and reality) by subordinating it to the power of the 
ego.19 Only the Romantics’ esteem for Goethe, their perpetual critic, seemed not to 
waver.  
 With the project of creating a new mythology, the Romantics envisioned a 
veritable panacea to these pressing challenges, theorizing it on the one hand as a remedy 
to what we might classify as crises of a social-political variety, and on the other to what 
we might deem crises of an aesthetic-philosophical sort. If we turn our attention to the 
latter, we find that what had begun troubling the Romantics in both philosophic and 
poetic discourses was a general lack of realism (Realismus). Here the term does not refer 
to the mimetic exactitude of a naturalist aesthetic, but rather to the metaphysical view that 
accords nature and history no less privileged a status than spirit and ideality. The 
                                                           
18 Perhaps the most famous example is Novalis’s epigonal essay, Die Christenheit, oder Europa. But 
similar sentiments can be readily found in the work of both Schlegel brothers, and Schelling too. 
19 Seminal statements of Romantic cultural critique include, among others, Novalis’s Die Christenheit, oder 
Europa (1799), Schelling’s lectures on the Philosophie der Kunst (1802-1803), and A.W. Schlegel’s 
Vorlesungen über schöne Literatur und Kunst (1801-1802). See especially KAV I, 458ff.  
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conceptual force behind this notion of realism, defined against the subjective idealism 
formulated by Kant and refined by Fichte, emerged from a generation that had 
simultaneously been disillusioned by the promises of Kantian philosophy and charmed by 
the beauty of art and poetry in the work of Goethe and Schiller.20 This is not to say, of 
course, that the Romantics merely dismissed the philosophy of Kant and Fichte as 
nonsense and devoted themselves to a life of l’art pour l’art: after all, Kant’s turn to 
epistemology was crucial in dismantling the onerous metaphysical systems of 
Rationalism that had gained traction in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But 
Kant’s self-proclaimed “Copernican revolution” in philosophy subjected reason to so 
thoroughgoing a critique that reason’s sphere of knowledge dwindled to the knowing 
subject itself. Fichte, in turn, radicalized Kant’s philosophy such that what resided 
outside the subject — nature, the objective, the universe — came to be seen as a merely 
regulative ideal, a chimera whose sole purpose lay in its promotion of the ego’s 
development. Nature’s reality, in effect, could not even be deduced by logic but had to be 
inferred from the fact that the ego required external obstacles for its moral growth.21 To 
the Romantics, it appeared that critical philosophy had privileged the ideal to the 
detriment of the real. 
                                                           
20 The philosophical and the political are not, however, unrelated. Manfred Frank devotes special attention 
to the political dimension of the new mythology, but likewise acknowledges that the Romantics promote a 
new mythology “auf der Grundlage einer Kritik an der analytischen Konzeption von Vernunft.” See in 
particular the sixth and seventh lectures in Der kommende Gott: Vorlesungen über die Neue Mythologie, 1. 
Teil (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982). Here: 188. 
21 On this score, see Frederick Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801 
(Cambridge: Harvard, 2002), 392. In general, Beiser gives a tremendously thorough and readable account 
of the Romantics’ response to the philosophy of Kant and Fichte, much of which informs this very chapter.  
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 Transcendental idealism’s apparent devaluation of nature vexed the practical 
sensibility of the Romantics. While Leibniz’s philosophy of the best of all possible 
worlds, with its theory of a pre-established harmony, flew in the face of empirical 
experience, so too did the conclusions reached by his critics, who had first proposed 
nature as an unknowable matter of faith before ultimately dismissing it as an ideal of 
instrumental value for the subject’s growth. Kant and Fichte’s assignation of rational 
primacy to the subject, which resulted in this thoroughly provisional conception of 
nature, would have far-reaching consequences: one philosopher of idealism imagined the 
need for a new physics that, instead of proceeding by principles of empiricism, would ask 
“Wie muß eine Welt für ein moralisches Wesen beschaffen sein?”22 To those for whom a 
provisional concept of nature simply would not suffice, the transcendental idealism of 
Kant and Fichte appeared as impractical as the bulky metaphysical systems of the 
Rationalists. Surely there were ways of knowing the reality of nature, even if synthetic a 
priori concepts, to use Kant’s language, could not correspond to the intuitions of a 
posteriori sense experience. 
 Friedrich Hölderlin was among the very first both to criticize the subjectivity of 
Fichte’s philosophy and to formulate the principles of an Absolute Idealism according to 
which the absolute might be accessed, if not via the concepts of discursive reason, then 
certainly via the power of intuition.23 In his fragmentary essay “Über Religion,” he writes 
                                                           
22 Das Älteste Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus, in Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, Kleine 
Stuttgarter Ausgabe, ed. Friedrich Beissner (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965), IV, 309.  
23 Hölderlin’s critique of subjective idealism is found in the now famous fragment, “Urteil und Seyn” in 
Sämtliche Werke, IV, 226-227. 
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of the “Bedürfnis der Menschen […] ihre verschiedenen Vorstellungsarten von 
Göttlichem […] sich einander zuzugesellen […].”24 While one’s rational faculty may 
approach such intuitions, it hardly begins to exhaust them; and for this reason, he 
suggests, there must be formulated a new means of Vorstellung: it will be neither purely 
intellectual nor purely historical, “sondern intellektuell historisch, d.h. Mythisch […].”25 
The traces of Hölderlin’s quest to realize such a mythology can be found in texts like his 
novel Hyperion, which employs a poetic narrative to communicate the possibility of the 
subject’s union with the object of nature. In a letter to a friend, for example, the novel’s 
eponymous hero writes quite tellingly, “Die Wissenschaft […] hat mir alles verdorben. 
Ich bin bei euch so recht vernünftig geworden, habe gründlich mich unterscheiden gelernt 
von dem, was mich umgibt, bin nun vereinzelt in der schönen Welt, bin so ausgeworfen 
aus dem Garten der Natur, wo ich wuchs und blühte, und vertrockne an der 
Mittagssonne.”26 As Beiser says of Hölderlin’s turn to an aesthetics of myth, “it avoids 
the abstract and analytical language of reason yet it puts our intuitions and feelings into 
some more concrete form. Mythical language is a synthesis of the intellectual and the 
historical: it has all the determinacy of the intellectual but also all the immediacy, unity, 
and wholeness of the historical.”27 Myth, Hölderlin surmised, could grant access to a 
realm that exists beyond the bounds of mere reason by balancing the ideal and the real. 
                                                           
24 Hölderlin, Über die Religion, Sämtliche Werke, IV, 291. 
25 Ibid., 292.  
26 Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, III, 9.  
27 Beiser, German Idealism, 397.  
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 The first, true “call” for a new mythology, invoked in the enigmatic text known as 
the Ältestes Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus (1795/96), envisioned that a 
contemporary mythology would fulfill a purpose similar to that which Hölderlin had 
described: namely, to communicate knowledge that otherwise posed a challenge for the 
narrow scope of philosophical inquiry. Thus the anonymous author of the two-page 
manuscript, alternately identified by historians as Hegel, Hölderlin, or Schelling, judges 
beauty rather than truth to be the apex of reason, stating quite clearly that “der höchste 
Akt der Vernunft […] ein ästhetischer Akt ist und daß Wahrheit und Güte nur in der 
Schönheit verschwistert sind.”28 This view of course entails a judgment concerning the 
relation of philosophy and art, the core of which is that poetry possesses “eine höhere 
Würde” and can be deemed the true “Lehrerin der Menschheit.”29 Consequently, the 
author asserts, “wir müssen eine neue Mythologie haben, diese Mythologie aber muß im 
Dienste der Ideen stehen, sie muß eine Mythologie der Vernunft werden.”30 Mythology, 
as the author of the Systemprogramm formulates it, would function as an aesthetic 
religion that works in concert with philosophy and rationality. Hardly a reactionary 
response to the critical philosophy of the Enlightenment, the Systemprogramm’s call for a 
new mythology emanates from the standpoint of Kant’s idealism while simultaneously 
attempting to transcend its self-imposed limits. 
 In much the same spirit, Friedrich Schlegel’s groundbreaking Rede über die 
Mythologie locates in myth the possibility of the subject’s union with the reality of nature 
                                                           
28 Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke, IV, 310. 
29 Ibid., 310. 
30 Ibid., 311. 
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via an aesthetic intuition. What Schlegel refers to as the new mythology would not be a 
poetic corpus of stale didactic fables, i.e. an allegorical recapitulation of contemporary 
philosophical doctrine. Rather, it would need to be a poetic work that transcended the 
limits of philosophy altogether. As he writes in the Ideen, “wo die Philosophie aufhört, 
muß die Poesie anfangen.”31 The new mythology would accordingly be an aesthetic 
phenomenon in which could be intuited that which the language of philosophy failed to 
articulate: in short, the absolute — or nature, the universe, the infinite, or God, depending 
on one’s lexicon. Like Hölderlin, who had intimated the communicative potential of myth 
in comparison to the deficiencies of discursive logic, Schlegel presents the new 
mythology as an aesthetic-religious lens via which the Anschauung of nature occurs. 
“Was sonst das Bewußtsein ewig flieht,” he writes, “ist hier [in Mythologie] dennoch 
sinnlich geistig zu schauen, und festgehalten […].”32 In Schlegel’s later emendations for 
his Sämtliche Werke (1823), for example, we see that he glosses Mythologie repeatedly as 
“symbolische Anschauung,” “symbolische Naturansicht,” “fest bestehende Symbolik der 
Natur und der Kunst.”33  
 These are no doubt important terms in their own right, indicating the supra-
rational dimension of the new mythology, but they also merit attention in that we glimpse 
in them the intellectual lineage of Schlegel’s project and the trajectory he charts for it. 
His speech on mythology appeared in the third issue of the Athenäum, 1800, just months 
after he had read what proved to be a formative text in his intellectual development: 
                                                           
31 KFSA II, 261. 
32 KFSA II, 318.  
33 Ibid., 311 ff. 
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namely, Friedrich Schleiermacher’s Über Religion, a collection of four speeches 
purporting to salvage religion in the wake of Kant’s triumph over metaphysics. Crucially, 
Schleiermacher claims there that religion consists neither in a system of speculative 
metaphysics like that of Leibniz, nor in a system of practical morality like that of Kant; 
rather, Schleiermacher says, the core of religion is the Anschauung des Universums: “Ihr 
Wesen ist weder Denken noch Handeln, sondern Anschauung und Gefühl. Anschauen 
will sie das Universum [...].”34 Kant’s critique of religion and faith failed to resound, 
Schleiermacher suggests, for he had been knocking at an open door. In point of fact, 
religion pursues a wholly different course — namely, that which had been proposed by 
Spinoza: 
 Opfert mit mir ehrerbietig eine Locke den Manen des heiligen verstoßenen Spinoza! Ihn 
durchdrang der hohe Weltgeist, das Unendliche war sein Anfang und Ende, das 
Universum seine einzige und ewige Liebe, in heiliger Unschuld und tiefer Demut 
spiegelte er sich in der ewigen Welt, und sah zu wie auch Er ihr liebenswürdigster 
Spiegel war; voller Religion war Er und voll heiligen Geistes; und darum steht Er auch 
da, allein und unerreicht, Meister in seiner Kunst, aber erhaben über die profane Zunft, 
ohne Jünger und ohne Bürgerrecht. Anschauen des Universums, ich bitte befreundet 
Euch mit diesem Begriff, er ist der Angel meiner ganzen Rede, er ist die allgemeinste und 
höchste Formel der Religion, woraus Ihr jeden Ort in derselben finden könnt, woraus sich 
ihr Wesen und ihre Grenzen aufs genaueste bestimmen lassen.35  
  
Schleiermacher’s religious enthusiasm for a philosopher so traditionally 
associated with atheism would no doubt ring paradoxical to the ears of Jacobi, but 
Spinoza had in fact theorized a quasi-mystical form of knowledge that approximated 
Hölderlin’s and Schlegel’s quest to transcend the cold logic of discursive reason. In his 
Ethics, Spinoza had posited reason and experience as distinct means of knowledge, but he 
                                                           
34 Schleiermacher, Über die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern (Hamburg: Felix 
Meiner, 2004), 28-29.  
35 Schleiermacher, Über die Religion, 31. 
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subordinated them both to what he deemed a third and higher form: scientia intuitiva.36 
Whereas reason climbs upward from effects to causes to essences, intuitive knowledge 
proceeds downward from essences to causes to their effects, thus inverting the process of 
analytic reason and proceeding from the whole to its parts, rather than from the parts to 
their whole. Distinct from the anti-rational, Protestant Christian mysticism of a Jakob 
Böhme or Johann Georg Hamann, Spinoza’s doctrine of scientia intuitiva resembled the 
hyper- or supra-rationalism of Friedrich Schlegel’s single most profound intellectual 
influence, Plato himself, as Frederich Beiser writes.37 Spinoza had written furthermore 
that intuitive knowledge would inspire a desire for itself in human beings and thereby 
produce the greatest of all possible intellectual satisfaction — joy.38 He writes that this 
joy ultimately yields the condition of blessedness itself, an amor dei intellectualis.39 In 
Spinoza's view, this intellectual love of God constitutes the equivalent of salvation.40  
Clearly, Spinoza’s God is not the personal God of Abrahamic theism, but rather 
the totality of the monistic universe’s one substance. After all, Spinoza was not primarily 
interested in epistemology, but rather (meta)physics: for prior to having circumvented the 
limits placed on reason by means of his scientia intuitiva, Spinoza had posited a monist 
ontology that did away with a mess of dualist binaries like subject/object, ideal/real, etc., 
                                                           
36 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley (New York: Penguin, 1996), 2p40s2. See also 
5p25 (cited by part, proposition, and scholion). 
37 On the distinction between these stances vis-à-vis rationality, see “Frühromantik and the Platonic 
Tradition” in Frederick Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German Romanticism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 56-72. 
38 Ethics, 5p26-27. 
39 Ethics, 5p32. According to the Definition of Affects, VI, “Love is a joy, accompanied by the idea of an 
external cause.” Thus, the joy produced by intuitive knowledge — accompanied by the knowledge of God 
as its cause — amounts to an intellectual love of God.  
40 Ethics, 5p36. Also 5p42. 
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by resolving them as the mere attributes of one universal substance. He had essentially 
turned Kant’s self-proclaimed Copernican revolution inside-out: if knowledge consists in 
the coincidence of subject and object, and if there is only one universal substance, then 
wouldn’t the transcendental philosopher’s first principle of “I exist”  amount to the 
Absolute Idealist’s proposition “There are things outside of me” anyway?41 In the 
subsequent Naturphilosophie of Schelling, it became clear that philosophy would not 
proceed from the subject before ultimately acknowledging a flimsy ideal of nature; on the 
contrary, philosophy would presuppose a robust, vibrant nature and admit the subject as a 
portion or attribute of it. For theists like Jacobi and Mendelssohn, this was tantamount to 
atheism; but for an Absolute Idealist like Novalis, Spinoza was a “Gottbetrunkener 
Mensch” and a visionary: for with intellectual tools he had bridged the gap between 
science and religion that Jacobi could only envision being leapt by a salto mortale. If the 
new mythology were to be a sensual religion, as the author of the Systemprogramm had 
written, its creed would be that of Spinozism.42 
In point of fact, Schlegel was hardly shy in appropriating this bogeyman of 
Christians and idealists alike. Throughout the Rede über die Mythologie, he trumpets 
Spinoza’s name while giving short shrift to any other figure in the history of philosophy. 
Ludoviko, the character in Schlegel’s dialogue who delivers the speech, supplies an 
important reason for the exaltation of Spinoza: it is not that he considers Spinoza to be 
                                                           
41 See Schelling, System des transzendenten Idealismus, introduction, corollary 2. 
42 The Romantics make important emendations to Spinoza’s doctrine of monism, most notably in that they 
conceive of the universe as a teleologically unfolding substance, rather than a static substance. On this note, 
see especially Frank, Der kommende Gott. Vorlesungen über die neue Mythologie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 
1982), 155ff. 
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the “Meister einer neuen Alleinherrschaft.” Rather, he regards Spinoza as an exemplary 
theoretician of the relationship of Mystik and Poesie.43 This of course sounds puzzling, 
given the absence of a philosophy of art in Spinoza’s oeuvre. But Schlegel conceived of 
the new mythology as a supra-rational poetic instrument designed for the intuition of 
nature. Inasmuch as the new mythology thus constitutes a commitment to the reality of 
nature, a position referred to in the speech as realism, it diverges from the abstractions of 
subjective idealism and displays its affinity to the objectivity of Spinoza’s naturalism. It 
is by this association of the mythological and the poetic with the natural and the real that 
Ludoviko can assert what otherwise sounds terribly perplexing: “Ich begreife kaum, wie 
man ein Dichter sein kann, ohne den Spinosa zu verehren, zu lieben und ganz der seinige 
zu werden.”44  
 The significance of “realism” to the project of the new mythology can hardly be 
overstated, for in addition to bearing the philosophical force outlined above, it carried 
with it a poetic connotation that rendered the Romantics’ doctrine of myth drastically 
different from the reigning view of Enlightenment theorists. The contrast stems above all 
from the fact that Enlightenment philosophes had long regarded myth as a form of poetic 
aetiology that amounted to little more than an allegorical shell. In point of fact, one might 
claim with accuracy that Enlightenment theorists did not know myth as anything but a 
highly didactic form of allegory. Following the example of Latin writers, who had 
translated the Greek mythos as fabula, French, English, and German writers all reduced 
                                                           
43 KFSA II, 321. 
44 KFSA II, 317. 
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the same term to fable or Fabel and in doing so sharply delimited its conceptual range. 
Gottsched, for example, devoted a lengthy section of his Critische Dichtkunst (1730) to 
what Aristotle referred to as mythos, linking it very specifically to the Rationalist poetic 
category of the Fabel. He defines it as a “moralischen Lehrsatz” cloaked by a fictional 
“Begebenheit.”45 To be sure, the allegory of the fable bore no conceptual relationship to 
the idealism of Kant or Fichte; yet its distinctly un-mimetic character as a didactic genre 
entailed all the same an irreality that implied remoteness from the objectivity of nature 
and history. Indeed, fabulae were illusive narratives that laid no claims to historical or 
natural veracity. To the Romantics, such an interpretation of mythos amounted to no less 
than a dilution of poetry itself, for which reason Novalis would later describe the 
Enlightenment’s effect on poetry as that of cold water on hot fire.46 
 Bernard Fontenelle’s (1657-1757) pithy essay De l’origine des fables (1724) 
formulated the myth-as-allegory thesis so succinctly and cogently that it set the tone for 
most subsequent treatments in French, English, and German.47 He wrote of myth as a 
primeval mode of narrative that accounted for inexplicable events: “Ces pauvres 
sauvages, qui ont les premiers habité le monde, ou ne connaissaient point ces choses-là, 
ou n’y avaient fait aucune attention. Ils n’expliquaient donc les effets de la nature que par 
                                                           
45 Johann Christoph Gottsched, Ausgewählte Werke, ed. Joachim Birke (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1968-1987), 
VI/1,  203. 
46 Schriften III, 516.   
47 Another noteworthy approach to myth among French scholars is to be found in Pierre Bayle’s famous 
encyclopedia, where his entry on Jupiter commences with an extensive litany of the god’s sundry offenses: 
rape, incest, sodomy, theft, murder, etc. Bayle attempts, fairly transparently, to lay bare the stupidity of 
those who would worship such gods. And, through an attack on pagan myths, the principles of his 
argument could be applied easily enough to the Judaeo-Christian tradition. See Bayle, Dictionnaire 
historique et critique, 5th ed. (Amsterdam, 1740), v. 2, 901-02. On the Enlightenment criticism of 
Christianity via pagan myth, see Hans Blumenberg, Work on Myth (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985). 
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des choses plus grossières et plus palpables, qu’ils connaissaient.”48 Myths arose as 
aetiological narratives, from which in turn were born myth’s gods and goddesses, indeed 
pantheons full of anthropomorphic deities whose divine activity accounted for a range of 
otherwise inscrutable natural phenomena. Fontenelle goes on to assert, with no faint hint 
of obloquy, that the fictitious nature of such narratives becomes compounded once myth 
has attained broader popularity, for then “on ne raconta plus les faits un peu remarquables 
sans les revêtir des ornements que l’on avait reconnu qui étaient propres à plaire. Ces 
ornements étaient faux […] et cependant les histories ne passaient pas pour être 
fabuleuses.”49 This process stubbornly perpetuates itself, according to Fontenelle, for two 
reasons. What has already proven pleasing legitimates its own existence and propagation, 
while people’s respect for the tradition of their progenitors “étend une sottise à l’infini.”50  
 David Hume (1711-1776), whose work enjoyed an intensive German reception, 
among the Romantics no less,51 adopted Fontenelle’s method of collective 
psychologizing in his Natural History of Religion (1757) and approached myth as a 
matter characteristic of an early and unenlightened humankind. Already known for his 
unique philosophy of causation, Hume writes that “we are placed in this world, as in a 
great theatre, where the true springs and causes of every event are entirely concealed 
                                                           
48 Fontenelle, De l’origine des fables, ed. J.-R. Carré (Paris : Librairie Félix Alcan, 1932), 16-17. 
49 Fontenelle, 22. 
50 Fontenelle, 28. Precisely this notion would be addressed in Lessing’s Nathan der Weise, when Nathan 
responds to a challenge to his Judaism by responding that he cannot simply judge his forebears to have 
been liars (III: 7).   
51 Günter Gawlick and Lothar Kreimendahl, Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung: Umrisse einer 
Rezeptionsgeschichte (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1987).  
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from us […].”52 Though it would be wisest of human beings to discern such causes in the 
machinery of the universe, so sage a manner of perception proves beyond their power of 
comprehension, Hume writes; instead, the imagination is employed to sort out the 
confusion over questions of causation. The imagination in turn furnishes all manner of 
queer explanations, among which are those that would ascribe personal agency to 
impersonal phenomena. Since “there is an universal tendency among mankind to 
conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object, those qualities, with 
which they are familiarly acquainted,”53 there comes about a belief in invisible powers — 
both salutary and destructive — upon which are conferred a range of human qualities. 
Like Fontenelle, Hume underscores the fictive component of myth by devoting an entire 
chapter of the Natural History of Religion to discussing the allegorical quality of fables. 
Fontenelle’s and Hume’s explanation of myth as an aetiological discourse shaped the 
contours of subsequent theorization to the extent that much of what German intellectuals 
later wrote must be weighed against these earlier statements. Christian Gottlob Heyne, for 
example, who was perhaps the foremost German classicist of the eighteenth century 
(Winckelmann included), only echoed the assertions of Fontenelle and Hume when he 
wrote that “the origin of all mythology is ignorance concerning what causes 
appearances.”54   
                                                           
52 David Hume, Principal Writings on Religion, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (New York: Oxford UP, 1993), 140.  
53 Ibid., 141. 
54 C.G. Heyne, “Inquiry into the Causes of Fables,” in The Rise of Modern Mythology 1680-1860, ed. and 
trans. Burton Feldman and Robert D. Richardson (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1972), 219. For original, see 
Heyne, “De caussis fabularum seu mythorum” (1764), in Opuscula Academica Collecta, v. 1 (Göttingen, 
1785), 194-206.  
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 In scholarship on the rise of eighteenth-century mythography, Heyne has won 
approbation as a philologist for his introduction of language as a lens through which to 
study myth.55 And, in important respects, Heyne’s contributions to the field did in fact 
undermine the longstanding equation of myth with the poetic fable: he argued, for 
example, that the linguistic capabilities of the cultures producing myth were simply too 
raw to have furnished the sorts of fables described by Fontenelle and others. Not having 
yet attained linguistic maturity, “man needed gestures, expressive voice, movements of 
limbs and eyes” to account rationally for sense perceptions.56 The body became an 
instrument of articulation, with the result that thoughts, perceptions, and memories found 
expression as events. As Heyne writes, “what was awakened in the mind by reflection 
becomes reproduced once more as a deed.”57 Classifying poetry an heir of myth, Heyne 
did indeed sunder the longstanding union of myth and poetry. But for as apparently 
radical as his argument was — with its historicist and linguistic sensitivity — it 
ultimately recapitulated the central thesis Fontenelle and Hume. Heyne’s historicism 
enabled him to dispute the notion that myth materialized only in poetry, showing instead 
that poetry later received and shaped the raw matter of myth; but even with a more 
nuanced methodology, he only seemed to confirm that myth had served as a primitive 
aetiology, the utility of which had been rendered obsolete by cultural maturation. This 
course of thought would meet rigid opposition from Romantics who regarded it as having 
                                                           
55 See e.g. Lucas Marco Gisi, Einbildungskraft und Mythologie: die Verschränkung von Anthropologie und 
Geschichte im 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007). 
56 C.G. Heyne, “Inquiry into the Causes of Fables,” in The Rise of Modern Mythology 1680-1860, ed. and 
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subordinated the autonomous value of art to narrowly utilitarian ends. Schelling rebuked 
Heyne, for example, for having interpreted Homer’s epics in this fashion, writing that 
“Die innere Geistlosigkeit einer solchen Vorstellung überhebt uns aller Widerlegung 
derselben. Es ist, möchte man sagen, die gröbste Art, das Poetische des Homeros zu 
zerstören. Das Gepräge einer solchen gemeinen Absichtlichkeit wird man an keiner Spur 
seiner Werke erkennen.”58 
 Indeed, Romantics like Schelling and A.W. Schlegel, a doting student of Heyne in 
Göttingen,59 much more doggedly pursued the simple but innovative vision of mythology 
proposed by the novelist-philosopher-proto-psychologist, Karl Philipp Moritz (1756-
1793). In his Götterlehre: oder mythologische Dichtungen der Alten (1791), Moritz had 
written that to reduce the myths of the ancients to mere didactic allegories “ist ein eben so 
thörichtes Unternehmen, als wenn man diese Dichtungen durch allerlei gezwungene 
Erklärungen in lauter wahre Geschichte zu verwandeln sucht.”60 He observes, in point of 
fact, that the myths of the Greeks avoid conceptions of eternity and infinity in favor of a 
cosmogony of limitation, definition, and generation. The gods of the Greeks avoid 
eternity and omnipresence and link themselves instead to history, albeit the “dunkle 
                                                           
58 SW V, 409. The work of Heyne in question is his “De origine et causis fabularum Homericarum,” in 
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addition to compiling the index to Heyne’s edition of Virgil. On Schlegel’s relation to Heyne, see Achim 
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Geschichte der Vorwelt.”61 Hovering thus on the edges of primeval time, they avail 
themselves of the reality of history and cannot be deemed a “leeres Traumbild,” a “bloßes 
Spiel des Witzes,” or “bloße Allegorie.”62 Nor, however, do they purport to be historical 
tales. Instead, Moritz writes, they are to be read “grade so […] wie sie sind, und soviel 
wie möglich mit einem Ueberblick das Ganze zu betrachten.”63 They are a “Sprache der 
Phantasie,” or, as we might gloss this: art. Echoing the principles of his classicist 
aesthetic ideal of autonomous art,64 Moritz writes of myth as a hermetic world fashioned 
according to the dictates of the beautiful: 
 Ein wahres Kunstwerk, eine schöne Dichtung ist etwas in sich Fertiges und Vollendetes,  
das um  sein selbst willen da ist, und dessen Werth in ihm selber, und in dem  
wohlgeordneten Verhältniß seiner Theile liegt […]. Alles, was eine schöne Dichtung 
bedeutet, liegt ja in ihr selber; sie spiegelt in ihrem grossen oder kleinen Umfange, die 
Verhältnisse der Dinge, das Leben und die Schicksale der Menschen ab; sie lehrt auch 
Lebensweisheit […]. Aber alles dieses ist den dichterischen Schönheiten untergeordnet, 
und nicht der Hauptendzweck der Poesie; denn  eben darum lehrt sie besser, weil 
Lehren nicht ihr Zweck ist; weil die Lehre selbst sich dem Schönen unterordnet, und 
dadurch Anmuth und Reiz gewinnt.65 
 
Whereas Enlightened intellectuals like Fontenelle, Hume, and Gottsched had conceived 
of myth as what appeared to the Romantics to be an attenuated poetry, devoid of realism, 
Moritz viewed myth as a lavishly, fantastical aesthetic world: its whole raison d’être lay 
in the realm of the aesthetic, and notions of aetiology quickly lost their currency. Indeed, 
Moritz regarded beauty as its own sufficient reason. 
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 This conception exerted a profound influence on the myth theory of the 
Romantics, above all on that of Schelling. We see this most clearly in his lectures on the 
Philosophie der Kunst, which, despite never being published by Schelling, still constitute 
his most extensive treatment of myth from the time of his collaboration with the 
Romantics in Jena. Schelling’s philosophy of art during this period emanates from his so-
called Identitätsphilosophie, a philosophical approach that attempted at once to balance 
the objective realism of Spinoza’s monism and the subjective idealism of Fichte’s first 
principle of self-consciousness or reflection. Via Schelling’s monist ontology of the 
Absolute, this philosophy found expression in a new first principle of identity: the reality 
of nature, namely, is identical to the ideality of spirit; each just happens to represent a 
different perspective of the Absolute. Art fulfills a crucial epistemological role in this 
philosophical system that reflects the role it had been assigned in the work, for example, 
of Hölderlin and F. Schlegel; that is, it provides an intuition of the absolute the likes of 
which lies beyond the means of philosophical reason. Philosophy, according to Schelling, 
aims to demonstrate the identity of the real and the ideal, but can do so only through 
means of an internal, subjective, intellectual intuition; art, on the other hand, renders 
comprehensible in objective form the identity of nature’s reality and the spirit’s ideality. 
Thus, as Douglas Stott writes of Schelling’s aesthetics, “in art the philosopher finds 
revealed objectively that which grounds his entire system, namely, the absolute itself, or 
absolute identity, and art is granted an expressly revelatory function.”66  
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 Within Schelling’s aesthetics, myth occupies a special place, the significance of 
which is evident when approached from the triadic structure upon which his 
Identitätsphilosophie rests. Schelling’s system of identity rests not just on the apparent 
dualism of the reality of nature and the ideality of spirit; that apparent dualism is 
subsumed by the indifference of their union in the absolute. As Schelling lays out his 
system, this triadic structure unfolds in further series of potencies: nature in its reality 
consists of matter (real), light (ideal), and their indifferent union in the organism; spirit in 
its ideality consists of knowledge (real), action (ideal), and their indifferent union in art; 
the absolute consists of truth (real), goodness (ideal), and their indifferent union in 
beauty. Schelling applies the triadic structure to art, as well, insofar as he conceives of art 
as the composite of three modes of representation: the schematic (real), the allegorical 
(ideal), and their indifferent union in the symbolic. According to Schelling’s definitions, 
schematism refers to the mode of representation in which the particular is intuited in the 
universal; allegory refers to the mode of representation in which the universal is intuited 
in the particular; and symbolism refers to the mode of representation in which the two 
have been synthesized as one.  
 Schelling believed that Moritz’s system of mythology accounted for precisely this 
synthesis of the schematic and the allegorical — the unity, that is, of the universal in the 
particular, and the particular in the universal. Moritz, after all, had underscored the 
character of the Greek gods as defined by limitation and historicity, all the while arguing 
that the mythological sphere constituted a world unto itself, an absolutized realm of 
fantasy in which the gods acted. Schelling adopted this conception of mythology, but 
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argued for it not from the perspective of the myths themselves, but rather by deducing the 
myths as the inevitable necessity of art’s function within the absolute. He arrives at this 
conclusion by means of a philosophical analogy from the perspective of the ideality of 
spirit: “Die besonderen Dinge, sofern sie in ihrer Besonderheit absolut, sofern sie also als 
Besondere zugleich Universa sind, heißen Ideen.”67 Given Schelling’s principle of 
identity, the same proposition can likewise be viewed from the perspective of the real; 
but in that case, where in nature would we locate the particular things that are absolute in 
their particularity? Here Schelling alights on the gods: “Dieselben Ineinsbildungen des 
Allgemeinen und Besonderen [...] sind real betrachtet Götter. Denn das Wesen, das An-
Sich von ihnen = Gott. Ideen sind sie nur, inwiefern sie Gott in besonderer Form. Jede 
Idee ist also = Gott, aber ein besonderer Gott.”68 The collective totality of the gods, i.e. 
the entirety of the mythology, thus represents in objective form the absolute. As Schelling 
writes, “Die Götter bilden nothwendig unter sich wieder eine Totalität, eine Welt […]. 
Demnach bilden sie nothwendig unter sich wieder eine Welt, worin alles durcheinander 
wechselseitig bestimmt ist, ein organisches Ganzes, eine Totalität, eine Welt.”69 In stark 
contrast to the theories of mythology propagated by the likes of Fontenelle, Hume, 
Heyne, or other Enlightenment philosophes, Schelling thus proposes a thesis that would 
derive mythology as a necessary aesthetic category from the perspective of his 
Identitätsphilosophie. Hardly a pedagogical tool characteristic of primitive peoples, myth 
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gains credence as a supremely privileged dimension of art itself, since only via its 
synthesis of schematism and allegory does the absolute reveal itself. 
 Schelling was not alone in rejecting the notion of myth as fable and constructing a 
framework within which its essence was seen as constitutive of nature itself. A.W. 
Schlegel, who by no means was a philosopher of Schelling’s caliber, arrived at a similar 
conclusion in his own discipline of philology. In response to Hume’s writing on religion 
and myth, for example, Schlegel remarked with some cheek, “Hume hat eine natürliche 
Geschichte der Religionen geschrieben: ich wollte, es schriebe einmal einer eine religiöse 
Geschichte davon.”70 A.W. Schlegel’s own theory of myth first emerged in his 
Vorlesungen über Philosophische Kunstlehre (1798-1799) in Jena, which in point of fact 
show the traces of Heyne, his teacher in Göttingen. Schlegel even explains the origins of 
myth on the basis of early human beings’ limited cognitive ability, just as Heyne had.71 
But by the time he delivered a similar course of lectures in Berlin, just a few years later, 
Schlegel began to echo Moritz by depicting myth as an intermediate act of the organ of 
Fantasie. First, he writes, the human subject performs a real, undeliberate (unabsichtlich) 
act of Fantasie when it posits its own existence as well as that of an external nature. Last, 
the human subject performs an ideal, deliberate (absichtlich) act of Fantasie when it 
creates art. Myth falls precisely between these two acts of Fantasie: like the initial act, it 
proceeds undeliberately in its assignation of agency to nature and thus may be deemed 
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“real”; yet in as much as it personifies nature, myth engages in the process of artistic 
creation and thus resembles art’s “idealism.”72 We thus see that Schlegel foreshadows 
Schelling’s own concept of mythology, according to which the union of the real and ideal 
is revealed objectively in art, while likewise reiterating the statements of his brother’s 
Rede über die Mythologie, in which the new mythology was likewise theorized as a union 
of the real and ideal.  
 Recent studies of Romantic and idealist philosophy have furnished exquisitely 
nuanced interpretations of this drive toward harmonizing the real and the ideal in the 
work of figures like Hölderlin, Schelling, Novalis, and F. Schlegel. Indeed, the central 
thrust of Beiser’s tome on German Idealism aims to correct the longstanding scholarly 
misperception that there may be assumed from an initial enthusiasm for Fichte a general 
infatuation with the subjectivity of idealism.73 Along these lines, we have now begun to 
glimpse that the impulse toward establishing a counterweight to the predominance of 
idealist philosophy led the Romantics first of all to privilege the revelatory power of 
mythic art over the discursive power of philosophy and, second, to refute what appeared 
to be the Enlightenment’s tendency toward divesting art of its reality. The latter of these 
tenets, in particular, would influence the style of artistic criticism that would eventually 
locate in the Commedia the ideal model of Romantic myth. A.W. Schlegel, for example, 
who states quite expressly that “nicht alles fabelhafte [gehört] zur Mythologie,” since 
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myths “sind Dichtungen, die ihrer Natur nach auf Realität Anspruch machten,”74 would 
repeatedly denigrate the mythic epics of poets like Milton and Klopstock on precisely 
these grounds. The realization of a mythology would inevitably fail, Schlegel writes, 
“wenn bloß allegorische Personen, denen es ganz an individueller Wahrheit fehlt, als 
mythische Wesen handelnd eingeführt werden.”75  
The Utopianism of Romanticism 
A caveat is in order: the present focus on the Romantics’ realism ought not discount their 
simultaneous allegiance to the legacy of idealism. Their cultivation of realism, after all, 
was an attempt to harmonize the philosophies of subjectivity and objectivity in the new 
mythology. It just happens that, as Beiser has demonstrated so well, scholarship has 
ceded disproportionate attention to the influence of Fichte and the philosophy of 
subjectivism since Rudolf Haym’s landmark study, Die romantische Schule (1870). But 
there is another sense, too, of course, in which we might speak of the idealism of the 
Romantic project of the new mythology; indeed, from this bird’s eye view it is crucial to 
observe that the ideals of a social utopianism impelled the project of a new mythology 
just as strongly as the heady philosophical discourses in Jena’s lecture halls. For the new 
mythology was conceived as a salve for what the Romantics perceived to be the 
increasing fragmentation of European social life. Granting the new mythology’s ability to 
transcend the limits of philosophical reason, we want to ask now what practical  
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implications it carried. What were the social and political dimensions of the new 
mythology? 
 One of the primary goals the Romantics hoped to achieve with the creation of the 
new mythology involved a reversal of what they regarded as the Enlightenment’s 
deleterious effects on European religious sensibility. To be sure, no matter how many 
contemporary scholars and critics misguidedly scold Novalis for his Christenheit essay, 
the Romantics in Jena by no means sought to revive a medieval Christianity. In general, 
they were less interested in the particulars of a doctrinal system than they were in 
reconstituting the intellectual parameters that would sanction the legitimacy of any 
religion at all. This kind of game-changing intellectual maneuver is precisely what F. 
Schlegel believed to have found in Schleiermacher’s speeches on religion, which, by 
redefining the essence of religion as Anschauung des Universums, had preempted the 
Kantian strictures imposed on reason. The new mythology bore on this rehabilitation of 
religion inasmuch as it provided for a symbolic intuition of the universe in the form of 
art. Indeed, if mythology could provide for a religious praxis centered on the intuition of 
nature, it would mitigate the deepest and most longstanding division that plagued 
humankind: namely, the division between the objective realm of nature and the subjective 
sphere of human existence. 
 In his novel Die Lehrlinge zu Sais (1798), Novalis depicted this disunity in a 
splendidly simple fairy-tale: there once lived a youth named Hyacinth who conversed 
with the trees, the flowers, and the animals of his home. Shortly after he fell in love with 
Rosenblütchen, who requited his love, Hyacinth received a visit from a longbearded 
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foreigner who gave him a mysterious book. From then on, Hyacinth lost interest in 
Rosenblütchen and left home in a form of self-inflicted exile. His wandering continued 
until he met a woman who burned his book and enjoined him to find the goddess Isis. 
When Hyacinth eventually located Isis and pulled back the veil that covered her, 
Rosenblütchen fell into his lap, their love was rekindled, and Hyacinth enjoyed a reunion 
with nature. The tale illustrates what the characters in the frame narrative of the 
philosophical novel reason about discursively: that there was once a unity between 
humankind and nature, but through the introduction of scientific knowledge, this unity 
was shattered. One of the novel’s characters illuminates the gist of the scientific fallacy 
when he explains that it has reduced nature to an “einförmigen Maschine, ohne Vorzeit 
und Zukunft […]”; proceeding as if nature were external to history, they treat it as if “sie 
keinen Geist hätte […].”76 In the context of the rapid growth of vitalism and 
Naturphilosophie, these remarks clearly take aim at the Enlightenment’s mechanistic 
conceptions of nature and hold them at least partially responsible for thwarting the 
eventual reconciliation of nature and humankind. Indeed, the same scientists are later 
described as “Scheidekünstler” and “tote Menschen” whose interest in nature extends 
only so far as they can exercise power over it.77  
 Like Hyacinth, who rediscovered an edenic union with nature, humanity too will 
one day overcome its alienation from nature, Novalis suggests. But whereas Hyacinth’s 
quest took the path of theistic religion — in finding the goddess, the exiled man found his 
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way back to the peace of the primordial idyll — Novalis knew well that the 
Enlightenment had all but precluded the possibility of reenchantment via traditional 
religion: any hope for a restoration of paradise would have to be accomplished by poetry. 
The proposition that humanity would be saved by a “großen gemeinschaftlichen 
Entschluß,”78 asserted early in the novel, is refined by its end, when a sage explains that 
such salvation must occur in the sphere of poetry. Poets alone “haben es gefühlt, was die 
Natur den Menschen sein kann [...]. Alles finden sie in der Natur. Ihnen allein bleibt die 
Seele derselben nicht fremd, und sie suchen in ihrem Umgang alle Seligkeiten der 
goldnen Zeit nicht umsonst.”79 Along these lines, when in the novel there is talk of 
“Verkündiger der Natur” and the gospels that they would generate,80 Novalis no doubt 
has in mind Lessing’s prediction of the coming of a new gospel, as well as his and F. 
Schlegel’s plans to write a new Bible — plans that fall under the conceptual umbrella of 
the new mythology.81 
 The Romantic conviction in the socially transformative power of poetic myth thus 
hinges in no small measure on the myth that humankind once enjoyed a unity with nature 
that processes of Enlightenment have long since sundered. The myth of a so-called 
golden age, ubiquitous in the poetic and theoretical work of Novalis,82  constitutes one of 
the core narratives of myth itself, according to Mircea Eliade, who writes that myth is 
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predicated upon the narration of sacred history that occurred in illud tempus, the 
primordial age when human beings communicated directly with the natural and celestial 
spheres.83 To the extent that myth seeks to recall and reinstantiate this form of primordial 
unity, according to Eliade, it operates as a curative endeavor on par in the twentieth 
century with psychoanalysis, which in its attempt to “rebirth” the patient from the 
moment of childhood strives for an essentially analogous result.84  
 It would be a mistake to judge the Romantics so sanguine (and naïve) as to expect 
the imminent advent of a new golden age. As Hans-Joachim Mähl has shown, the 
anticipatory expressions of a Novalis, which could so easily be confused for a form of 
messianism, are in point of fact only a rhetorical strategy predicated upon the view that 
progress toward a utopian ideal demands the fervor of apodictic language.85 In much the 
same way, the work on a mythic poetry among figures like Novalis and F. Schlegel was 
undertaken not with the real expectation that it would usher in a new golden age, but with 
the hope that it would hasten the real changes required of moving toward such a goal. 
Specifically, they believed that such a poetics would assuage the cultural atomization 
wrought by enlightened absolutism and democratic revolution, the two opposing poles of 
eighteenth-century political life that had laid waste to social harmony. While the French 
Revolution had once roused the excitement of the Romantics, by the end of the 
eighteenth century, its aftermath had prompted Novalis to compare the dissolution of 
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monarchies to the rubble left behind by a collapsing mountain.86 The status quo of the 
ancien régime, however, was no cheery alternative. More than any other state, Novalis 
wrote, Prussia was governed like a mechanized factory (Fabrik), the human cogs of 
which had been stuck together by the old paste of mutual self-interest.8788 Like his 
intellectual idol, Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), who in the Briefe über die ästhetische 
Erziehung (1795) had prescribed art as a remedy for the barbarism of the Revolution, 
Novalis understood his and other poets’ roles as pedagogical in nature, poetic in form. 
“Wir sind auf einer Mißion,” he wrote, “zur Bildung der Erde sind wir berufen.”89 
Implicit in the mission of Bildung was the forging of genuine human bonds through 
poetry, as Novalis would write in Blüthenstaub: “Die Menschenwelt ist das 
gemeinschaftliche Organ der Götter. Poesie vereinigt sie, wie uns.”90  
 Neither in the critique of a mechanistic state nor in the conviction that poetry 
might save it was Novalis alone. The anonymously written Ältestes Systemprogramm des 
deutschen Idealismus, drafted in the years just before the school in Jena coalesced, 
heralded a new mythology precisely as a means of transforming what seemed to be a de 
facto machine-state. In contrast to Novalis, however, who yearned for a constitutional 
monarchy governed by love, the author of the Systemprogramm had envisioned a 
radically different scenario: the abolition of the state itself. Since the state belongs not to 
the realm of nature or ideas, he wrote, but is generated instead by Menschenwerk, it 
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necessarily treats human beings as cogs in a system. “Denn jeder Staat muß freie 
Menschen als mechanisches Räderwerk behandeln; und das soll er nicht; also soll er 
aufhören.” Whereas the mechanism of the state cannot sustain, let alone generate, 
genuine human community, the author asserts that beauty can and consequently 
designates poetry rather than philosophy the “Lehrerin der Menschheit.” This view leads 
to what the author confesses is a rather bold proposition: 
wir müssen eine neue Mythologie haben, diese Mythologie aber muß im Dienste der 
Ideen stehen, sie muß eine Mythologie der Vernunft werden. Ehe wir die Ideen ästhetisch, 
d. h. mythologisch machen, haben sie für das Volk kein Interesse; und umgekehrt, ehe die 
Mythologie vernünftig ist, muß sich der Philosoph ihrer schämen. So müssen endlich 
Aufgeklärte und Unaufgeklärte sich die Hand reichen, die Mythologie muß philosophisch 
werden und das Volk vernünftig, und die Philosophie muß mythologisch werden, um die 
Philosophen sinnlich zu machen. Dann herrscht ewige Einheit unter uns. Nimmer der 
verachtende Blick, nimmer das blinde Zittern des Volks vor seinen Weisen und Priestern. 
Dann erst erwartet uns gleiche Ausbildung aller Kräfte, des Einzelnen sowohl als aller 
Individuen. Keine Kraft wird mehr unterdrückt werden. Dann herrscht allgemeine 
Freiheit und Gleichheit der Geister! – Ein höherer Geist, vom Himmel gesandt, muß 
diese neue Religion unter uns stiften, sie wird das letzte, größte Werk der Menschheit 
sein.91 
 
Mythology, in other words, is a more effective instrument for achieving the education of 
the Volk than Enlightenment philosophy itself.  
 But if an intervention into the sphere of aesthetic practice like the one proposed 
by the Systemprogramm were to provide for the conditions of a unified and democratic 
equality, artists would require a common mythology in the first place. This posed no 
small problem, the Romantics thought, because the spiritual-intellectual heritage of 
modern German poetry was every bit as splintered as the hundreds of German 
principalities that littered central Europe. F. Schlegel diagnosed the affair in his Rede 
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über die Mythologie, in which Ludoviko articulates the lacuna common to modern poetic 
production: 
 Ihr müßt es oft im Dichten gefühlt haben, daß es Euch an einem festen Halt für Euer  
 Wirken gebrach, an einem mütterlichen Boden, einem Himmel, einer lebendigen Luft.  
Aus dem Innern herausarbeiten das alles muß der moderne Dichter, und viele haben es 
herrlich getan, aber bis jetzt nur jeder allein, jedes Werk wie eine neue Schöpfung von 
vorn an aus Nichts. Ich gehe gleich zum Ziel. Es fehlt, behaupte ich, unsrer Poesie an 
einem Mittelpunkt, wie es die Mythologie für die der Alten war, und alles Wesentliche, 
worin die moderne Dichtkunst der antiken nachsteht, läßt sich in die Worte 
zusammenfassen: Wir haben keine Mythologie. Aber setze ich hinzu, wir sind nahe daran 
eine zu erhalten, oder vielmehr es wird Zeit, daß wir ernsthaft dazu mitwirken sollen, 
eine hervorzubringen.92 
 
The lack of a Mittelpunkt, a common “motherly ground,” entailed consequences for the 
composition of modern poetry, Schlegel believed. In the vision of modernity sketched by 
Ludoviko, each and every poet’s endeavors arose not from a common intellectual, 
spiritual, or mental heritage, but rather from the ego itself, such that what he refers to as 
“unsrer Poesie” is linked not so much to an uns as to an aggregate of discrete ichs.  
 Even before his transformation from classicist to Romantic, Schlegel had 
lamented this fractured ground of modern poetry. His essay Über das Studium der 
griechischen Poesie (1795-97) had delineated the riven character of modern poetry as it 
compared to what he saw as the cohesion of classical Greek poetry. Indeed, in the 
Studiumaufsatz he had written that modern poetry hardly reveals “etwas Gemeinsames,” 
let alone a “befriedigende Einheit.”93 There prevails, instead, what Schlegel characterizes 
as a “rastlose unersättliche Streben nach dem Neuen, Piquanten und Frappanten, bei dem 
dennoch die Sehnsucht unbefriedigt bleibt.”94 Despite the positive shifts in Schlegel’s 
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estimation of modern, Romantic poetry between the time of this essay and the Gespräch 
über die Poesie, he persisted in his view that poets’ quest for union with the absolute and 
with each other would benefit should it spring from a common fount rather than a 
scattered mess of disparate intellects. As Schlegel writes in the introduction to the 
Gespräch über die Poesie, the poet will first make progress on his quest for union with 
the absolute “wenn er den Mittelpunkt gefunden hat, durch Mitteilung mit denen die ihn 
gleichfalls von einer andern Seite auf eine andre Weise gefunden haben. Die Liebe bedarf 
der Gegenliebe. Ja für den wahren Dichter kann selbst das Verkehr mit denen, die nur auf 
der bunten Oberfläche spielen, heilsam und lehrreich sein. Er ist ein geselliges Wesen.”95 
In addition to the philosophical harmony of the real and the ideal, there lay at the heart of 
Schlegel’s vision for the new mythology, in other words, the vision of a social-aesthetic 
harmony. 
 It is perhaps now more than ever a mystery that Dante’s Commedia should have 
been an integral piece in what we have just outlined as the Romantic project of a new 
mythology. What did a profoundly Catholic and quintessentially medieval poem have to 
do with the new gospel evangelized by Spinoza’s devotees? Why would a group of 
Romantics, who railed against the absolutism of the ancien régime, embrace a poem 
whose author gleefully prophesied the advent of a new world order based in Rome? To 
be sure, these aspects of the Commedia were not lost on its Romantic readers; they hardly 
could be, given that they formed the basis of the poem’s tepid reception in the French and 
German Enlightenment. But with the turn toward a radical aestheticism, as well as a new 
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historicism that relativized the peculiarities of Dante, the Romantics discovered in the 
poem a work amenable to the new, revelatory character they had begun to ascribe to 
poetry. In the remainder of this dissertation, I will argue that the Romantics believed that 
in Dante’s Commedia they had located an exemplary model for the means by which they 
might transform the tenets of Fichte’s idealism and Spinoza’s realism into an objective 
artwork, a new mythology, that would simultaneously outstrip the limitations of 
philosophical reason and provide for a new source of cultural-poetic currency.  
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2 
 
Discovering Dante and Theorizing Myth:  
The Schlegel Brothers and the Origins of the New Mythology 
 
 
Une Divinité Cachée 
 
Vous voulez connaître le Dante. Les Italiens l’appellent divin; mais c’est une divinité 
cachée: peu de gens entendent ses oracles; il a des commentateurs, c’est peut-être encore 
une raison de plus pour n’être pas compris. Sa réputation s’affermira toujours, parce 
qu’on ne le lit guère. Il y a de lui une vingtaine de traits qu’on sait par coeur: cela suffit 
pour s’èpargner la peine d’examiner le reste.96  
 
Voltaire’s assessment of Dante, which in the same sentence both registers his towering 
reputation and undermines its foundation, bespeaks the generally contested position of 
the Italian poet and his Commedia in Neo-Classical literary culture of the eighteenth 
century. To be sure, even if the remark was intended pejoratively (it was),97 Voltaire did 
not err in labeling Dante une divinité cachée — particularly from the vantage point of 
German-speaking Europe.98 Translated into German for the first time in 1559, Dante 
attained early notoriety in German lands as a forerunner of Luther by virtue of his Latin 
treatise on universal monarchy, De Monarchia, which vociferously denounced the 
legitimacy of the papacy’s interventions in the operation of temporal government.99 The 
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Commedia, on the other hand, garnered attention only slowly over the course of the 
German eighteenth century.100 For the better part of the century, in fact, it was deemed a 
Gothic monstrosity due to its violation of the standards of French taste as propagated by 
the likes of Boileau, Voltaire, and the literary dictator of Leipzig, Johann Christoph 
Gottsched.101  
Against Dante’s various detractors, the Swiss critic Johann Jakob Bodmer — who 
had already polemicized on behalf of Milton’s Paradise Lost — launched a defense of 
the Commedia in essays and remarks scattered between 1749 and 1763.102 To those who 
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Heinrich Brockes in which he even wrote a strophe mocking Dante’s apparent simplemindedness: “Zwar 
Dantes stellet uns des Ditis Hofstadt dar, / Und schreibt ein langes Werk von der Verdammten Plagen: / 
Alleine, wird man nur der Einfalt recht gewahr, / So müssen wir dabey mehr lachen, als verzagen.” I quote 
here from Emil Sulger-Gebing, “Dante in der deutschen Litteratur des XVIII. Jahrhunderts,” Zeitschrift für 
vergleichende Litteraturgeschichte 9:6 (1896), 470. Sulger-Gebing summarizes Dante’s meaning for 
Gottsched himself: “Gottscheds ganzer Richtung auf das Nüchterne und Verstandesgemässe war Dantes 
Dichtung diametral entgegengesetzt, und so können wir uns nicht wundern, dass er dem grossen Florentiner 
keine Sympathie und nur widerwillig die dürftigste Anerkennung, in erster Linie für seine Verdienste um 
die Sprache […] entgegenbrachte […],” 470.  Another critic, Johann Nicolaus Meinhard, marvels over the 
heights of Dante’s genius, yet criticizes him for the “größten Ungereimtheiten” and the “frostigsten und 
niedrigsten Einfällen” to which he at times sinks. Meinard’s explanation for this discrepancy relies on a 
Gottschedian argument: Dante’s imagination, he writes, “bleibt nicht immer gleich gespannt, sie sinkt 
bisweilen desto tiefer, je höher sie vorher gestiegen war, wenn sie nicht durch die Kunst und durch Regeln 
unterstützt wird. Außerdem kann sie (Dante’s imagination) sich sehr wohl mit einem Verstand gatten, der 
von den Vorurtheilen und dem falschen Geschmacke eines barbarischen Jahrhunderts angesteckt ist; und 
dieses war der Fall, in welchem sich Dante befand.” Meinhard, Versuche über den Charakter und die 
Werke der besten Italiänischen Dichter (Braunschweig: 1774), 23.  
102 Bodmer makes two major statements on Dante. The first comes in letter twenty-nine of the Neue 
critische Briefe über ganz verschiedenen Sachen (Zürich: Orell, 1749). The second is his essay “Über das 
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would disparage the poem for not having been written “in unsere[r] Denkensart,” Bodmer 
prescribed a dose of historicism: after all, the critics who dismiss the Commedia on such 
grounds are the same ones who presuppose their times to be “die aufgeklärtesten und 
gründlichsten […].”103 Indeed, Bodmer argues, a condescending assurance of their own 
intellectual superiority leads critics to apply contemporary standards of taste and morals 
to vastly different peoples and ages, as if the principles of French Neo-Classicism 
obtained universally. Precisely this myopic outlook, according to Bodmer, resulted in the 
judgment that “übler Geschmack” and “gotische Kühnheit” reigned supreme in the 
Commedia.104 Oddly enough, he writes, critics deemed Dante a sort of naïve genius, but 
since his poem did not display the principles of a classical arrangement, “es beleidigte 
alle Regeln die zum mechanischen Baue eines Gedichtes gegeben worden.”105  
This dynamic is evident even in the fervent but episodic Sturm und Drang 
reception of Dante. Johann Heinrich Füssli (1741-1825) illustrated scenes from the poem, 
while the dramatist Heinrich Wilhelm von Gerstenberg (1737-1823) adapted Dante’s 
grisly Ugolino material into a tragedy of the same name (1768). Bodmer, too, though no 
proponent of the Sturm und Drang, incorporated the tale of Ugolino into his drama Der 
Hungerthurm zu Pisa (1769), a heroic drama written to counter what seemed to him a 
glut of sentimental literature. And later, Josef Alois Gleich (1772-1841), an Austrian 
dramatist, and Casimir Boehlendorff (1775-1825), a friend of Friedrich Hölderlin, would 
                                                                                                                                                                               
dreyfache Gedicht des Dante,” published most recently in Schriften zur Literatur, ed. Volker Meid 
(Stuttgart: Reclam, 1980), 283-293. This was originally published in “Freymüthige Nachrichten von Neuen 
Büchern, und andern zur Gelehrtheit gehörigen Sachen,” 20. Jahrgang 1763, pp. 268-270, 276-278. 
103 Bodmer, “Über das dreyfache Gedicht des Dante,” Schriften zur Literatur, 283. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., 284. 
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write dramas based on the very same Ugolino material. Above all, however, these 
episodic approaches to the Commedia — which limited themselves almost exclusively to 
adaptations of Inferno 5 and Inferno 33 — seemed to reinforce the already prevalent 
assumption that Dante’s genius, stifled by the weight of his Gothic edifice, sparkled only 
intermittently in moments of the most intense pathos. 
Bodmer’s earlier defense of the Commedia, however, indicates what would be a 
decisive juncture in eighteenth-century aesthetics, indeed one so fundamental that it 
would transform the opprobrium apportioned to the Commedia as well as to many other 
foreign works into enthusiastic approbation. The juncture to which I refer is the 
emergence in the 1760s and 1770s of a radical historicism, the effect of which relativized 
what once seemed to be the infallible and universally valid aesthetic judgments 
authorized by the Rationalism of Gottsched and his school. It was precisely this 
historicism that enabled Herder, in his essay Über Shakespeare (1773), for example, to 
rely on cultural and anthropological arguments in order to legitimate the excellence of the 
Bard’s decidedly un-Aristotelian dramas.106 Published together with Herder’s 
Shakespeare essay was another famous salvo, Goethe’s Von deutscher Baukunst, which is 
unusually illuminating in highlighting the stakes of the Commedia’s entry into German 
arts and letters in the final quarter of the eighteenth century. Goethe describes there the 
initial experience of encountering the Strasbourg Cathedral, a Gothic monument whose 
connotations in 1773 will have borne striking similarities to those associated with Dante’s 
                                                           
106 On the rise of German historicism, and in particular of Herder’s involvement with the development of 
anthropology, see Frederick Beiser, The German Historicist Tradition (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011).  
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famously architectonic poem. I would like to emphasize what he identifies as the 
prejudices of his taste upon visiting the church: 
Als ich das erstemal nach dem Münster ging, hatt ich den Kopf voll allgemeiner 
Erkenntnis guten Geschmacks. Auf Hörensagen ehrt ich die Harmonie der Massen, die 
Reinheit der Formen, war ein abgesagter Feind der verworrnen Willkürlichkeiten 
gotischer Verzierungen. Unter die Rubrik gotisch, gleich dem Artikel eines Wörterbuchs, 
häufte ich alle synonymische Mißverständnisse, die mir von Unbestimmtem, 
Ungeordnetem, Unnatürlichem, Zusammengestoppeltem, Aufgeflicktem, Überladenem 
jemals durch den Kopf gezogen waren. Nicht gescheiter als ein Volk, das die ganze 
fremde Welt barbarisch nennt, hieß alles gotisch, was nicht in mein System paßte, von 
dem gedrechselten, bunten Puppen- und Bilderwerk an, womit unsre bürgerliche 
Edelleute ihre Häuser schmücken, bis zu den ernsten Resten der älteren deutschen 
Baukunst, über die ich, auf Anlaß einiger abenteuerlichen Schnörkel, in den allgemeinen 
Gesang stimmte: »Ganz von Zierat erdrückt!« und so graute mir's im Gehen vorm 
Anblick eines mißgeformten krausborstigen Ungeheuers. 
This account, in which Goethe admits he understood the Gothic not so much as an 
historically informed heuristic but as a generic placeholder for everything that “nicht in 
mein System paßte,” indicates the manner in which generally a-historical prejudices 
underwrote the Rationalist criticisms leveled at works like the Commedia. Telling, too, is 
Goethe’s confession that the aversion to anything so foreign as the Gothic necessarily 
rendered it barbarisch. This term, as we have already seen from Meinhard’s remarks,107 
was among the most common pejoratives used to criticize Dante’s poem.108 In an early 
statement, even Friedrich Schlegel described the medieval period at large as “das große 
barbarische Intermezzo, welches den Zwischenraum zwischen der antiken und der 
modernen Bildung anfüllt.”109 If the Commedia were to find a thoughtful reception 
among German readers of the eighteenth century, therefore, its stewards would have to 
                                                           
107 See note 101 above. 
108 Before having been convinced of its beauty, even Friedrich Schlegel described the Commedia as 
beholden to the “gotischen Begriffen des Barbaren.” See below, p. 70. 
109 KFSA I, 235. 
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span the seemingly unbridgeable gap into the “barbarism” of the middle ages and make 
Dante compelling for readers and critics in eighteenth-century Europe.110    
Making Dante Modern 
As a student in Göttingen (1786-1791), A.W. Schlegel undertook the most sympathetic 
assessment of Dante in German since Bodmer.111 There he met the historian of Romantic 
literature, Friedrich Bouterwek (1766-1828), studied under the tutelage of Gottfried 
August Bürger (1747-1794), a Sturm und Drang poet and revolutionary, and cultivated 
careful scholarly habits under the mentorship of Christian Gottlob Heyne (1729-1812), 
the classicist whose historicism paved the way from the Enlightenment’s interest in fable 
to the nineteenth century’s study of myth.112 Exploiting his teachers’ turn to historicism, 
                                                           
110 Edith Höltenschmidt makes the important observation that, even if F. Schlegel once regarded the middle 
ages as a “barbarisches Intermezzo” between ancient and modern literature, he did not identify Dante with 
either of the two streams of poetry he described as local to the middle ages, namely the heroic poetry of the 
north or the fantastical poetry of the south: “Von den beiden mittelalterlichen Literaturbereichen nordischer 
und südlicher bzw. romanischer Prägung wird indirekt Dante ausgeschlossen […]. Mit der Dominanz des 
Verstandes über die ursprüngliche Phantasie komme in Dante das im Christentum angelegte, bewußt 
lenkende Kunstprinzip der Moderne vollends zum Durchbruch, welches in der vorangegangenen, 
überwiegend naturpoetischen Literatur des Mittelalters erst spurenweise vorhanden gewesen sei.” See 
Höltenschmidt, Die Mittelalter-Rezeption der Brüder Schlegel (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000),  281.   
111 In fairness, Johann Nikolaus Meinhard had written Versuche über den Charakter und die Werke der 
besten italiänischen Dichter (1763). But, it reiterated many of the same criticisms that had come from the 
Commedia's Enlightened critics. Schlegel in fact dismisses Meinhard's work, writing of it to Schiller in 
Dante's own words: “Non ragioniam di lor, ma guarda e passa!” (Let's not speak of them, but look and pass 
by)! See his letter to Schiller in Schiller, Nationalausgabe, ed. Günter Schulz (Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus 
Nachfolger, 1943-1998), Bd. 35, 215 (June 4, 1795). Friedrich Schlegel, in his 1792 review of Bürger’s 
Akademie der schönen Redekünste, would criticize his brother’s dismissive attitude toward Meinhard’s 
work.  
112 A helpful account of Schlegel's years in Göttingen can be found in Stefanie Roth, “Der Einfluß des 
Göttinger Neuhumanismus und der Universität auf die frühromantische Bewegung,” in Romantik in 
Niedersachsen: Der Beitrag des protestantischen Nordens zur Entstehung der literarischen Romantik in 
Deutschland, ed. Silvio Vietta (Hildesheim, Zürich, New York: Georg Olms, 1986): 148-151. See likewise 
the excellent account of Achim Hölter, “August Wilhelm Schlegels Göttinger Mentoren,” in Der Europäer 
August Wilhelm Schlegel: Romantischer Kulturtransfer — romantische Wissenschaften, ed. York-Gothart 
Mix and Jochen Strobel (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 13-29. Hölter explains that Bouterwek, despite his 
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it was Schlegel who bridged the gap between the fourteenth and the eighteenth centuries 
and managed once and for all to popularize Dante.113 Instead of perpetuating the image of 
a poet hindered by the circumstances of his barbaric age, Schlegel freely acknowledged 
the barbarism of the fourteenth century while analogizing it to the barbarism of the 
eighteenth century. After all, Europe ca. 1790 no longer looked like le meilleur des 
mondes possibiles, as the Rationalist credo would have it; in fact, it looked conspicuously 
similar to a world mired in Guelph-Ghibelline factionalism. Rather than represent Dante 
as the victim of an age so foreign as to be barbaric, therefore, Schlegel depicted Dante’s 
century as so similar to his own that Dante could not but be regarded as an exemplary 
model for contemporary poets. It was not the affective intensity of the Sturm und Drang, 
therefore, that effected the comprehensive appraisal of the Commedia in the German 
nineteenth century, but rather this historical contextualization by means of which A.W. 
Schlegel both familiarized his readers with the poem and asserted its contemporaneity. 
Ernst Behler’s assessment that A.W. Schlegel’s study of the Commedia shifted interest 
“from the political, theological, and historical aspects of the work to its poetry and poetic 
structure”114 is true, in other words, but only because Schlegel himself had enabled an 
aesthetic reception by arguing in the first place on behalf of the contemporaneity of the 
“political, theological, and historical aspects of the work.”  
                                                                                                                                                                               
similarities to Schlegel, exerted very little impact on the writings of A.W. Schlegel, whose later lecture 
cycles made him a competitor of Bouterwek (20).  
113 For another discussion of Schlegel’s historicism, particularly vis-à-vis the Dante reception and his 
studies with Heyne, see Höltenschmidt, 15ff. She writes that the historicist approach to literary texts in 
Schlegel culminates, however, “in die Zirkularität gegenseitiger, unreflektierter Ableitung von Literatur 
und Historie [...], welche in einem idealisierten Geschichtsverständnis wurzelt [...].” 
114 Behler, “Dante in Germany,” Dante Encyclopedia, 266. 
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 Schlegel’s major early contribution to Dante studies was an essay that appeared in 
the third volume of Gottfried Bürger’s Akademie der schönen Redekünste (1791). Here 
he aims to popularize a poet who, having been burned on a pyre of moral and aesthetic 
rules, had been the victim of an auto-da-fé.115 The metaphor of the auto-da-fé bears 
mentioning in that it marks Dante first of all as an aesthetic heretic, a figure whose 
poetry, like Shakespeare’s dramas, contravened the rules of the French. It likewise 
confers upon Dante and his poetry an air of the sacred. He is a holy figure, Schlegel 
implies, whose genius earned for him only the condemnation of the Pharisees of 
eighteenth-century Rationalism. In an attempt to preempt their criticisms, Schlegel 
himself acknowledges the poet’s foreignness by adopting the very pejoratives they had 
employed: “In unserm Zeitalter ist Dante selbst seinen Landsleuten […] wenig bekannt. 
Seine Dunkelheit wird ihnen immer undurchdringlicher, seine Sprache fremder, der 
männliche Klang seiner Verse rauher und barbarischer.”116 To compensate for this 
distance, indeed to render the barbarian ring of his verses more intelligible, Schlegel 
explains that readers must “einen Zug seiner Grösse in sich [übertragen].”117 The critical 
apparatus required of such a translation would be provided by Schlegel himself, who 
drawing on the principles of Heyne’s and Herder’s historicism, would illuminate the 
“Dunkelheit” of Dante. The ensuing essay, therefore, in addition to providing an 
informative overview of medieval Italian politics and culture, employs this historical  
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frame to suggest the relevance of Dante to contemporary intersections of art and 
politics.118 
 Schlegel’s historical sketch operates on two valences, for the apparently 
straightforward account of medieval Italy demands to be read reflexively as a 
commentary on the radical troubles facing Europe at the close of the eighteenth century. 
In this respect, Schlegel’s historical sensitivity does more than contextualize a foreign 
poem: it functions as a mode of cultural translation, spanning a gap of some five centuries 
and enabling Schlegel to portray Dante as a poet with something urgent to convey to 
Revolutionary Europe. What clues us in to the double valence of Schlegel’s 
historiography is the bold comparison he draws between medieval and modern Europe.119 
“So voller Barbarei, Ausschweifungen, und Greuel das Jahrhundert war, worin er [Dante] 
lebte, so steh ich doch nicht an, es dem jetzigen weit vorzuziehen.”120 Writing in 1790-
1791, one can imagine that the medieval Barbarei, Ausschweifungen, and Greuel of 
which Schlegel writes represent favorable alternatives to the more violent affairs of 
revolutionary France. If, as Goethe had written, Gothic barbarism were reducible to all 
that which “nicht in mein System paßte,” the Barbarey of the Revolution denoted 
                                                           
118 Ulrike Schenk-Lenzen has written of Schlegel’s historicist approach to Dante as an effort to fulfill the 
conviction that there need be a critical maneuver undertaken in order to render Dante intelligible to his 
readers. Schenk-Lenzen regards this historicism as enabling a “Metamorphose des Geistes” that transports 
readers to Dante’s own century. While I share Schenk-Lenzen’s basic point, I would suggest that the 
historicism works in the opposite direction: namely, Schlegel’s introduction to the Commedia renders its 
poet modern, rather than its reader medieval. The historiographical parallelisms that Schlegel constructs 
between 14th-century Florence and contemporary Europe seem to bear this out. See Schenk-Lenzen, Das 
ungleiche Verhältnis von Kunst und Kritik: Zur Literaturkritik August Wilhelm Schlegels (Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 1991), 251ff.    
119 As a point of comparison, for example, one might consider Novalis’s Die Christenheit, oder Europa, 
another Romantic account of medieval Europe, that is almost diametrically opposed to Schlegel’s reading 
in this essay.  
120 AWSW III, 201. 
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something entirely less innocuous. Indeed, only four years after Schlegel’s Dante essay 
appeared, his friend and mentor, Schiller, would famously employ the term Barbarey to 
describe the ultra-principled but deplorably inhumane aristocracy of revolutionary 
France.121 In Schlegel’s case, the barbarism of the eighteenth century likely refers to the 
violence of the revolutionaries themselves, which Schlegel, as we know from his 
correspondence with his brother, regarded most disapprovingly.122  
 Several details emerge in Schlegel’s panorama of late-medieval Europe to suggest 
correspondences with modern Europe, but none more suggestive than the observation that 
Italy found itself the victim of eternal feuds: “Es war dort nur eine ewige Wuth Aller 
gegen Alle.”123 The “blinde Wuth der Faktionen,” he writes, led to bitter strife between 
several parties, such that nobles and commoners fought against each other, while even the 
sexes opposed one another.124 The specter of the Revolution looms large over these lines, 
                                                           
121 Schiller, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (1795). 
122 A.W. Schlegel’s position toward the French Revolution must be reconstructed from Friedrich Schlegel’s 
letters to his brother. In a letter of August 26th, 1791, Friedrich acknowledges that A.W. Schlegel would 
like for him to read Reflections on the Revolution in France by Edmund Burke, one of the most stalwart 
opponents of the Revolution (KFSA XXIII, 23). In a letter from November 24th, 1793, amidst 
Robespierre’s Reign of Terror, Friedrich writes not without a hint of sarcasm to his brother, “Mit Rührung 
verehre ich Deine edle Menschlichkeit, die <die kleinste> Gewaltthätigkeit verabscheut, sie mag im Namen 
der Ordnung oder im Namen der Freyheit verübt werden; aber ungern sehe ich daß Dein Haß gegen die 
Franken Dich unbillig macht, daß alle Theilnahme, die Du einem großen Volke zu schenken hast, einige 
bittre Spöttereyen sind” (KFSA XXIII, 161). Otto Brandt, accounting for A.W. Schlegel’s later comments 
on the Revolution, summarizes in the following way: “August Wilhelm Schlegel ist unter den Romantikern 
zuerst und am lautesten als Gegner der französischen Revolution ausgetreten. Ehe noch mit Adam Müller 
und Arnim der romantische Ansturm gegen die revolutionären Erscheinungen begann, früher als seine 
nächsten romantischen Freunde hat er erkannt, welch tiefe Kluft sich zwischen der französischen 
Bewegung und den erwachenden politischen Ideen und Idealen der Romantik auftat.” Otto Brandt, August 
Wilhelm Schlegel: Der Romantiker und die Politik (Stuttgart and Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1919), 
36.   
123 AWSW III, 201. 
124 Ibid., 203. Such observations would find famous poetic expression in Goethe’s Unterhaltungen 
deutscher Ausgewanderten, published, incidentally, together with Schlegel’s translations of and comments 
on Dante’s Inferno in Die Horen (1795).  
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with Schlegel writing that despite its myriad problems, life in medieval Europe would 
have been preferable to life in contemporary Europe. The reason for this, he thinks, 
depends on one’s perspective. For even though mired in feuds, “damals konnte die 
Nation noch alles werden [...]. Jetzt ist sie gewesen, was sie werden konnte.”125 When in 
hindsight Schlegel surveys the landscape of eighteenth-century Europe, he determines 
that the factionalism of Dante’s age simply never abated. On the contrary, it had 
intensified so aggressively as to prevent Schlegel from regarding his own age as the 
beginning of a new one, deeming it instead an age in which historical enmity had merely 
become integral to the status quo.126  
 Schlegel’s account of Dante’s Italy draws readers’ attention to the lack of a single 
political head, and in so doing, constructs another vital parallel for his German-speaking 
contemporaries: “Das Ansehen der Kaiser galt nichts mehr, und doch gab es sonst kein 
Oberhaupt, welches Macht gehabt hätte, die trotzige Städte zu einem Ganzen zusammen 
zu ordnen und sie ihre Freiheit ertragen zu lehren. Herrenlos war das Land und fast jeder 
kleine Theil desselben von mannichfaltiger Unterdrückung gequält.”127 More than just 
echoing the central thesis of Dante’s political worldview, namely that a single imperial 
                                                           
125 Ibid., 201. Friedrich Schlegel wrote a review of Bürger’s journal in 1792 for the Jenaische Allgemeine 
Literaturzeitung and quoted this line from his brother’s essay. He too draws attention to the analogy 
between medieval Europe and Revolutionary Europe. 
126 In his Berlin lectures on Romantic poetry, Schlegel gives an overview of medieval life in which he alters 
and idealizes the notion of the medieval feud. No longer does factionalism mark the middle ages as 
barbaric, instead, it concentrates itself in the form of the individual feud and finds expression in honorable, 
hand-to-hand combat: “Da man gegen die verwandten Waffenbrüder durch die Fehde doch eigentlich nur 
sein Recht suchte, wollte man es auch auf eine rechtmäßige Art thun, die Hinterlist wurde ausgeschlossen, 
man kämpfte offen, mit gleichen Waffen und Mitteln. So reducirte sich die Fehde allmählich auf den 
Zweykampf, dieser bekam eine gesetzliche Sanction und wurde unter dem Vorsitz des Lehnsherrn nach 
gewissen Veranstaltungen gehalten.” See KAV, II/1, 76.  
127 AWSW III, 203.  
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ruler could achieve unity and peace, Schlegel raises a point that invites readers to think 
reflexively about medieval Italy. Just months before Mainz would be sacked by the 
French, and not long before the Holy Roman Empire itself would collapse after a 
millennium’s reign, Schlegel’s historical observations did more than diagnose the 
precariousness of medieval political life; they indirectly referenced the unsettling 
divisions among Germans in the face of the French Revolution and its aftermath. Conflict 
between Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa had precluded any grand dreams of pan-
Germanic unity and exacerbated strife between Prussia and the Empire. The former’s 
francophilic inclinations, moreover, represented an indignity to German patriots. The 
monarchs’ deaths, in 1786 and 1780 respectively, blew gaps in German governance while 
the reigns of their successors, Frederick II and Joseph II, despite favorable Enlightenment 
policies, culminated in little more than disappointment over their inefficacy. In the final 
analysis, Germans’ political reality was largely shaped by a scattered host of minor 
princes and governors. Thus when Schlegel adds that none of the Italians “wusste, ob er 
ein Vaterland habe,” he bespeaks a sentiment common to eighteenth-century Germans, 
and one that would find resonance among other Romantics.128 After all, in his notorious 
essay Die Christenheit, oder Europa (1799), Novalis would call attention to the very 
same deficiency in contemporary political governance, though by making precisely the 
opposite claim about the medieval period.129  
                                                           
128 Ibid., 204. 
129 Schriften III, 507: “Es waren schöne glänzende Zeiten, wo Europa ein christliches Land war, wo Eine 
Christenheit diesen menschlich gestalteten Welttheil bewohnte; Ein großes gemeinschaftliches Interesse 
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 Having sufficiently demonstrated the turmoil linking Dante’s age to his own, 
Schlegel prepares to articulate that which his contemporaries stand to learn from a poet 
who had otherwise appeared impossibly foreign. He does this by sketching the cultural 
landscape of the fourteenth century and censuring the abstract, apolitical erudition of 
medieval scholasticism and contrasting it with contemporaneous art forms that celebrated 
action. This is nowhere more evident than in the distinction Schlegel draws between 
medieval men of the book and medieval men of action. The “speculierenden Köpfe” of 
Dante’s age, he writes, busied themselves “in einer aus vorigen Zeiten herabgeerbten 
Erstarrung zum Theil mit vielem Scharfsinn, zum Theil auch durch bloße platte 
Pedanterei sich selbst gefangen. Nichts wusste man von allem, was nützlich ist zu wissen, 
und bekümmerte sich auch nicht darum.”130 Against the background of internecine feuds, 
when the “romantische Geist ritterlicher Abenteuer” was emerging, these poindexters of 
the ivory tower twiddled their thumbs in Erstarrung and Pedanterei, not wanting to 
engage in “was nützlich ist zu wissen.”131 Amidst this scholastic culture of Aristotle’s 
admirers, however, there arose a form of poetry “bedewed by the sweat of praiseworthy 
deeds” — the Minnesang of the Provençal troubadours.132 Unmistakable in the contrast 
between scholastic and knightly literature is a judgment that suggests that intellectual 
production not rooted in the affairs of lived experience is to be dismissed as pedantry.133 
Minnesang, of course, did not belong to the sphere of political rhetoric, but its origins in a 
                                                           
130 AWSW III, 204-205. 
131 Ibid., 203. 
132 Ibid., 206. 
133 The rise of knightly culture becomes crucial to Schlegel’s later historiography of the Middle Ages. In 
the Vorlesungen über die romantische Literatur (1803-04), he enthuses over Germans’ knightly heritage 
and undertakes an astonishing defense of religious warfare. See for example KAV, II/1, 72-73. 
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vernacular courtly culture that prized action and love were significant inasmuch as those 
values demarcated it from the otherwise abstruse, Latin learning of medieval literati. The 
discussion of Minnesang and its attendant status as loosely political art foreground 
Schlegel’s estimation of Dante’s poetry. This estimation culminates in a portrait of Dante 
that is best understood in light of his remarks on the tension between the middle ages’ 
tempestuous politics and pedantic erudition. Schlegel writes the following: 
 Es ist das Siegel menschlicher Vortrefflichkeit, unabhängig zu sein vom Schicksal: Dante  
war’s. Weder Druck, noch Leiden, noch Unruhe und Ungewissheit des äußern Zustandes 
machten seine Seele irre in ihrem Thun. Gewöhnlich leiden große Menschen viel, und 
selten läßt sich bestimmen, in wie fern das Schicksal sie zu der Würde erzog, oder nur die 
in ihnen ruhende Größe entwickelte und ihnen Stoff zum Wirken gab. Dieß ist auch der 
Fall beym Dante. Wir wissen nicht, welch ein Gedicht, er hervorgebracht haben würde, 
hätte er in Ruhe und in Wohlstand seines Lebens genossen; das, welches er in der 
Verbannung geschrieben hat, ist göttlich. Ihm sank der Muth nicht zu einer so 
umfassenden Unternehmung, die das angestrengteste Nachdenken vieler Jahre forderte, 
und er führte sie zu Ende mit einer Ueberlegenheit, daß alle Werke seiner Zeitgenoßen, 
nicht nur in Italien, sondern in ganz Europa, wie Mißgeburten oder Zwerggestalten 
daneben  stehen. Drang der Sorgen verjagt alle Ruhmbegierde aus den Herzen kühner, 
aber nicht ausdauernder Menschen; bei ihm zog sie sich mehr in’s Innere zurück und 
wurzelte tiefer in sein Dasein. Er wandte sich von den Lebenden weg an die Nachwelt. 
Nicht geachtet zu werden, war für ihn ein Sporn, seinen Werth darzuthun: ihm ahndete, 
und ihm durfte es ahnden, er werde einst vor denen, die damals in ihrer kleinen Größe 
prunkten, aus dem Dunkel hervorleuchten. — Und wenn man nun liest, wie er von 
Mächtigen und Geringen, von Lebenden und Todten so frei, so niederwerfend stark die 
Wahrheit sagt, und dann bedenkt: der, welcher so redet, war seiner bürgerlichen Existenz 
beraubt, ohne die im damaligen Italien eben so wenig als im alten Griechenlande 
Wohlstand des Lebens Statt fand; war unstät, abhängig und beinah zum Betteln 
verdammt; wer muß sich nicht mit Ehrfurcht neigen vor seinem Bilde, nicht weil es eines 
Denkers oder Dichters, sondern weil es eines Mannes Bild ist?134  
 
In this magnificent panegyric, which asserts Dante’s having transcended the hardships of 
his fate by exploiting them to cultivate his innate talent, Schlegel suggests Dante as a 
model for achieving greatness in the face of almost unimaginable adversity. The 
Commedia, he writes, cannot be conceived independently of Dante’s exile and his 
concomitant longing for esteem. Robbed of his “bürgerlichen Existenz,” and damned to 
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“begging,” Dante composed it not primarily as a Denker or as a Dichter, but as a Mann. 
With this observation, Schlegel echoes his earlier remark on the “männlichen Klang” of 
Dante’s verse and insists on manliness and action as prerequisites of aesthetic success.135 
Indeed, the insistence on Dante’s manliness enables Schlegel to distinguish the poetry of 
a man of action from the writing of those who “in ihrer kleinen Größe prunkten.”136 In 
contrast to the pedants whom Schlegel had excoriated for their useless learning — among 
whom, by way of anachronism, one is tempted to include the Rationalists and Neo-
Classicists of the eighteenth century — Dante wrote a poem whose germ consisted of real 
experience. Whereas at the beginning of the essay Schlegel had acknowledged critics’ 
confusion over Dante’s “Dunkelheit,” he now points to Dante as a poet who knew he 
would one day “aus dem Dunkel hervorleuchten.” Dante, while not a poet of the 
Enlightenment, is nonetheless a luminary. Clearly, Schlegel’s essay neither espouses nor 
criticizes the particulars of contemporary policy. And yet its political import is 
unmistakable: in censuring the barbarism of contemporary Europe and suggesting that 
good art bears the capacity to transcend and perhaps even transform such barbarism, 
Schlegel anticipates the imminent programs of Weimar Classicism and Jena 
Romanticism.   
                                                           
135 Ibid., 200. 
136 In his Vorlesungen über die romantische Poesie, Schlegel again marvels over the manliness of medieval 
men, particularly that of German knights. He claims that they and their horses were bigger and stronger 
than men (and horses) of the eighteenth century (“sie waren ihnen in Wahrheit durch Muth, wackre 
Gesinnungen, Stärke, ja selbst an edler schöner Gestalt und an Leibesgröße unendlich überlegen”). Here, 
though, there is no attempt to link the manliness of medieval men with the composition of poetry. See KAV 
II/1, 74-75. 
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The venue in which Schlegel published this initial Dante essay, which deems 
experience a sine qua non for the production of good poetry, further attests to the timely 
political valences of the essay. Gottfried Bürger, Schlegel’s professor, friend, and the 
publisher of the Akademie der schönen Redekünste, so vocally criticized absolutism and 
supported the Revolution that he earned a public scolding.137 The Akademie itself, 
established in 1789 and published for the first time in 1790, functioned as an organ of 
German patriotism.138 And in the very same edition of the Akademie in which Schlegel 
published his essay on Dante, Bürger published an anonymous piece on translation that 
satirized the Germans’ inactivity and irrelevance as poets and scholars.139 The 
anonymous author of the essay, which bears the unwieldy title “Panegyrikus oder 
flüchtige Standrede zu Ehren der wohllöbl. Uebersetzergenossenschaft im heil. röm. 
deutschen Reiche,” jokes that Germany’s excellent translators maintained Germans’ 
humility by not presupposing that they could write any books that would actually surpass 
the quality of those that they translated. Indeed, herein lies the sharpness of German 
translators, the author says, for whereas  
der Selbstdenker und Erfinder handelt maschinenmäßig [...] der Uebersetzer, der mit 
jeder Zeile eine Probe seines mannhaften Fleisses giebt, zeigt sich eben dadurch als ein 
edleres, freieres, selbständigeres Wesen, und giebt den Unerfahrnen eine Weisung, wie 
                                                           
137 On Bürger’s political radicality, see Walter Grab, “Gottfried August Bürger als literarischer Wegbereiter 
und politischer Weggefährte des deutschen Jakobinismus,” in Gottfried August Bürger (1747-1794): 
Beiträge der Tagung zu seinem 200. Todestag, ed. Wolfgang Beutin and Thomas Bütow (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 1994), 9-23. In his Romantische Schule (1833), Heine famously wrote of Bürger: “Der 
Name Bürger ist im Deutschen gleichbedeutend mit dem Wort citoyen.” See Heine, Historisch-kritische 
Gesamtausgabe der Werke, ed. Manfred Windfuhr (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1979), Bd. 8/1, 170. 
138 Bürger's dedicatory poem prays to the goddess of song that, though it has not happened yet, she be 
dignified by the German Volk in the way that she has been by the Greeks, Romans, British, and French. See 
Akademie der Schönen Redekünste 1:1 (1790), ll. 1-3.  
139 The essay was attributed to “Xy” on the journal's title page.  
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man zur Vortrefflichkeit kommen kann auf dem kürzesten, gemächlichsten und 
sichersten Wege.140 
  
In this respect, “die deutsche Nation ist unter allen Nationen der Welt die einzige, die 
sich selbst den untersten Platz zuerkennt, wenn die Rede ist von Rangstreit. Bei ihr allein 
ist Nationaldemuth zu finden.”141 Lampooning the notion that translation displays “manly 
industriousness,” the author, like Schlegel, implies that German writing lacks the 
manliness characteristic of foreign writers for whom patriotism or political action play a 
role. This, then, is the context in which Schlegel’s first essay on Dante — and the first 
truly significant German essay on Dante at all — is to be read. In his introduction to the 
German reading public, and in a pivotal publication for a founding member of the Jena 
Frühromantik, Dante represented the ideal of a man whose trying life blossomed into a 
celestial poem.    
Allegory and Theology in the Commedia 
Schlegel’s essay on Dante, written at just the point when he moved from Göttingen to 
Amsterdam, reflects the lasting influence of his university professors while 
simultaneously signaling a step that would distinguish him as a scholar in his own right. 
If the spirit of Bürger’s activism infused the text with its political tone, and Heyne’s 
historical sensitivity lent nuance to its methodology, it was above all Schlegel’s selection 
of the Commedia itself and interpretation of it that distinguished him from his forebears 
                                                           
140 Akademie der Schönen Redekünste 1:3 (1791): 329-331. 
141 Ibid., 330. 
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and paved a way for him to move forward with his career.142 Indeed, the influence of 
Bürger, in particular, grew especially problematic after Schiller wrote a damning review 
of his poetry in the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung of 1791. His view that Bürger failed to 
idealize his poetry properly, in effect that he wrote too idiosyncratically,143 was echoed 
later by Schlegel’s impressionable brother, Friedrich, who saw in Bürger an impediment 
to A.W. Schlegel’s success. Thus in December of 1793, F. Schlegel explained to A.W. 
Schlegel, after a lengthy diatribe against Bürger’s poetry, that “Seit Du Car.[oline] 
liebtest, und wie Du nachher den Dante kennen lerntest, stieg Dein Geschmack zu einer 
Höhe, die B.[ürger] vielleicht nicht zu begreifen fähig ist. [...] Dein Eifer gegen Schiller 
gründet sich auf die Furcht, er möchte schaden. Sey sicher, er ist noch viel zu gut!”144 
The irony in Friedrich’s statement, of course, is that such rancor would fester between 
himself and Schiller in 1796 that Schiller would disavow the Schlegels entirely; not, 
however, before A.W. Schlegel could publish a series of translations and commentary on 
Dante’s Inferno in Schiller’s short-lived but eminent journal, Die Horen (1795-1797).  
 Schlegel’s 1791 essay laid the groundwork for the series of four translations and 
commentaries on the Inferno that would be published in Schiller’s Horen in 1795.145 An  
uncharacteristic fit for the otherwise classicist journal,146 these publications — spurred by 
Gottfried Körner’s effusive praise of Schlegel’s Dante essay for Bürger147 — were 
                                                           
142 Though never completed, Schlegel had planned throughout the 1790s to write and publish an entire 
book on Dante. On this, see Oskar Walzel, “Wilhelm Schlegel und Georg Joachim Göschen,” in Prager 
Deutsche Studien 9 (1908), 125-147. 
143 Schiller, Allgemeine Literaturzeitung 14 (1791): 105-110. 
144 KFSA XXIII, 166. December 11, 1793. 
145 Schlegel would likewise translate and comment on excerpts from the Purgatorio and Paradiso between 
1795 and 1797. These publications included less commentary and appeared in Beckers Taschenbuch zum 
geselligen Vergnügen. They appear in AWSW III. 
 
 
 
60 
received with what was perhaps a surprising measure of acclaim.148 Schiller’s publisher, 
J.F. Cotta, despite certain reservations regarding the translations, deemed the contribution 
a “Meisterstük.”149 Herder, who had read the Commedia twice on his own, still found 
Schlegel’s commentary to be both illuminating and enthralling. He commended Schiller 
for its publication:  
Mit größestem Dank empfangen Euer Wohlgeb. Die Schlegelsche Schrift über Dante 
anbei zurück. Sie ist der Horen auf alle Weise werth; nicht nur die Verse sind sehr wohl 
gearbeitet; [...] und der literarische sowohl als kritische Blick auf das Gedicht selbst ist in 
hohem Grad belehrend. Es thut mir weh, daß das Mscr. zu Ende war, und ich bitte, dem 
Verfasser auch von mir [...] zu danken, und ihm um die Fortsetzung des Werks zu bitten. 
Ich habe den Dante im Italienischen 2mal gelesen, und bekenne gern, daß mir einige 
Illustrationen neu waren.150  
 
Schiller, too, offered lavish praise for Schlegel’s contributions on Dante, noting that 
Schlegel had given him “ein zu entschiedenes Verdienst um den glücklichen Fortgang 
dieses Journals, als dass ich Ihnen nicht den verbindlichsten Dank dafür sagen sollte.”151 
It is possible that Schiller’s kind words sprang from the relief of having acquired a 
publication with which to pad his journal, as F. Schlegel seemed to suggest to his 
brother.152 Indeed, Friedrich Schlegel, despite appreciating certain portions of his 
brother’s commentary, found the overall quality marred by Schiller’s decision to release 
                                                                                                                                                                               
146 In its first year of publication, Die Horen included Schiller’s letters on aesthetic education, Goethe’s 
Literarischer Sanscülottismus, Heinrich Meyer’s Ideen zu einer künftigen Geschichte der Kunst, and a bevy 
of other texts that seemed to announce the advent of Weimar Classicism. 
147 Schiller, Nationalausgabe, Bd. 35, 108-109 (December 12, 1794). Körner writes of Schlegel’s 1791 
essay: “Vorzügliche Stellen sind metrisch übersetzt, das übrige im Auszuge, mit einem historisch-
philosophischen Commentar, der sich durch Geist und Kunstgefühl auszeichnet. In der Uebersetzung ist 
besonders der Ton des Ganzen sehr gut gelungen.” 
148 Körner, for example, informs Schiller that Schlegel ought to be very pleased with the “günstige 
Aufnahme” of his work, particularly because its initial appearance in Bürger’s journal attracted very little 
attention. See ibid., 151 (February 16, 1795). 
149 Ibid., 175 (March 20, 1795). 
150 Ibid., 145-146 (February 4, 1795).  
151 Ibid., Bd. 27, 194. 
152 See F. Schlegel’s letter to his brother. KFSA XXIII, 246 (August 17, 1795). 
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the work in four separate runs.153 Friedrich intimated, moreover, that his older brother 
ought to find new material: “Darf ich fragen ob Du ausser dem Dante schon eine 
bestimmte Arbeit unter den Händen hast?”154 Generally, Friedrich supported and 
encouraged his brother’s translation of the Commedia, but the commentary in the Horen 
seems to have disappointed him.155 Wilhelm von Humboldt found Schlegel’s Dante 
ultimately pedestrian, though better than the texts with which it was published: “Die 
Unterhaltungen [deutscher Ausgewanderten] mißfallen durchaus und total […] Der Dante 
gefällt nur mittelmäßig, Herder gar nicht.”156 The attention Schlegel devoted to the 
Ugolino episode, however, earned special praise from Humboldt.157 And Klopstock, who 
by 1795 was an aging poet of yesteryear, boasted in curmudgeonly fashion that he had 
known Dante “seit langer Zeit, vielleicht vor Schl.[egels] Geburt.”158 
 While Schlegel’s new interpretive approaches to the Commedia lacked the same 
political valence of the earlier Dante essay, their critical approach was nonetheless rooted 
in that essay’s preliminary outline of the poetic principles of the Commedia. Indeed, 
already in the essay for Bürger, Schlegel had outlined a paradigm for reading Dante that 
                                                           
153 Ibid. 
154 KFSA XXIII, 247 (August 17, 1795).  
155 Friedrich likewise admonishes A.W. Schlegel: “Vor einigen Jahren glaube ich schrieb ich Dir nach nach 
Amsterdam: 'Concentrire Dich'. Damals hatte das keine Bedeutung. Jetzt ist es ein Wort zu seiner Zeit. 
Zerstreue Dich nicht in Lektüre, in litterarischen Kleinigkeiten. Thue Dir Gewalt an.” Ibid. 
156 Humboldt, in Schiller, Nationalausgabe, Bd. 35, 250 (July 17, 1795).  
157 Ibid., 341 (September 14, 1795).  
158 Klopstock, Werke und Briefe, ed. Horst Gronemeyer et al. (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 
1974—), Briefe, Bd. 9.1, 186 (November 18, 1797). While Klopstock displays some knowledge of Dante, 
joking to Böttiger, for example, that Dante’s Latin resembled Kant’s German, he seems to have been 
thwarted by Dante’s language, writing to Böttiger that he usually could not understand Dante. This is 
attested in a much earlier letter Klopstock had sent to Bodmer, in which he wrote “Wie sehr wünschte ich, 
dass Ihr Freund den Dante übersetzte. Ich habe schon lange ein grosses Verlangen gehabt diesen Poeten zu 
lesen.” Ibid., Briefe I, 51 (June 7, 1749).   
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would render him uniquely suited to the Romantic project of a new mythology as 
formulated at the end of the century. Alighting on a word that would be important to F. 
Schlegel, A.W. Schlegel described the Commedia as a “Hieroglyphe,” an artwork 
constructed in such manifestly reverent fashion that even its tremendous age and 
interpretive riddles could not entirely obscure its sacred quality.159 Schlegel writes that 
the poem bears an allegorical dimension that invites readers “nachdenkend zu verweilen, 
wie vor einem bedeutenden Bilde, in dessen Zusammensetzung etwas räthselhaftes zu 
liegen scheint.”160 Vital to this particular conception of the Commedia as both sacred and 
cryptically multivalent was Schlegel’s exposition of a letter that Dante had written to his 
patron, Can Grande della Scala, in which the poet explained the means with which the 
poem was to be interpreted.161 In that letter, Dante writes that the Commedia ought to be 
considered “polysemous, that is, having several senses. For the first sense is that which is 
contained in the letter, while there is another which is called allegorical, or moral or 
anagogical […]. And although these mystical senses are called by various names, they 
may all be called allegorical, since they are all different from the literal or historical.”162 
Referencing the quadruplex sensus of scripture, Dante interpolates his poem in a tradition 
                                                           
159 AWSW III, 225. A.W. Schlegel again uses this term as a descriptor for the verbal and visual signs of the 
Commedia in his 1799 essay Ueber Zeichnungen zu Gedichten und John Flaxmans Umriße. See AWSW 
IX, 114. 
160 Ibid., 225. 
161 In his Vorlesungen über die romantische Poesie (1803-1804), Schlegel insists on the authenticity of the 
letter. See KAV II/1, 150. The matter of the letter’s authenticity has engendered heated debate among 
medievalists and Dantisti. See e.g. Peter Dronke, Dante and Medieval Latin Traditions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986) and Robert Hollander, Dante’s Epistle to Can Grande (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1993). The latter, citing the argument of the former against the authenticity 
of the epistle, writes cheekily: “Not one to be defeated by the evidence, Dronke twists it to his purpose” 
(48). 
162 Dante to Can Grande, trans. Robert S. Haller, Literary Criticism of Dante Alighieri (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1973), 99.  
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of Christian biblical exegesis that dated back at least to Origen in the third century and 
that flourished in the medieval Latin theological tradition. He presents himself, however, 
not as an interpreter; instead, his claim suggests that his poem — inasmuch as it may be 
read according to scripture’s four senses — matches the Bible in the depth of its powers 
of signification. This assertion, taken together with Dante’s claims to be a divinely 
commissioned scribe in the poem itself (Paradiso 10.27), undoubtedly contributed to 
Schlegel’s notion that the Commedia was like a sacred hieroglyph. In the 1791 essay, 
however, Schlegel’s response to the poem as Polysensuum is one of bemused 
ambivalence. For on the one hand, when it is “unmittelbar gefühlt,” the profound allegory 
gives readers something over which to marvel. On the other hand, Schlegel blanches at 
the thought of being tasked with laying bare something so monstrously inscrutable. Thus, 
after explaining the nature of allegory in the Commedia, he reasserts the poem’s 
hieroglyphic nature in arguing that it would be “vergeblich […] eine so geheimnisvolle 
Symbolik ergründen zu wollen.”163 
 The inscrutability of the poem’s allegory — specifically, the sheer inability to 
fathom the particular referents of each and every allegorical representation — does not 
hinder Schlegel from evaluating allegory as one of the figural devices of the poem. In 
fact, he suggests that the manner in which Dante employs allegory constitutes at least part 
of what distinguishes him from lesser poets. For in the case of many writers, their use of 
                                                           
163 AWSW III, 226. Despite their hesitancy to decode the allegorical referents of the Commedia, and indeed 
their acknowledgment of the literal valence of the poem, Schlegel and his brother would become targets of 
Hegel’s scorn for what he deemed their overly allegorizing reading of poetry in general, and of Dante in 
particular. See Hegel’s comments on F. Schlegel, allegory, and Dante in the Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, 
in Werke, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969-1971), XIII, 404-
405. 
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allegory unintentionally reduced characters to “marklosen Schatten,” robbing them of 
their fictive power in a narrative. “Ein nackter Verstandesbegriff hat für die Fantasie 
weder Leben noch Schönheit,” Schlegel says.164 In order to maintain both the allegorical 
and the historical dimensions of a poem, Schlegel explains, the Verstandesbegriff must 
“sich in eine sinnliche Gestalt verlieren, und nur so wie die menschliche Seele im Körper 
durchschimmern.”165 Indeed, Schlegel writes, most poets fail so miserably at managing 
the Versinnlichung of the Verstandesbegriff that the palpable tension between literal and 
allegorical levels interrupts readers as a constant irritant. Dante’s ability to avoid 
precisely this dilemma marks the genius of the Commedia’s allegory. His characters, 
though allegorical, have a solid existence (Bestandheit) independent of their symbolic 
meaning. The historical tactility of the poem thus allows Schlegel to describe the reading 
experience as one of walking “überall auf festen Boden, umgeben von einer Welt der 
Wirklichkeit und des individuellen Seins.”166 As an example, Schlegel cites Virgil as a 
personification of earthly wisdom who simultaneously functions in a personal capacity as 
the first-century, Roman poet.  
 Schlegel’s remarks on the allegory of the Commedia are important in two 
respects. First of all, inasmuch as Schlegel’s reading both accommodates and lends 
credence to the literal dimension of Dante’s text, it signifies nothing less than a decisive 
turning point in the history of the exegesis of the Commedia. For since the appearance of 
the earliest trecento commentaries, the literal sense of the Commedia, as Robert 
                                                           
164 AWSW III, 226. 
165 Ibid. 
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Hollander notes, had been dismissed as a poetic shell, the purpose of which had been to 
furnish an allegorical understanding of the poem.167 Hollander, who deems “the 
misprision of that argument […] the single most negative force hindering the 
development of Dante studies,” identifies Erich Auerbach’s devotion to the historical 
sense of the text the driving force behind the modern reevaluation of the poem’s 
allegorical depth, particularly in the dantismo of the Singletonian school.168 Yet what 
Hollander does not note is Auerbach’s indebtedness to the by no means simplistic 
readings of the Romantic school, beginning with those by A.W. Schlegel.169 When, in a 
seminal monograph like Dante als Dichter der irdischen Welt (1929), Auerbach asserts 
his cardinal interpretive gesture to be the observation that Dante has fixed the individual, 
earthly-historical character of the souls in the Commedia for eternity, we would do well 
to remember that A.W. Schlegel — and Schelling, after him — had repeatedly 
emphasized the real, historical texture and richness of the poem’s characters.170 Evidence 
                                                           
167 Robert Hollander, “Dante and his commentators,” in The Cambridge Companion to Dante, ed. Rachel 
Jacoff (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 229. 
168 Ibid., 234.  
169 One of the factors preventing a legitimate reappraisal of Romantic readings of the Commedia is the 
presupposition that Romantic readings are largely undifferentiated. Hollander, for example, writes the 
following: “What Dante knew best how to portray, for [Romantic readers of the Commedia], was the 
passion of suffering. It would be foolish to claim that this vision of the Commedia is entirely incorrect; 
rather, one would better claim that the great Romantic reading of the poem seized the foreground and put it 
against another backdrop, as though Francesca, Pier delle Vigne, Ulysses […], and Ugolino were characters 
in a text by Goethe at his stormiest. The ‘professional’ dantista may decry the Romantic reading (and I will 
surely join in the chorus); however, all of us who deal professionally with the poet ought to realize that, in a 
real sense, we owe our jobs to the Romantic recovery of his work” (232). Hollander’s assessment certainly 
applies to a great number of Dante’s readers, but as this dissertation has set out to show, there are other 
narratives to be found within the Romantic reception of the Commedia. 
170 Erich Auerbach, Dante als Dichter der irdischen Welt (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1969 (1929)), 108. In 
Auerbach’s own words: “Dante hat einen ganz besonderen Schauplatz für seine Darstellung gewählt, der 
ihm und ihm als erstem, wie wir oben gesagt haben, ganz neue Möglichkeiten des Ausdrucks eröffnete. 
Gestützt auf die höchsten Autoritäten der Vernunft und des Glaubens, wagte es sein dichterischer Genius 
zu unternehmen, was noch keiner vor ihm gewagt hatte: die gesamte irdisch-historische Welt, die zu seiner 
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of Auerbach’s own debt to these readings ought to be no secret. After all, it was in his 
1929 inaugural lecture in Marburg that he discussed the “Entdeckung Dantes in der 
Romantik.”171  
 The second reason for the significance of A.W. Schlegel’s discussion of Dante’s 
representational technique has more narrowly to do with the Romantic project of a new 
mythology. Quite simply, the technique of symbolism that Schlegel identified as inherent 
to Dante’s mode of signification became a crucial component in the poetic theory of the 
Romantics’ new mythology.172 To be clear, this symbolism ought not be understood as 
pointedly different from allegory;173 instead, as Schlegel uses it, symbolism refers to a 
broad representational practice whereby a range of poetic images is used to articulate a 
more abstractly conceptual worldview.174 As we will see, this notion of symbolism would 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Kenntnis gelangt war, als schon dem endgültigen Urteil Gottes unterworfen und somit an ihren 
eigentlichen, ihr nach der göttlichen Ordnung zukommenden Platz gestellt, als schon gerichtet vorzustellen, 
und zwar so, daß er die einzelnen Gestalten in ihrem eschatologischen Endgeschick nicht etwa ihres 
irdischen Charakters beraubt oder auch nur ihn abschwächt, sondern indem er die äußerste Steigerung ihres 
individuellen irdisch-historischen Wesens festhält und sie mit dem Endgeschick identifiziert.” 
171 Erich Auerbach, “Entdeckung Dantes in der Romantik,” in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur romanischen 
Philologie (Bern: Francke, 1967), 176-183. 
172 On this, see Höltenschmidt, 358ff. On symbolism and allegory in German Romanticism, see Behler, 
“Symbol und Allegorie in der frühromantischen Theorie,” in Studien zur Romantik und zur idealistischen 
Philosophie, ed. Ernst Behler (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1993), Bd. 2, 249-263. 
173 On this note, see Gadamer, who writes that “der uns selbstverständlich erscheinende künstlerische 
Gegensatz zwischen Allegorie und Symbol erst das Resultat der philosophischen Entwicklung der letzten 
zwei Jahrhunderte ist und an deren Beginn so wenig erwartet werden darf, daß vielmehr die Frage zu 
stellen ist, wie es überhaupt zum Bedürfnis einer solchen Unterscheidung und Entgegensetzung kam. Es 
läßt sich nicht übersehen, daß Winckelmann, dessen Einfluß auf die Ästhetik und Geschichtsphilosophie 
der Zeit bestimmend war, beide Begriffe synonym gebraucht, und das gilt vom Ganzen der ästhetischen 
Literatur des 18. Jahrnhunderts.” Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen 
Hermeneutik (Tübingen: Mohr, 1965 (1960)), 68. 
174 Behler, cited two notes previously, wrote what is now an authoritative article on symbolism and allegory 
in German Romanticism. Contrary to Gadamer, he describes a differentiation of symbol and allegory in the 
theory of the early Romantics; yet much of the evidence Behler cites seems just as likely to support the 
thesis of Gadamer. My own sense is that the early Romantic distinctions between symbol and allegory were 
im Werden, and that even if we may discern distinctions in their usage, these distinctions are so 
unsystematic that we are better served by presupposing their interchangeability than we are by 
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inform both F. Schlegel’s concept of myth as well as the poetics of absolute idealism that 
girds Novalis’s Heinrich von Ofterdingen. In addition to these early Romantic 
applications of a theory of the symbol to the project of a new mythology, the notion of 
symbolism itself would come to play a crucial role in the subsequent study of myth in 
later Romantic historiography. Franz Josef Mone, a historian in Heidelberg, for example, 
would eventually write the Geschichte des Heidenthums im nordlichen Europa (1822-23) 
in which he characterized myth as a symbolic system — encoded in symbols, runes, and 
hieroglyphs — that relied on a theological substrate. Friedrich Creuzer, Mone’s colleague 
in Heidelberg, described myth in similar terms in his highly contended Symbolik und 
Mythologie der alten Völker (1810-12).175 The authors of these later mythographical 
studies, knowingly or not, adopted a discourse rooted in A.W. Schlegel’s assessment of 
the allegory of the Commedia.  
 In addition to these factors, one of the primary reasons that the Commedia 
becomes central to the poetic theory of Romanticism is Schlegel’s exegesis of it as a 
singular synthesis of theology, physics, and metaphysics. What distinguishes Dante’s 
depictions of the afterlife from those of other poets, Schlegel explains, is the necessity by 
which his system of metaphysics orders them:  
Dante’s Zweck erlaubte es nicht, die Hölle in ungewissen Umrissen, wie ein Chaos schreckender 
Dinge oder Undinge hinzuwerfen. Er öffnet sie nicht, wie etwa Tasso, nur um einzelne handelnde 
Personen daraus hervorgehen zu lassen, und sie dann wieder zu schliessen, sondern seine ganze 
                                                                                                                                                                               
presupposing their difference. One of the first post-Goethean definitions is that of Schelling in the 
Philosophie der Kunst, discussed below in chapter four. On Romantic allegory in relation to the Commedia, 
see also Hölter, Der Dichter der Hölle und des Exils, 55, 81ff.  
175 For a fulsome overview of these two texts, see Williamson, The Longing for Myth in Germany: Religion 
and Aesthetic Culture from Romanticism to Nietzsche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 102-
104, 121-150. 
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Handlung, die wunderbare Reise, liegt in ihr und den beyden andern Geisterreichen, die er 
vollständig kennen lehren will. Der fast unendliche Reichthum seiner belebten Gruppen müßte 
zum Labyrinth werden, ohne einen sichern Leitfaden. Dazu dient ihm die mathematische 
Begränzung der verschiedenen Geisterwohnungen. Deswegen trennt und ordnet er die Arten der 
Verdammten, Büßenden und Seeligen, nach seinem System der philosophischen Moral und der 
Theologie.176 
 
Dante’s delineations of Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise, governed by his didactic mission, 
arise not from the contingencies of poetic entertainment but rather from the necessity of 
his “System der philosophischen Moral und der Theologie.” The exactitude with which 
Dante executes these representations, drawing the boundaries of each realm with 
mathematical precision, bespeaks the methodology of the Commedia: art serves science, 
poetry serves theology. Schlegel reiterates this point when, describing the poem’s 
geography of the earth, he observes that Dante’s placement of Jerusalem on the exact 
center of the earth’s surface owes not to scientific error, but rather to “einer gewißen 
christlichen Mythologie.”177 It is neither historical nor geographical contingency that 
dictates the poem’s mimesis; on the contrary, it is Dante’s theological worldview that 
dissolves such contingencies in the first place and institutes a representational mode 
underpinned by philosophical necessity. Schlegel describes this interpenetration of 
science and art in a revelatory poetics at greater length in his essay on John Flaxman’s 
contour illustrations of the Commedia, where he writes of Dante:  
Er baut den Himmel, in den er sich aufschwingt, nach beschränkteren Begriffen vom 
Weltsystem, als die unsrigen sind, und eben darum geordneter und schöner.  Zwar lag 
dabei Wißenschaft zum Grunde : nämlich theils die Weltlehre des Aristoteles, die aber 
rational sein wollte, und folglich die Regelmäßigkeit des Ganzen umfaßte; theils die 
ältere Astronomie, die schon Mythologie, d. h. poetisches Kostum der Natur, geworden 
war.178  
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We already know from F. Schlegel’s definitional Athenäumsfragment that Romantic 
poetry was tasked with uniting the disparate spheres of poetry and philosophy, and in his 
interpretation of Dante’s Commedia  as a “poetisches Kostum der Natur,” we see that 
A.W. Schlegel had found a unique model of just such a synthesis. Indeed, in a lecture 
known much less well than F. Schlegel’s 116th Athenäumsfragment, A.W. Schlegel 
describes the nature of the impulse toward synthesis in a way that clarifies its relation to 
myth.179 There he writes that philosophy and poetry constitute the “ursprünglichen und 
ewigen Anlagen [...] des menschlichen Gemüths” and that, historically, “Mythologie war 
das verbindende Mittelglied zwischen Philosophie und Poesie [...].”180 To the extent that 
Dante had seamlessly woven geography, physics, and metaphysics into the poetic fabric 
of the Commedia, his poem represented precisely the mediation between philosophy and 
poetry presupposed of the new mythology.  
Friedrich Schlegel and the New Mythology 
For as much significance as we cede to A.W. Schlegel in having discovered Dante, it was 
ultimately his precocious younger brother, Friedrich, who located in Dante the model for 
the Romantics’ new mythology. This critical maneuver sprang from Friedrich Schlegel’s 
habit of outlining the future of European poetry on the basis of his idiosyncratic 
interpretation of its past, an almost constant enterprise for the younger Schlegel 
throughout the 1790s. During this period, the mercurial critic would transition from 
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writing in the essay Über das Studium der griechischen Poesie (1795) that Dante’s poem 
owed its structure to the “gotischen Begriffen des Barbaren” to the conviction that this 
poem of gothic construction could alone signal to modern poets the means by which they 
might realize a new mythology.181 These reversals in poetic fortune epitomize Schlegel’s 
almost constant reappraisal of European literature, variations of which can be noted even 
within the years of the most intense Romantic theoretical output, 1798-1800. It will be 
necessary to survey these shifts in order comprehend the origins and goals of the new 
mythology as well as to witness how Dante emerges as a vital figure in this project. 
 When in his Platonic dialogue, Das Gespräch über die Poesie (1800), F. Schlegel 
included a Rede über die Mythologie, he posited a new mythology as the solution to a 
dilemma that was not local to the poetics of Jena Romanticism, but rather to post-
classical poetry at large. He had articulated this vision, albeit from a different point of 
view, in the protracted Studiumaufsatz on the history of Greek poetry. It was there that 
Schlegel, who freely acknowledged his essay to be a “Versuch […] den langen Streit der 
einseitigen Freunde der alten und der neuen Dichter zu schlichten,” had renewed the old 
querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, yet like many other prominent Germans — 
including Gottsched, Winckelmann, Goethe, Hölderlin, etc. — wrote what amounted to a 
theory of how the moderns might approach what the ancients had already 
accomplished.182 To do this, Schlegel postulated certain theses that separated the poetry 
of the Greeks from that of the moderns. These theses included, most fundamentally, the 
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observation that whereas Greek poets privileged the beautiful, modern poets privileged 
the interesting. Inasmuch as the Greeks appealed to objective principles of beauty, they 
enabled the flourishing of a harmonious aesthetic culture, whereas the reliance of the 
moderns upon subjective aesthetic experience produced “nur einzelne durch äußre 
Gewalt aneinander gefesselte Stücke, ohne eigentlichen Zusammenhang, ohne ein 
Ganzes.”183 The gap between ancient and modern poetry was expanded, moreover, by the 
means of its production: whereas Greek poetry sprang organically to life “in der 
natürlichen Bildung,” modern poetry was forged “in der künstlichen Bildung.”184 This 
difference, too, resulted in a modern poetry that could only ever approximate — but 
never attain — the totality of the ancients. In judging the task of his own essay to be a 
“wesentliche Bedingung der Vervollkommnung des Deutschen Geschmacks und 
Kunst,”185 Schlegel, we see, had already begun to undertake efforts to mitigate the 
splintered character of modern poetry. 
 Between 1798 and 1799, Schlegel’s efforts to theorize the regeneration of modern 
poetry and to overcome its fragmentation assumes new forms, particularly via an 
inchoate concept of myth that begins to emerge in fragments, annotations, and other 
assorted jottings in Schlegel’s notebooks. Indeed, in the first of his notes entitled “Zur 
Poesie. 1799.,” we find a statement that would prove programmatic for the new direction 
of his thought: “Das Wesen der π[Poesie] besteht allerdings im µυθος. […] Durch den 
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µυθος wird die Poesie eben so unendlich. —”186 Germs like this one would blossom in 
1800 in the fullest poetological treatise that Schlegel would ever compose, Das Gespräch 
über die Poesie. There, in the Rede über die Mythologie, it was the tantalizing possibility 
of renewing myth in modernity that would inspire Schlegel to write that Romantic poetry 
— lacking a “mütterlichen Boden” and a “Mittelpunkt” — could eventually grow from a 
common spiritual heritage rather than be forged from the interior of each individual poet. 
This corona of Romantic theory would likewise find expression in Schlegel’s Ideen, a 
collection of fragments likewise published in the final volume of the Athenäum. 
 To be sure, when the term mythos begins to appear in Schlegel’s notebooks in the 
late 1790s, it bears many of the same supramundane accoutrements that accompany the 
term in popular discourses to this day: gods, goddesses, etc. These figures could range 
from Greek deities to Christian saints like the Virgin Mary, whose centrality to the visual 
art theorized by early Romantics had brought Catholic imagery into the purview of 
intellectuals weaned on an Enlightened Protestantism. Yet Schlegel’s notebooks reveal a 
theoretical substrate that underpins and indeed precedes these connotations. At its core, 
this substrate is predicated on the view that myth constitutes a functional — which is to 
say purposive — aesthetic mode.187 In certain respects, the notion of myth as purposive 
will be familiar to us from the Enlightened philosophes like Fontenelle, who already in 
the first half of the eighteenth century had dismissed myth as a form of fictional 
aetiology. With its attendant connotations of dissemblance (particularly in the case of 
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Fontenelle), however, the category of fiction approximates Schlegel’s apprehension of 
myth less closely than does a broader and more fluid concept of aesthetic representation. 
The consequence of this by no means blunt distinction is anything but trivial: for myth, in 
Schlegel’s view, comes to be conceived not as an ideological device designed to 
hoodwink or console primitive peoples, but rather as an aesthetic system that, to the 
extent that it crystallizes a particular worldview in imaginative art, provides for the 
efflorescence of a unified artistic culture.  
 Certain formulations in Schlegel’s notebooks prove helpful in elaborating this 
vision of myth. When in 1799 he writes, “Poesie ohne Kunst ist Mythologie, und d.[er] 
Kern aller Mythologie ist die Idee der Natur,” he links art and nature in a way that would 
begin to assume more mystical connotations in subsequent fragments and publications.188 
At another point in the notebooks, for example, he theorizes: “Für d[en] Mystiker kann 
Poesie nur durch d[as] Medium d[er] Mythol[ogie] deducirt werden — als Stütze d[er] 
Kosmologie — oder auch polemisch als Gegengewicht d.[er] Ontologie — aus Rückkehr 
zum Ganzen.”189 It is important to note in these definitional fragments that Schlegel, by 
identifying die Idee der Natur and Kosmologie as fundamental to the task of myth, codes 
it as a discourse that is grounded in the physics of the cosmos. Along these lines, it is 
likewise significant that Schlegel describes myth as the Gegengewicht der Ontologie, i.e. 
the counterweight to the branch of philosophy devoted to the nature of being. What I 
want to underscore in singling out these statements is the status of myth, in each case, as 
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Stütze of nature/cosmos and as Gegengewicht to ontology. The latter of these 
formulations, which conceives of myth as fulfilling a role incapable of being realized by 
philosophical rationality, importantly posits the revelatory dimension of myth. The 
former of these formulations, together with the notion that the “Kern aller Mythologie ist 
die Idee der Natur,” suggests that what this aesthetic mode reveals (or represents) is the 
object about which ontology philosophizes, i.e. being, nature, cosmos. This much is 
confirmed elsewhere in the notebooks, for example, when Schlegel opines that “Die 
Form der natürlich[en] Dinge ist d.[as] eigentl[iche] Wesen d[es] Symbolischen, d[er] 
höhern Poesie,”190 when he notes that “Die Factoren d[er] Mythologie sind Allegorie und 
Kosmogonie,”191 and when he writes elliptically: “Das große Centrum Offenbarung der 
Natur genannt.”192  
 Schlegel’s understanding of myth as the mode whereby the essence of nature in 
its totality is revealed in art likewise underpins his Rede über die Mythologie. Indeed, he 
refers there to mythology as both the “hieroglyphische Ausdruck der umgebenden Natur” 
as well as the “Kunstwerk der Natur.”193 When he revised the Rede for a new edition in 
1823, he even glossed Mythologie as “symbolische Anschauung,” “symbolische 
Naturansicht,” and “Symbolik.”194 Leaving aside the striking language of symbolism, 
which as I already mentioned links Schlegel’s concept of a new mythology and his 
brother’s early theorization of the Commedia, I want to underscore the preoccupation 
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with nature that permeates the Rede über die Mythologie. Unable to envision precisely 
how the new mythology will materialize, Ludoviko, the figure in Schlegel’s dialogue 
who holds the Rede, repeatedly emphasizes that its source ought to be sought in modern 
physics: “Ich kann nicht schließen,” Ludoviko declares, “ohne noch einmal zum Studium 
der Physik aufzufodern, aus deren dynamischen Paradoxien jetzt die heiligsten 
Offenbarungen der Natur von allen Seiten ausbrechen.”195 This insistence, as Ernst 
Behler has written, refers to the school of Naturphilosophie as epitomized around the turn 
of the century by the philosophy of Friedrich Schelling.196 As Schlegel notes elsewhere in 
the Rede, the development of a philosophy of nature out of the seed of idealist philosophy 
provides a model for imagining the emergence of a new realism out of the spirit of 
idealism. This notion is vital to his theory of the new mythology, for as Schlegel writes, it 
will take the form of a poetry centered upon the harmony of the real and the ideal. It will 
be a union of the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of spirit in the dimension of 
art.197 
 What should by no means be neglected in this account of the Rede, however, is 
another figure who is no less significant for the appearance of a new realism: Spinoza. 
Despite his reputation as Europe’s most dangerous atheist, Spinoza — by virtue of his 
pantheism — had been celebrated by the Romantics as “den Gott betrunkenen 
Menschen,” the philosopher whose unique interpretation of the cosmos had saved 
                                                           
195 Ibid., 321-322. 
196 Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 162-163. In 
addition to Schelling, we might likewise mention in this respect Franz Baader, whom Schlegel discusses in 
the Ideen as a Physiker. See KFSA II, 266. 
197 KFSA II, 314-315. 
 
 
 
76 
religion from the Enlightenment, as Frederick Beiser has shown so well.198 Throughout 
the Rede, Ludoviko lauds Spinoza with the fervor of a new convert, and indeed Schlegel 
had recently been won over to Spinoza by his reading of Schleiermacher’s speeches Über 
die Religion (1799), in which Schleiermacher had dispensed with theories of religion — 
hawked by both believers and critics — that reduced religion to either a matter of 
metaphysics or a matter of morals.    
Sie [Religion] begehrt nicht das Universum seiner Natur nach zu bestimmen und zu 
erklären wie die Metaphysik, sie begehrt nicht aus Kraft der Freiheit und der göttlichen 
Willkür des Menschen es fortzubilden und fertig zu machen wie die Moral. Ihr Wesen ist 
weder Denken noch Handeln, sondern Anschauung und Gefühl. Anschauen will sie das 
Universum [...].199 
 
Schleiermacher owed his assertion that the essence of religion lay in Anschauen to 
Spinoza, who in the Ethics had both articulated a theory of intuitive knowledge (scientia 
intuitiva) and suggested that the realization of this highest form of knowledge would lead 
the human subject to a state of blessedness.200 The Spinozist-Schleiermacherian 
articulation of religion exerted a profound impact on Friedrich Schlegel, who in a short 
span embraced Spinoza as the evangelist of his new religious outlook and quickly saw the 
overlaps between Schleiermacher’s reading of religion and his own theorization of myth. 
In the Ideen, for example, he writes: “In der Welt […] der Kunst und der Bildung, 
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erscheint die Religion notwendig als Mythologie oder als Bibel.” This statement 
reiterates the revelatory character of myth while naming that which myth reveals, the 
essence of the cosmos, “Religion.” At another point in the Ideen: “Die Andacht der 
Philosophen ist Theorie, reine Anschauung des Göttlichen, besonnen, ruhig und heiter in 
stiller Einsamkeit. Spinosa ist das Ideal dafür. Der religiöse Zustand des Poeten ist 
leidenschaftlicher und mitteilender. Das Ursprüngliche ist Enthusiasmus, am Ende bleibt 
Mythologie.” Like Schlegel’s notebook entry on myth that was cited above, this 
articulation establishes a parallel between the tasks of philosophy and poetry while 
suggesting that the poet’s mythology is the religious counterpart to the philosopher’s 
theoria. Religion, in other words, has little to do with faith in personal deities; at its core, 
it is a privileged mode of encountering the cosmos that expresses itself in the aesthetic 
system of a mythology. Without naming it religious, Frederick Beiser has summarized 
the import that Romantics like Schlegel had ascribed to aesthetic experience, which 
nonetheless amounts to Schlegel’s (and earlier, Schleiermacher’s) theory of religion 
around 1800: “Through aesthetic experience, they [the early German Romantics] 
believed, we perceive the infinite in the finite, the supersensible in the sensible, the 
absolute in its appearances. Since art alone has the power to fathom the absolute, it is 
superior to philosophy, which now becomes the mere handmaiden of art.”201 Aquinas had 
once called philosophy the handmaiden of theology (ancilla theologiae); for the 
Romantics, aesthetic experience now served as religious experience.  
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 In both the Gespräch über die Poesie and the Ideen, Schlegel displays more than 
a characteristically Romantic longing for the realization of this form of aesthetic-religious 
experience. He squarely asserts that its time has arrived: “Es ist Zeit den Schleier der Isis 
zu zerreißen, und das Geheime zu offenbaren,” he writes at the outset of the Ideen.202 
Diagnosing the lack of a modern mythology in the Rede, he (Ludoviko) proclaims: “Wir 
haben keine Mythologie. Aber setze ich hinzu, wir sind nahe daran eine zu erhalten, oder 
vielmehr es wird Zeit, daß wir ernsthaft dazu mitwirken sollen, eine hervorzubringen.”203 
As Ernst Behler has written, however, “the new mythology is not a research project to be 
carried out in the near future, but one of those more fundamental tasks that, upon 
reflection, manifest both the impossibility and the necessity of their realization.”204 
Judging by the apodictic tone of his assertions as well as his own literary plans, Schlegel 
likely would not have agreed with Behler’s assessment of the project as impossible; yet it 
is certainly true that he can do no more than provide intimations of how such a 
monumental feat of cultural transformation might be realized. As Ludoviko says in the 
Rede, idealism provides one hint; but Schlegel himself provides others. In the Ideen, for 
example, he writes of the ancients’ system of mythology and sees its analog in the Bible, 
which bears on the possible manifestation of a new mythology: “Auf eine ähnliche Weise 
sollen in der vollkommnen Literatur alle Bücher nur Ein Buch sein, und in einem solchen 
ewig werdenden Buche wird das Evangelium der Menschheit und der Bildung offenbart 
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werden.”205 In point of fact, Schlegel and Novalis — inspired by Lessing’s prediction of a 
gospel of the future in the Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts (1780) — had 
corresponded about the possibility of composing a new Bible, and Novalis had even 
conceived of his encyclopedia project, Das allgemeine Brouillon, as a scientific bible.   
 At any rate, Schlegel himself seems to have recognized the amorphous vision of 
the new mythology as he had sketched it in the Rede and sought to define its features 
more clearly in the dialogue following the talk. Indeed, many of the characters in the 
Gespräch voice concerns and make comments that readers of the text likely share, 
thereby allowing Schlegel to clarify and elaborate the concept of the new mythology at 
greater length. In general, these questions and comments are twofold in nature: they 
center (1) functionally on the question of how the poetic form of the new mythology 
ought to accomplish its goals and (2) historically on the question of who and what might 
serve as its models. The first of these topics hinges on remarks made by Marcus, Antonio, 
and Lothario, each of whom has been alleged to represent a member of the Jena circle, 
and all of whom expand the lexicon with which Ludoviko had described the new 
mythology.206 These comments, which theorize concepts like the didactic and the 
romantic, culminate when Ludoviko gathers and summarizes them: “Mit andern Worten: 
alle Schönheit ist Allegorie. Das Höchste kann man eben weil es unaussprechlich ist, nur 
allegorisch sagen.”207 This much will be familiar to us from Schlegel’s notebook entries, 
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which, as we saw, posited the aesthetics of myth as a form capable of manifesting the 
totality of the cosmos, an understanding of art as revelation. Ludoviko’s remark is of 
particular significance here, however, inasmuch as it leads the dialogue’s participants to 
squabble over whether Böhme, Plato, or others might not have served as better exemplars 
than Spinoza. The quibbling is finally left behind when Camilla, in the lone question 
posed by a female participant, asks Ludoviko: “Wäre es nicht möglich, daß Sie, 
Ludoviko, den Geist des Spinosa in einer schönen Form darstellen könnten; oder besser 
noch Ihre eigne Ansicht, das was Sie Realismus nennen?”208 In this one direct question, 
which reduces the hubbub of the discussion to the heart of the matter (what would the 
new mythology look like?), Camilla elicits from Ludoviko his final word on the topic of 
the new mythology: “Wer etwa dergleichen im Sinne hätte, würde es nur auf die Art 
können und sein wollen wie Dante. Er müßte, wie er, nur Ein Gedicht im Geist und im 
Herzen haben, und würde oft verzweifeln müssen ob sichs überhaupt darstellen läßt. 
Gelänge es aber, so hätte er genug getan.”209   
Friedrich Schlegel: New Herald of Dante, Herald of a New Dante 
Schlegel’s identification of Dante as the model author for the creation of a new 
mythology clearly displays the influence of his brother, A.W. Schlegel. Ludoviko’s 
assumption that Dante must have experienced despair in writing, for example, calls to 
mind the elder Schlegel’s attention to the personal vigor of Dante, whose poetry 
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blossomed so magnificently, he wrote, precisely because of the struggles Dante had 
endured. Indeed, this sentiment is validated by Andrea, another character in the dialogue, 
who responds to Ludoviko’s statement with a similar assessment: “Sie haben ein 
würdiges Vorbild aufgestellt! Gewiß ist Dante der einzige, der unter einigen 
begünstigenden und unsäglich vielen erschwerenden Umständen durch eigne Riesenkraft, 
er selbst ganz allein, eine Art von Mythologie, wie sie damals möglich war, erfunden und 
gebildet hat.”210 The notion of Dante’s enormous force powering him through countless 
trying circumstances likewise relies on A.W. Schlegel’s first Dante essay in the Akademie 
der schönen Redekünste.  
 To be sure, it was through the mediation of his older brother that F. Schlegel first 
engaged with the Commedia: in 1792, he reviewed A.W. Schlegel’s 1791 essay on Dante 
and the Commedia for the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung in Jena;211 he acted as a liaison 
between his brother and his German publishers while A.W. Schlegel lived in Amsterdam 
and continued his translation of Dante; and on several occasions, Friedrich raised 
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Schlegel’s incisive political commentary and confesses confusion over the notion that Dante’s exile in any 
way does his poem credit. F. Schlegel likewise asserts that the Commedia is a work of more universal 
scope than A.W. Schlegel gives it credit.  
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interpretive questions, offered practical suggestions, and gave encouragement to his 
brother in his scholarly work on Dante.212 It would be wrong to assume, however, that F. 
Schlegel’s appeal to the Commedia and its hallowed author in the Rede merely relied on 
the scholarly work undertaken by A.W. Schlegel a decade earlier. For in the years since 
the publication of A.W. Schlegel’s initial Dante essay in 1791, F. Schlegel himself had 
taken to wrestling with the Commedia in his own right. As works of Romantic literature 
began to permeate what once seemed like Friedrich Schlegel’s devotion to an exclusively 
classical canon, Dante assumed a pivotal role in Schlegel’s historiography of Romantic 
literature and subsequent theorization of the new mythology. In a review essay in 1796, 
he writes with gusto of the figure whom A.W. Schlegel had attempted to recover: “In 
jenen Zeiten, welche wir barbarische nennen, vor der sogenannten Erweckung der Alten, 
gab es einen Dante.”213 If Dante came to represent for F. Schlegel a paradigmatic figure 
in the creation of a new mythology, this view relied in no small measure on his 
interpretation of Dante’s singular place in European literary history. “Die moderne Poesie 
fängt an mit Dante,” he jots in a notebook entry in 1797;214 “Dante ist der Keim der 
ganz[en] modern[en] Poesie” he writes in another;215 and later, “Dante ist der Anfang des 
Romantischen aus dem Didaktischen.”216 
 The universalizing tendency of Schlegel’s statements, typical of his remarks on 
Dante in these years, emerges not (merely) from the hyperbolic Schwärmerei of a 
                                                           
212 See for example an assortment of Friedrich’s more substantive remarks to A.W. Schlegel in KFSA 
XXIII, 19, 26, 50, 138, 165, 172, 184, 185, 223, 224, 27, 228, 246. 
213 Review of Herder’s Humanitätsbriefe in KFSA II, 52. 
214 KFSA XVI, 171. 
215 Ibid., 131. 
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Romantic, but rather from his interpretation of the Commedia as a unique pleroma of 
Romantic poetics. Indeed, in turning again to the notebooks, we find that what 
distinguishes Dante for Schlegel is his having aligned harmoniously and absolutely the 
most distant coordinates that map the geography of romantische Poesie. The Commedia 
is at once a mimetic novel (Inferno), a sentimental novel (Purgatorio), and a fantastical 
novel (Paradiso).217 In addition to its uniting Ethos, Philosophie, and Poesie,218 its 
manner of doing so via a visionary system — akin to that of the Old Testament, Schlegel 
writes — is foundational for any attempt at wedding poetry and philosophy.219 In this 
respect, Schlegel suggests that the Commedia transcends other works of Romantic poetry: 
its unification of genres and forms within the logic of a prophetic vision renders it 
quintessentially Romantic inasmuch as prophecy operates as a device of intensive self-
reflection.220 On this note, we will recall that in the most famous of his 
Athenäumsfragmente, Schlegel characterizes Romantic poetry as radically unitive in its 
approach to literary forms while profoundly reflexive in its execution (“wie in einer 
endlosen Reihe von Spiegeln”).221 It is the Commedia’s interpenetration of forms within a 
                                                           
217 Ibid., 158. 
218 Ibid., 108. 
219 Ibid., 112.  
220 Schlegel, like his brother and like Schelling, alternated between designations of the genre of the 
Commedia. At one point, for example, he writes plainly: “Dante’s Komödie ist ein Roman” (KFSA XVI, 
91). At another point: “In den modernen Kunstepopoën stecken zwei Gedichte, ein prophetisches und ein 
absolut poetisches. Im Dante noch außerdem ein absolut synthetisches” (KFSA XVI, 116). Elsewhere, it is 
“absolutes poetisches Drama” (KFSA XVI, 157). A few years later, in 1802, he notes to himself: “Dante ist 
durchaus didaktisch — vielleicht auch lyrisch” (KFSA XVI, 375). In 1803: “Alte Tendenz des Epos zum 
Didaktischen und vice versa — in Dante gewissermaßen synthesirt” (KFSA XVI, 493). These changes do 
not signal Schlegel’s changing conception of the Commedia so much as they exemplify the robust diversity 
that he continually ascribed to it. As he writes in 1804, Dante’s Commedia unites all genres (KFSA XI, 
153).  
221 KFSA II, 182-183. 
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system of such (prophetic) reflexivity that prompts Schlegel to deem it the paradigmatic 
instance of Transcendentalpoesie: “Dante tendenzirt zugleich auf absoluten Roman 
absolutes poetisches Drama und auf absolute Prophetie. Er umfaßt die ganze 
Transc[endental]π[poesie], insofern auch die ganze Abstr[acte] und die ganze 
R[omantische]π[poesie].”222 This assertion, recorded in 1797 and reiterated in another 
notebook entry in which Schlegel writes “Dante ist nichts als die gesamte 
Transc[endental]π[poesie],”223 would make its way one year later into the 
Athenäumsfragmente, where Schlegel writes that “Dantes prophetisches Gedicht ist das 
einzige System der transzendentalen Poesie, immer noch das höchste seiner Art.”224 
 Dante, of course, was not the only star in Schlegel’s constellation of Romantic 
literature; in the very same Athenäumsfragment, he compares Shakespeare’s universality 
to the “Mittelpunkt der romantischen Kunst” and refers to Goethe’s poetry as the 
“vollständigste Poesie der Poesie.” Hyperbolic paeans like these would seem to relativize 
the place that Dante occupies in what Schlegel refers to as this “Dreiklang der modernen 
Poesie,” as do other superlative compliments paid to the likes of Camoens, Calderón, and 
Cervantes.225 Notwithstanding such bluster, neither Shakespeare, nor Goethe, nor any 
other writer occupies precisely the same perch in Schlegel’s canon in the final years of 
the century that Dante does. As Schlegel himself writes, “Dante ist unter allen 
                                                           
222 KFSA XVI, 157. In quoting certain notebook entries, I opt not to adopt the entirety of Schlegel’s 
idiosyncratic, symbolic annotations (often Greek letters, for example, within what appears to be a 
mathematical function), but use instead the editors’ glosses.  
223 Ibid., 143. 
224 KFSA II, 206. 
225 As late as 1803, Schlegel’s notes seem to suggest Dante still reigns supreme in Schlegel’s canon: 
“Außer dem Dante — doch Calderone und Shakespear die bedeutendsten Dichter — Camoëns und 
Cervantes auch” (KFSA XVI, 466).  
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mod.[ernen] Dichtern allein, encyklopaed[isches] Bild des Zeitalters. Sh[akspeare] ist 
das nicht.”226 For in addition to the Commedia having epitomized the emblematic 
definitions of Romantic poetry, its appearance of having comprehensively mirrored 
Dante’s age rendered the Commedia a perfect model for the creative and productive tasks 
of the new mythology. As Schlegel outlines the creation of a new mythology in the Rede, 
this project represents not merely the attempt to concretize a modern Weltanschauung 
into an artwork that would be lodged in a museum or library; on the contrary, the 
aesthetic system constituted by the new mythology would serve as a living, symbolic font 
from which all new poetry could be created. Schlegel judged the Commedia to have 
produced a summative vision of medieval Christian life and thinking that he saw as not a 
mere system of images, but rather as a foundation for the subsequent development of all 
modern (Romantic) literature. This distinguishes Dante’s fate, Schlegel writes, from 
those of Cervantes and Shakespeare: Dante is “der Stifter und das Haupt einer neuen 
Poesie.”227 As he writes in the Epochen der Dichtkunst, the historiographical segment of 
the Gespräch über die Poesie: 
Die katholische Hierarchie war unterdessen ausgewachsen; die Jurisprudenz und die 
Theologie zeigte manchen Rückweg zum Altertum. Diesen betrat, Religion und Poesie 
verbindend, der große Dante, der heilige Stifter und Vater der modernen Poesie. Von den 
Altvordern der Nation lernte er das Eigenste und Sonderbarste, das Heiligste und das 
Süßeste der neuen gemeinen Mundart zu klassischer Würde und Kraft 
zusammenzudrängen, und so die provenzalische Kunst der Reime zu veredeln; und da 
ihm nicht bis zur Quelle zu steigen vergönnt war, konnten ihm auch Römer den 
allgemeinen Gedanken eines großen Werkes von geordnetem Gliederbau mittelbar 
anregen. Mächtig faßte er ihn, in Einen Mittelpunkt drängte sich die Kraft seines 
erfindsamen Geistes zusammen, in Einem ungeheuren Gedicht umfaßte er mit starken 
Armen seine Nation und sein Zeitalter, die Kirche und das Kaisertum, die Weisheit und 
die Offenbarung, die Natur und das Reich Gottes. Eine Auswahl des Edelsten und des 
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Schändlichsten was er gesehn, des Größten und des Seltsamsten, was er ersinnen konnte; 
die offenherzigste Darstellung seiner selbst und seiner Freunde, die herrlichste 
Verherrlichung der Geliebten; alles treu und wahrhaftig im Sichtbaren und voll geheimer 
Bedeutung und Beziehung aufs Unsichtbare.228    
 
This account of Dante’s achievement, which precedes the Rede within the frame of the 
same dialogue, reveals Schlegel’s concern for the encyclopedic and representative 
character of the Commedia. Indeed, the very insistence upon the singularity of the poem 
(“Einen Mittelpunkt,” “Einem ungeheuren Gedicht”) prefigures the same rhetorical tack 
that Ludoviko and Andrea use when identifying the Commedia as the only model for a 
new mythology (“Nur Ein Gedicht im Geist und im Herzen haben,” “Dante der einzige,” 
etc.). 
  All of these features of the Commedia — its encyclopedic scope, its 
representative contemporaneity, its singularity — bespeak the reasons why Dante 
becomes so vital in these years to Schlegel’s theorization of a new mythology, 
particularly as it begins to take shape in his notebooks. Indeed, just as the philosophical 
fragment ultimately gives way to the Romantics’ preoccupation with a philosophical 
system, represented by the efflorescence of their lecture cycles,229 so too does the 
aesthetic of the fragment give way in Schlegel to the aesthetic of the system. His and 
Novalis’s Bible-project derived from a view of the Bible as a system of books; Schlegel 
understood the diversity of ancient Greek poetry as unified by its one system of 
mythology; and Dante, it seemed, had achieved a similar unity in the Commedia. He 
alone, and perhaps Jakob Böhme, Schlegel writes, could be credited with treating 
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Christianity in a truly catholic (i.e. universal and systematic) fashion. “Dante ist der 
Mythologe der katholischen Religion,” Schlegel writes; “Er hätte gleich von selbst Papst 
werden.”230    
 Schlegel’s notebook entries from 1797-1800, which I have already drawn on 
rather heavily in sketching the place of Dante in Schlegel’s conception of European 
literary history, likewise reveal how deeply Schlegel’s own mythopoeic plans and 
“romantische Einfälle” owed to the particular interpretation of Dante and the Commedia 
he had begun to formulate. His vision for the development of Romantic poetry, which 
would be articulated most programmatically in the Gespräch über die Poesie, already 
shows a Dantean proclivity toward those ideas which would take shape in the idea of the 
new mythology. Take, for example, the following excerpts from the plans from 
Schlegel’s “Ideen zu Gedichten”: 
Ein φπµ[philosophisches Poem] in dramat.[ischer] Form aus d.[er] Kunstgeschichte. — 
Die ganze φσ[Philosophie] und Hist[orie] der π[Poesie] in Ein Gedicht von Virgilisch-
Dantisch epischer Form. —231 
 
Maria und Christus. Eine Fantasie/ Darstellung d[es] Himmels./ Satan. Darstell[un]g der 
Hölle.232 
 
Die Poetisazion der ganzen Natur und die Philosophation der Mythol.[ogie] machen nur 
Ein Ganzes aus.233 
 
Die ΔιΘ[Dithyramben] = Kosmogonie + [absolutes Pathos]. Die Welt als χα[Chaos] und 
χα[Chaos] für die Welt. — Das Universum ist ewig und unveränderlich, aber die Welt 
des κοσµοζ ist im ewigen Werden. — Evangelium der Poesie; also Poesie der Poesie 
[…] Das Ganze = Mysterien der Natur — und Orgien der Schönheit oder der Liebe. — 
Alle Bilder sind wahr. — Licht ist Leben und Liebe; alle Materie ist menschlich und alle 
Form göttlich. Die Rückkehr zu den Elementen ist das was eigentl[ich] d[en] Menschen 
von Thieren und Pflanzen unterscheidet. — Paradies. — Ansicht d[er] Mahlerei? Adam 
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und Eva. — Der Himmel innerlich wie im Böhme. — Fülle d[er] Alleg[orien] und 
Gesichte. — Darstell[un]g des Himmels. Ein Lichtreich wie im Dante. — Die 
Menschheit ein unmittelbarer Ausfluß der Gottheit. — Auch Thiere, Pflanzen und 
Elemente idealisirt nach d[em] Charakter jener. Unmittelbares Anschauen der Sonne, und 
auch sonst ursprüngl.[icher] Sinn der jezt verlohren ist.234 
 
Der Regenbogen als himmlische Allegorie […] Eine göttliche Ansicht d[er] Natur und 
d[es] Universums zugleich.235 
 
Es müßten Terzinen seyn die zu xa <Chaotischem> gut passen. — Viell.[eicht] jene 
Vision als Fortsetzung des An die Deutschen […].236 
 
In perusing Schlegel’s notebooks from these years, we see that the earliest Romantic 
theorization of a poetics of myth, and thus of the new mythology with it, is deeply 
enmeshed in Schlegel’s engagement with Dante and the unique poetic model of the 
Commedia. He returns time and again to the possibility of uniting philosophy and poetry 
in a single, magisterial poem like the Commedia, a prospect which for him is attractive 
inasmuch as it concretizes in aesthetic form the monistic metaphysics of the hen kai 
pan.237 Indeed, Schlegel’s concept of poetry, as we see in the fragments above, ascribes 
increasing significance to the task of rendering the cosmos in aesthetic form, an 
imperative that we know finds its clearest expression in the Gespräch über die Poesie and 
in the Rede. It is Dante, moreover, who provides the clearest example of how to 
accomplish this goal: most of the poetic images, features, and devices Schlegel identifies 
for its realization — the combination of philosophy, poetry, and history in the heavenly 
allegory of a single magisterial poem (in Terzinen, no less!) — all point to the Commedia 
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as the poetic work that Schlegel (via Ludoviko) would later identify as the only possible 
model for the new mythology.  
 It can hardly escape the attention of the reader of these notebooks that, down to 
the very minutiae of its formal components — and in particular its status as vision in 
terza rima — the Commedia represented to Schlegel a model form for the new 
mythology. At different junctures, he writes of depicting “Die alten Götter und 
Mythol.[ogien] […] in Terz.[inen] Sonn.[etten] Stanzen”; of using “Terzinen oder 
Visionen zum Ausdruck d[er] Religion, zur Magie und Mystik”; and of poeticizing 
Böhme’s cosmogony in Terzinen.238 Inchoate and undeniably provisional, these 
conjectures and plans nonetheless point toward what shortly thereafter would crystallize 
in the (comparatively) clear call for a new mythology. If we recall that, in the Rede and 
its variants, Schlegel repeatedly glosses the neue Mythologie as a symbolic view of 
nature, we recognize all the more clearly its roots in those notes of Schlegel inspired by 
the Commedia: “Fantasi[en] und Vision[en] als fortgehend[e] Studien des 
Romantisch[en]. Vision[en] in Terz[inen]. Der Grund aller Vision und Allegorie 
dergl[eichen] Anschauung der Natur.”239 Even before having sounded the call for a new 
mythology, Schlegel envisions here that the Romantic will unfold in fantasies and visions 
in Terzinen — i.e., in the unique formal dress of the Commedia. 
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 Schlegel’s practice of literary diagnostics — the manner, that is, in which he 
identifies the philosophic-aesthetic currents of the age and projects their future 
manifestations — likewise involves locating their symptoms. The clearest sign to 
Schlegel that contemporary European poetry was near to blossoming in a Dantean 
mythology lay, of all places, in the work of a poet who at the time had little to no interest 
in Dante: namely, Goethe. As early as Schlegel began conceiving the poetics of myth, 
Goethe’s Faust project — portions of which he had published in 1790 as Faust. Ein 
Fragment — seemed a natural source for the possible resurrection of mythology in 
modernity.240 According to Schlegel’s theorization of European literary history, this 
linked Goethe’s potential role for modernity with that of Dante for the emergence of 
medieval, Romantic literature: “Im Faust d[ie] deutsche Mythologie, wie die alte im 
Dante,” Schlegel writes in one note.241 Just as Schlegel conceived of Dante as a 
supremely productive poet inasmuch as his Commedia spawned a school of Romantic 
literature — as opposed to Shakespeare, for example, who had been quickly forgotten — 
he imagined Goethe, in adopting the role of Dante, might provide a fecund ground for the 
development of contemporary poetry. He states as much in the Gespräch über die Poesie 
when he concludes its final segment, a Versuch über den Styl in Goethes früheren und 
späteren Werken, with the assertion that Goethe, should contemporary poets follow his 
lead, will be “der Stifter und das Haupt einer neuen Poesie […], für uns und die 
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Nachwelt, was Dante auf andre Weise im Mittelalter.”242 Indeed, it is almost uncanny the 
degree to which there obtains a correspondence between Schlegel’s notes on a new 
poetry of myth and the form assumed by Goethe’s Faust II many years later. We will  
 
return to the relation of the Romantics’ new mythology and Goethe’s endeavors in Faust 
in chapter four. 
A.W. Schlegel and the Mythology of Dante 
 
In much the same way that Herder had once tried to resurrect Shakespeare, A.W. 
Schlegel declared the timeliness of a modern rehabilitation of Dante in his Vorlesungen 
über die romantische Literatur: “Dante ist auch einer von den riesenhaften Schatten der 
Vorwelt, fuer die es jetzt an der Zeit ist, wieder aufzuerstehen, da die gaenzlich bis auf 
den Begriff verlohren gegangne Philosophie und Theologie anfaengt, sich wieder zu 
beleben.”243 Schlegel’s listeners may have refuted the last of these claims, but thanks to 
his and his brother Friedrich’s efforts, there was no debating the emerging relevance of 
Dante for the crystallization of Romantic poetics at the turn of the century. Over the 
winter of 1799 and into the spring of 1800, with both brothers having taken up residence 
in Jena, there took place Italian lessons in A.W. Schlegel’s house in which he and 
Friedrich tutored their guests and boarders in the Commedia. The degree to which this 
manner of study shaped the subsequent Romantic reception of Dante and the formulation 
of the theory of a new mythology can hardly be underestimated. The Schlegels’ Dante 
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lessons coincided with the pinnacle of Romantic poetic activity, which in the difficult 
years after the turn of the century gave way to a canon of critical and poetic work shaped 
by the impact of Dante and the Commedia. This canon included Friedrich Schlegel’s 
immensely fecund notebooks as well as his Gespräch über die Poesie, which we have 
already examined; but it likewise included Friedrich Schelling’s groundbreaking essay 
Ueber Dante in philosophischer Beziehung (1802) and his lectures on the philosophy of 
art (1802-03); Novalis’s novel-fragment Heinrich von Ofterdingen (1801); and A.W. 
Schlegel’s Vorlesungen über die romantische Literatur (1803-04). To the extent that 
these figures studied Dante together, traded editions of and commentaries on the 
Commedia, and compared notes for the composition of their various lecture cycles, their 
engagement with Dante and the Commedia constitutes one of the preeminent models of 
Romantic Symphilosophie. We will chart this terrain in subsequent chapters, but not 
before casting one last glance at A.W. Schlegel’s lectures on Romantic poetry, in which 
he sketches a map whose features will prove instructive for the duration of our inquiry.  
 When in his Berlin lectures A.W. Schlegel once again devotes earnest attention to 
Dante, more than a decade after his initial publication on Dante in Bürger’s journal, he 
underscores more strongly than ever the theologically didactic dimension of the 
Commedia. In a comparison of Dante and Calderón, he asserts that these two poets are de 
facto theologians whose poetry provides “eine irdische Hülle und körperliche 
Einkleidung der unsichtbaren Dinge und göttlichen Kräfte, eine Art von Theologie, nur 
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allgemein verständlicher und lieblicher als die eigentlich so genannte.”244 This judgment, 
which bespeaks the unmistakably pedagogic function that Schlegel ascribes to the 
Commedia, likewise identifies Dante as having fulfilled the task charged several years 
earlier by the author of the Systemprogramm: namely, a poetic representation of 
philosophical truths that is comprehensible to the Volk. Dante’s poetry, verständlicher 
and lieblicher than theology itself, expresses what Schlegel regards as the constitutive 
task of theology: “Darstellung des Universums.”245 This articulation carries with it the 
resonances of the Romantic discourse of myth and religion, for it articulates a notion 
inherent to both Schleiermacher’s theory of religion (Anschauung des Universums) as 
well as to F. Schlegel’s theory of a new mythology (symbolische Ansicht der Natur). In 
drawing on the Romantic lexicon of myth and religion from 1799-1800, A.W. Schlegel 
aligns his reading of the Commedia as a symbolic representation of the cosmos with that 
already put forward by his brother Friedrich in the Rede. 
 The alignment of his and his brother’s readings of the Commedia is expressed 
nowhere more clearly than when A.W. Schlegel elaborates what he means by describing 
the Commedia as a Darstellung des Universums: “Die wesentlichsten Naturkräfte werden 
dem Dichter Symbole des geistigen Seyns, und so geht aus der Vereinigung seiner Physik 
mit seiner Theologie eine scientifische Mythologie hervor, so daß, wenn man die 
Möglichkeit bezweifelt, daß die Poesie Organ des Idealismus werden könne, man sie hier 
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schon realisiert findet.”246 A.W. Schlegel’s description of poetry as the Organ des 
Idealismus, we will recall, reiterates his brother’s discussion of the quest to unite the ideal 
with the real in a new mythology, brought to material form by means of poetry. A new 
mythology, that form of realism that operates as the counterpart to idealist philosophy, is 
glossed by A.W. Schlegel in the very same language as that which had been employed by 
F. Schlegel: it is a system of poetic Symbole united in a Mythologie. 
 Dante’s ability to versify a complex, theological architectonic, for all its merits, is 
not without its dilemmas. Whereas Greek religion, according to Schlegel, had arisen from 
“Träumen der Phantasie […], an denen sich künstlerische Willkühr immerhin alles 
erlauben mochte,” and thus in its essence amounted to poetry, the theological tenets of 
Christianity did not lend themselves so readily to poetic representation: “Das Wesen der 
Wesen redend und handelnd einführen, den unendlichen Geist den engen armseligen 
Formen unserer Psychologie unterwerfen, ist ein Wagstück [...].”247 Of course, Dante was 
not the only prominent Christian poet to have faced the problem of depicting 
transcendent beings. In the eighteenth century, with critics like Bodmer, Breitinger, and 
Gottsched having debated the place of das Wunderbare in secular poetry, poems like 
Milton’s Paradise Lost and Klopstock’s Messias furnished aesthetic precedents. Indeed, 
the comparison of the Commedia with these poems would lead Schlegel to alter the 
distinction between Greek religion’s affinity for poetry and Christianity to a confessional 
distinction between Catholicism and Protestantism. In his essay on John Flaxman’s 
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contour illustrations, Schlegel comments on the particular suitability of the Commedia for 
visual representation. Rather than illustrate scenes from his revered countryman, Milton, 
Flaxman chose prudently, Schlegel writes, to illustrate the “finstern” Dante. Schlegel 
underscores the difference between Milton and Dante by referencing their confessional 
divide in aesthetic terms, describing Milton as someone whose attempt to idealize 
Christianity classically would relegate him to a position behind “den großen Propheten 
des Katholicismus.”248 Elsewhere, too, Schlegel would link Dante’s plasticity with his 
Catholicism while contrasting it with what he deemed a more image-starved 
Protestantism. Whereas Klopstock, for example, had written the Messias in a manner of 
“heiligen entkörperten, schwebenden Darstellung,” Dante composed the Commedia in 
such “festen, bestimmten Umriße” that Schlegel deemed him the Michelangelo and 
Raphael of poetry.249 This contrast between the German Protestant and the Italian 
Catholic would retain validity for Schlegel, who even in his lectures on aesthetics in 
Berlin described Klopstock’s Messias as the “vergebliches Bestreben eine protestantische 
Mythologie aus nichts zu machen.”250  
 Schlegel’s faith in the aesthetic merits of Catholicism guided his appreciation of 
medieval art while, as one might suspect, it entailed a severely critical view of the 
aesthetic theory and production of the Enlightenment. In a commemorative essay on 
Bürger, in which he reflects on the criteria of Volkspoesie, he writes that the Bible and the 
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medieval hymns of Catholicism achieved staggering popularity, whereas “die neuen bild- 
und schwunglosen, vernünftig gemeinten, und wasserklaren, die man in ihre Stelle 
gesetzt hat, sind das ganz und gar nicht.”251 Neo-Classical artists, he writes at another 
point, are little more than the “geistlosen Nachahmern einer misverstandnen 
Classicität.”252 And Klopstock, whom one might otherwise mention in the same breath as 
Dante, earns a sharp rebuke from the medievalizing Schlegel: “Klopstock. Vergebliches 
Bestreben eine protestantische Mythologie aus nichts zu machen. Irreligiosität hierin.”253 
The sudden growth of a distinctly Catholic aesthetic around 1800, nourished first by 
Tieck and Wackenroder, enabled Schlegel to remap the bounds of good taste and idealize 
the ground from which the Commedia blossomed — all while leveling devastating 
judgments at the religious epics that appeared to compete with it.  
 The irony in such judgments, of course, is that they embodied prejudices no less 
arbitrary than those against which Schlegel had directed his first article on Dante more 
than a decade earlier. We would do well to remember, however, that it was not Dante’s 
Catholicism that first rendered him an object of inquiry for the Schlegel brothers; and 
even if his filiation with a Catholic aesthetic endears him to the medievalizing A.W. 
Schlegel, Friedrich Schlegel’s respect for the Commedia — as we will see in this 
dissertation’s epilog — would wane after his own conversion to Catholicism in 1808.  
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3 
Dreaming of Dante: 
Novalis’s Heinrich von Ofterdingen and the Poetics of Absolute Idealism 
 
Between 1799 and 1800, when the Schlegel brothers were teaching Dante to house guests 
in Jena, their friend Friedrich von Hardenberg toiled away on his monumental novel 
project, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, which after his death in 1801 would come to be 
regarded as the quintessential poetic accomplishment of the Jena Frühromantik. 
Instrumental in the process of this literary canonization was Ludwig Tieck, another 
Romantic novelist and visitor in Jena, who when he published the first edition of 
Novalis’s works included a hagiographic statement that would set the tone for Novalis 
reception until the publication of a critical edition by Paul Kluckhohn and Richard 
Samuel in the 1960s. A considerable reason for the efficacy of Tieck’s statement lay in 
his reverential praise of Heinrich von Ofterdingen’s cosmic, ethereal quality, the force of 
which Tieck was able to enhance by mythologizing the 1797 death of Novalis’s fiancée, 
Sophie von Kühn, and its profound impact on the poet. It was precisely this biographical 
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detail, in fact, that enabled Tieck to draw the following bold comparison between Novalis 
and Dante:  
So erfand er, von Beispielen unbestochen, einen neuen Weg der Darstellung, und in der 
Vielseitigkeit der Beziehung, in der Ansicht der Liebe und dem Glauben an sie, die ihm 
zugleich Lehrerin, Weisheit und Religion ist, darin, daß ein einziger großer Lebens-
Moment und Ein tiefer Schmerz und Verlust das Wesen seiner Poesie und Anschauung 
wurde, gleicht er unter den Neueren allein dem erhabenen Dante, und singt uns wie dieser 
einen unergründlichen mystischen Gesang, sehr verschieden von jenem mancher 
Nachahmer, welche die Mystik wie ein Ornament glauben an und ablegen zu können.254 
 
Alluding to the loss of Sophie, and linking it to Dante’s longing for Beatrice, who had 
likewise died young, Tieck establishes the foundation for what he suggests is a more 
substantive connection between the two writers. Yet what is more noteworthy here than 
the biographical parallel is the language in which Tieck forms this connection. Observing 
his string of qualifying adjectives — ein einziger großer Lebensmoment, Ein tiefer 
Schmerz, allein dem erhabenen Dante, einen unergründlichen mystischen Gesang — we 
hear more than a faint echo of Schlegel’s call for a new Dantean mythology. For when in 
his dialogue Ludoviko is asked how a Spinozistic mythology might assume concrete 
form, Schlegel writes (through Ludoviko’s voice): “Wer etwa dergleichen im Sinne hätte, 
würde es nur auf die Art können und sein wollen wie Dante. Er müßte, wie er, nur Ein 
Gedicht im Geist und im Herzen haben […].”255 Dante displayed singularity, as Schlegel 
indicates in his dialogue, in two respects: (1) First, his Commedia represents the only 
means of realizing a new mythology and (2) second, he is a poet known not for a plethora 
of minor works, but rather for one, magisterial magnum opus. In one of the documents 
most notorious for mythologizing Romantic poetry, Tieck appears to have taken a lesson 
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from Schlegel’s own Rede über die Mythologie, suggesting that Novalis’s one 
“unergründliche[r] Gesang” transcended the mystical posturing of common hacks and 
dilettantes.  
 In fairness to Tieck, who on account of this biographical sketch has suffered 
considerable criticism, there were in fact unmistakeable parallels to be seen between 
Dante and Novalis.256 It is true, for example, that the death of Sophie prefigures aspects 
of the Hymnen an die Nacht as well as Heinrich von Ofterdingen, though scholars have 
long debated the weight that ought to be accorded the so-called Sophien-Erlebnis. 
Beyond biographical correspondences, moreover, the two shared poetic and intellectual 
traits. Dante’s masterpiece was preceded by the Vita Nuova, a prosimetric reflection in 
which a poet stylizes and codifies his love for a deceased woman, just as before Heinrich 
von Ofterdingen Novalis had used the Hymnen an die Nacht to articulate a 
simultaneously erotic and mystical vision of love. Just as Dante, in the De Monarchia, 
had written wistfully of the past age of (Roman) European political unity, so too had 
Novalis in Die Christenheit oder Europa longed for a lost era of (Christian) European 
unity. And just as in the Commedia Dante had merged the identity of a poet and a 
pilgrim, so too did Novalis in Heinrich von Ofterdingen compose a grand romance in 
which a poet’s process of self-actualization assumes the form of a pilgrimage. As striking 
as these parallels are, they are all the more astonishing when one considers that in his 
entire ouevre, there is not a single instance in which Novalis mentions Dante. The closest 
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one comes to finding an indication that he might have read Dante, for example, is in an 
early letter of Friedrich Schlegel to A.W. Schlegel: “Schiller hat sehr gut von dir geredet; 
vorzüglich Dein Dante hat ihm sehr gefallen, und nach dem was er von andern vom 
Dante gehört, glaubt er daß Du deßen Geist vortrefflich gefaßt hättest. Dies hat er 
Hardenberg gesagt, nicht mir….”257  
 Despite Novalis’s complete silence on the Commedia, he continued to inspire 
comparisons to Dante, particularly by dint of Heinrich von Ofterdingen. When Heinrich 
Heine discussed the novel in his retrospective analysis of German Romanticism, for 
example, he described it as “das Fragment eines großen allegorischen Gedichtes, das, wie 
die Göttliche Komödie des Dante, alle irdischen und himmlischen Dinge feiern sollte.”258 
Whereas this sounds like a vague justification for a rather bold comparison, and it may in 
fact only derive from the narrative already spun years earlier by Tieck, A.W. Schlegel 
offers a particularly illuminating comparison in his lectures on Romantic poetry. When 
discussing the Commedia, he underscores the uniqueness of its fusion of physics and 
theology with an ode to Novalis: “Es ist dies eins von den unzähligen Zeugnissen, 
wodurch man beweisen könnte, dass die Bemühungen mancher mir verbrüderten 
Zeitgenossen, z.B. Novalis, welche man als so unsinnig verschrien, in noch nicht längst 
verflossenen Zeiten als die wahre Richtung anerkannt wurden.”259 Schlegel’s exegesis of 
the Commedia as an encyclopedic poeticization of medieval science will in fact ring 
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familiar to readers of Novalis, whose encyclopedic project, Das Allgemeine Brouillon, 
had important overlaps with Heinrich von Ofterdingen. Indeed, from the time of some of 
the early criticism of the novel, including Dilthey’s treatment of it in Das Erlebnis und 
die Dichtung (1906), it has been accepted that Heinrich von Ofterdingen can in fact be 
read as a poeticization of contemporaneous scientific theories like Galvanism and 
magnetism.260 Furthermore, the link that Tieck had established between Dante’s Beatrice 
and Novalis’s Sophie was sufficiently impressive to inspire Karl Immermann, in the 
dedication to his mythic drama Merlin (1832), to draw the very same comparison.261 
 In recent years, the comparisons of Novalis’s novel and Dante’s poem have 
emerged in more definite form: Silvio Vietta has succeeded in showing that the romantic 
female figure in Heinrich von Ofterdingen, Mathilde, is the direct intertextual descendant 
of Dante’s Matelda, the woman who resides atop Mount Purgatory in the earthly 
paradise.262 Given scholars’ now two-hundred year debate over the relation of Novalis’s 
novel to Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister and the tradition of Bildungsromane/Künstlerromane, 
which, incidentally, has led to no particular interpretive consensus, Vietta has discovered 
new “data.” The novelty of this discovery is all the more surprising when we consider, 
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for example, that Dante makes no appearance in a virtually comprehensive work like 
Hans-Joachim Mähl’s Die Idee des goldenen Zeitalters im Werk des Novalis or a 
reception-history like Ira Kasperowski’s Mittelalterrezeption im Werk des Novalis. Yet 
with the rise of cultural studies, Vietta’s article has been buried under more contemporary 
approaches to Novalis’s novel.263 Given the many comparisons between Novalis and 
Dante, from the time of his death onward, it is disappointing that Vietta’s claims have not 
gained more traction — particularly given the way they alter our basic intellectual 
associations with the novel. My goal in this chapter lies in modulating the parameters of 
Vietta’s two primary maneuvers: whereas he locates Novalis’s adaptation of Dante within 
a narrative of European secularization advanced by art, I would suggest narrowing our 
focus by reading Novalis’s adaptation of Dante as a seminal moment within the narrative 
of the Romantic project of a new mythology. There are of course implications to be 
drawn for processes of secularization, but it is difficult to extrapolate them without first 
framing the novel in its more immediate context. Indeed, this point of historicization 
raises a matter of hermeneutics: whereas Vietta reads Novalis’s Mathilde as a mediatrix 
in the mold of the feminine figures in Dante’s Commedia, and convincingly so, the 
context of the Romantics’ new mythology, particularly given the Schlegels’ revolutionary 
scholarship on and theorization of the Commedia, suggests that the significance of the 
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Commedia for Heinrich von Ofterdingen lay in more than Dante’s depiction of female 
soteriological figures.264 The present chapter thus revisits the Dantean adaptations of 
Heinrich von Ofterdingen, in some cases accenting different points than those raised by 
Vietta, and in others highlighting allusions that Vietta neglects. The goal is not to 
contravene Vietta’s wonderful work, but rather to resituate the material he has identified 
and show that Novalis’s interaction with Dante constitutes an advancement of the 
Schlegelian dictum that the new mythology could be realized only in the way that Dante 
had written the Commedia. 
Establishing the Intertext 
Just as the Commedia begins on the brink of sleep (“tant’ era pien di sonno a quel punto,” 
leading some to speculate whether its action was not intended to be read as a dream,265 so 
too does Novalis’s novel open as its protagonist hovers on the borders of consciousness: 
while contemplating in the middle of the night a distant blue flower, he falls asleep to the 
vision of an unsettling dream in which he sees wondrous animals, lives with various 
people in war, is taken prisoner, dies, is reborn, and loves someone passionately but is 
                                                           
264 Vietta’s point, however, is well taken, and I would add that it anticipates an even longer trajectory than 
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of an experience that he himself—like St. Paul—was unable to explain […]” (144). This dilemma and its 
bearing on Heinrich is discussed more thoroughly below. 
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ultimately separated from her.266 Toward morning, however, Heinrich is overtaken by a 
calm that brings with it a more pleasant dream of a singular landscape: “Es kam ihm vor, 
als ginge er in einem dunkeln Walde allein. Nur selten schimmerte der Tag durch das 
grüne Netz. Bald kam er vor eine Felsenschlucht, die bergan stieg.”267 Codified by some 
of the most famous lines of European poetry (“Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita / mi 
ritrovai per una selva scura”), the image of the solitary pilgrim who traverses a dark wood 
before reaching the face of a mountain can neither be written nor read without conjuring 
the specter of the Commedia’s initial images.268 Lost in a dark wood, the allegory of a 
spiritual quagmire, Dante’s pilgrim sees that his way up a mountain and out of the forest 
is impeded by three beasts. Heinrich’s pilgrimage unfolds in the same landscape, though 
its connotations, as well as his path, are markedly different: whereas Dante’s pilgrim 
cannot scale the mountain without first witnessing the terrors below, Novalis’s disinterest 
in a specifically Christian topography of the afterlife leads him to eschew the space of 
Hell, relegating it perhaps elliptically to Heinrich’s first unquiet dreams, in favor of a 
quick ascent up the mountain, where Heinrich discovers a cavern in which he disrobes 
and bathes in an edenic spring. The space, unmistakeably vaginal in its imagery, borders 
on the incestuous in the manner in which it blends two registers of the feminine: the 
dream-journey, broken when Heinrich looks longingly at the image of a romantic object 
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but is awoken by his mother, signals at once a retreat to the womb yet a yearning for 
romantic fulfillment.269  
 The bifurcation of femininity along the borders of the maternal and the erotic, 
inasmuch as Novalis maps it onto a geography of the idyllic, bespeaks the conceptual 
dynamic according to which he had theorized the idea of a golden age, an idea that teeters 
between experiences of Erinnerung and Ahnung. Elaborating the significance of a golden 
age for Novalis is a task unto itself, and one that has been fulfilled more than adequately 
in Hans-Joachim Mähl’s magisterial work on the topic, but it bears repeating that the 
concept of a golden age animates the fundamental principles of his philosophical-
historical worldview. In abbreviated form, this idea entails a triadic structure that one can 
locate at play in most of his poetic work: a golden age that has been lost to the present 
will return in an age of fulfillment. But as Mähl has shown, the coming golden age 
represents to Novalis not simply a return to the primal Naturzustand; instead, it will be a 
new age that unites the universe in harmony while preserving the individuation of each 
being.270 Whereas to the original golden age Novalis thus ascribes characteristics like 
instinct and monotony, he envisions the new golden age as a time marked by art, 
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harmony, and rebirth.271 In this respect, we witness the considerable overlap in Novalis’s 
conception of the future of humankind, on the one hand, and what documents like Das 
älteste Systemprogramm and Die Rede über die Mythologie imagine a new mythology 
will accomplish for the future of humankind, on the other. Significantly, the authors of 
these documents, together with Novalis, agree that the approximation of a future utopia 
will be effected by art alone. They even share the same metaphorics of flowing water in 
its visualization: just as in the Gespräch über die Poesie Schlegel writes that “alle Ströme 
der Poesie fließen zusammen in das allgemeine große Meer,” and just as the System des 
transcendentalen Idealismus envisions that the age of myth would usher in a sea of 
poetry, so too does Novalis write of the coming golden age as a return of the waters of 
poetry.272  
 The novel’s first dream functions as a microcosm of this conceptual dynamic, 
transporting Heinrich to a primal womb in which he is simultaneously enveloped by the 
warmth of the past yet reborn to the delights of a future that will be realized by means of 
his development as a poet. Indeed, the subsequent action of the novel reveals the 
profound extent to which this dream functions as a harbinger of Heinrich’s process of 
actualization and Novalis’s attendant poeticization of past and future. In this respect, we 
might focus our attention on the novel’s pivotal fifth and sixth chapters, where — after a 
series of encounters with merchants, crusaders, and their captive, Zulima — Heinrich 
first penetrates the surface of the earth and encounters the memory of the original golden 
                                                           
271 Mähl, 306-309. 
272 KFSA II, 283; HKA IX/1, 329; Mähl, 398.  
 
 
 
107 
age before ascending to experience a premonition of its future coming. This sequence 
begins when in a village tavern Heinrich happens upon an aged Bohemian miner who 
regales a group of curious listeners with tales of his trade and leads a party, including 
Heinrich, into nearby caves. Wending their way underground, they pass deposits of bone 
and teeth in various states of decay and petrification, which while frightening to the 
neophytes, signify to the adept miner the “Überbleibsel einer uralten Zeit,” “Zeichen 
eines undenklichen Altertums.”273 As Theodore Ziolkowski has noted, geological 
observation in the late eighteenth century afforded a novel mode of historical 
interpretation, with some writing of lapides literati, others finding runes in stones, yet 
others believing they had discovered Hebrew or Arabic inscriptions in crystals.274 In this 
case, they point to a primeval antiquity whose conflicting interpretations by the miner and 
his followers dramatize the very question of how to “read” history.  
 The same interpretive quandary arises in the miner’s subsequent discussion with 
Count Friedrich of Hohenzollern, a crusader-turned-hermit whom the miner and his 
group discover living in the caves. The hermit opines that, from a remote distance, one 
can interpret series of events and begin to understand the interconnectedness of past, 
present, and future. In an echo of Friedrich Schlegel’s maxim that “Der Historiker ist ein 
rückwärts gekehrter Prophet,” he describes miners as “verkehrte Astrologen […]. Jenen 
ist der Himmel das Buch der Zukunft, während euch die Erde Denkmale der Urwelt 
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zeigt.”275 When they wander into other caverns, it is this discussion that foregrounds one 
of the novel’s most enigmatic moments: Heinrich leafs through the hermit’s library and 
discovers a book as remarkable as it is indecipherable, for in it he recognizes images of 
himself, his family, and his new acquaintances. The puzzling artifact, the meaning of 
which he cannot solve, conveys to the novel’s readers in a poetic image the theory of 
historical understanding that the hermit had just explained:  
Der eigentliche Sinn für die Geschichten der Menschen entwickelt sich erst spät, und 
mehr unter den stillen Einflüssen der Erinnerung, als unter den gewaltsameren 
Eindrücken der Gegenwart. Die nächsten Ereignisse scheinen nur locker verknüpft […]; 
und nur dann, wenn man imstande ist, eine lange Reihe zu übersehn und weder alles 
buchstäblich zu nehmen, noch auch mit mutwilligen Träumen die eigentliche Ordnung zu 
verwirren, bemerkt man die geheime Verkettung des Ehemaligen und Künftigen, und 
lernt man die Geschichte aus Hoffnung und Erinnerung zusammensetzen.276  
 
Heinrich cannot interpret the book, Novalis suggests, because he is blinded by his 
proximity to the story that it tells.   
 History is rendered more intelligible, the miner and the hermit agree, when it is 
fused with the spirit of poetry, even assuming the form of a fairy-tale.277 It is this 
transformation that we find in the very next chapter: whereas the descent through the 
caves had evoked a golden age of the historic past, Heinrich’s arrival in Augsburg now 
ushers in the fairy-tale paradise of a future age. Disembarking at the home of Heinrich’s 
grandfather, Schwaning, the traveling party hears music and observes that a party is 
afoot, for which reason Heinrich and his mother fret over their weary appearance. 
Entering the house, but unable to locate anyone, they ascend a spiral staircase, explain 
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themselves to the servants, and eventually meet Schwaning in an overladen scene of 
anagnorisis that reenacts a fairy-tale told to Heinrich by the merchants with whom he had 
traveled. The entire sequence, the reader quickly realizes, represents Novalis’s mythic 
transformation of the cave of history into a fairy-tale. The otherworldly topos in which 
Heinrich finds himself is none other than an earthly paradise: amidst singing, dancing, 
drinking, and jollity, he is introduced by his grandfather to both a poet, Klingsohr, as well 
as to Klingsohr’s charming daughter, Mathilde, who serves as an allegory of the spirit of 
poetry itself, the actualization of the blue flower that Heinrich had seen in the novel’s 
first dream. In describing the atmosphere’s effect on Heinrich, Novalis embeds the 
images in a biblical register:  
Der Lebensgenuß stand wie ein klingender Baum voll goldener Früchte vor ihm. Das 
Übel ließ sich nicht sehen, und es dünkte ihm unmöglich, daß je die menschliche 
Neigung von diesem Baume zu der gefährlichen Frucht des Erkentnisses, zu dem Baume 
des Krieges sich gewendet haben sollte. Er verstand nun den Wein und die Speisen. Sie 
schmeckten ihm überaus köstlich. Ein himmlisches Öl würzte sie ihm, und aus dem 
Becher funkelte die Herrlichkeit des irdischen Lebens.278  
 
The majesty of earthly life, the tree with its fruit, and Heinrich’s disbelief that amidst this 
splendor one would have turned toward evil all render clear allusions to the garden of 
Eden as it is depicted in Genesis. While such thoughts occupy Heinrich, his grandfather 
interrupts with a song that not only thematizes the earthly paradise, but that directly 
bespeaks Heinrich's disbelief that Adam and Eve could have ever chosen sin: 
    Sind wir nicht geplagte Wesen? 
    Ist nicht unser Los betrübt? 
    Nur zu Zwang und Not erlesen 
    In Verstellung nur geübt, 
    Dürfen selbst nicht unsre Klagen 
    Sich aus unserm Busen wagen. 
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    Allem was die Eltern sprechen, 
    Widerspricht das volle Herz. 
    Die verbotne Frucht zu brechen 
    Fühlen wir der Sehnsucht Schmerz; 
    Möchten gern die süßen Knaben 
    Fest an unserm Herzen haben. 
 
    Wäre dies zu denken Sünde? 
    Zollfrei sind Gedanken doch. 
    Was bleibt einem armen Kinde 
    Außer süßen Träumen noch? 
    Will man sie auch gern verbannen, 
    Nimmer ziehen sie von dannen.279  
 
There are at least two points to be made here with respect to Novalis’s adaptation of the 
Commedia. Leaving aside for now the major intertextual link, namely the connection of 
Novalis’s Mathilde to Dante’s Matelda, the first of these points concerns the initial 
response of Dante’s pilgrim upon learning that he has entered the earthly paradise after 
having scaled Mount Purgatory. There he reproaches the nerve of Eve, who “could not 
suffer to be under any veil, under which if she had devoutly remained I would have felt 
those ineffable delights sooner and for longer time.”280 It is precisely this reaction, though 
articulated more humanely in the narration of Novalis’s novel, that both preoccupies 
Heinrich’s thoughts and precipitates his grandfather’s song, which in opposition to Dante, 
justifies concupiscence from the perspective of Eve. The second observation to be made 
with respect to the adaptation of the Commedia, related to the first, concerns the very 
technique by which Novalis has enabled Heinrich’s grandfather to intuit Heinrich’s 
thoughts and provide correction: precisely this ability to “read the mind” of the poet-
pilgrim and provide instruction recurs throughout the dialogue between Virgil and Dante 
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in the Commedia. Just as Dante’s Virgil is endowed with the qualities of both mind-
reader and prophet, so too is Novalis’s Schwaning, whose so apparently quaint drinking 
song in fact presages Heinrich’s fateful dream that evening. 
 This dream, which is found at the end of the sixth chapter, occurs just as 
Heinrich’s dream in the first chapter had, which is to say it materializes in the hours just 
before waking. Apropos the dreams’ links to the Commedia, this attention to the hour of 
their appearance bears significance inasmuch as the Dante points to the hours before 
sleep as the time when dreams are prophetic.281 In Heinrich’s dream, when a blue river 
emerges from a space of greenery, Mathilde appears paddling a small boat on the river. 
Bedecked in wreaths, she looks wistfully at Heinrich while singing. Suddenly the boat 
begins to swirl and take in water. Heinrich tries to bridge the space between them by 
diving into the river and following her voice, but he is carried away and loses 
consciousness while Mathilde is drawn under. When he regains consciousness, he 
believes himself to be ashore; indeed, Mathilde clutches him in a tight embrace, fulfilling 
the words of yearning in Schwaning’s song: “[wir Mädchen] möchten gern die süßen 
Knaben / fest an unserem Herzen haben.” Heinrich asks where the river is, Mathilde 
points to its blue waves above them and indicates that they have both been submerged, 
explaining that they are now in the eternal realm of their parents. She kisses him and 
whispers a secret word that, though it resounds through his entire being, is lost when he is 
awoken by his grandfather.282 Inasmuch as the dream stages the union of the pilgrim with 
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his romantic object, it constitutes a reimagined transformation of the novel’s first dream, 
in which Heinrich had submerged himself in water before losing consciousness and 
awaking (within the dream) to the image of Mathilde’s face in the blue flower.  
 It is the paradisiacal landscape of the Commedia, its representation of the 
encounter between the poet-pilgrim and the feminine figure who tends that landscape, 
and indeed its sequence of action that shapes these vital dreamscapes in Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen. Whereas in the first dream Heinrich had begun in the equivalent of Dante’s 
selva oscura, reality itself has now assumed the hue of poetry, foregrounding the action 
of the second dream. Thus it is the actual setting of his grandfather’s home, repeatedly 
coded as a return to the locus amoenus of Eden, that introduces the dream whose events 
now unfold in the equivalent of the divina foresta in which Dante locates his earthly 
paradise. When he enters that forest, Dante’s pilgrim hears the melodious singing of a 
woman (Matelda) whom he observes picking flowers across a stream. He advances 
toward her and requests that she, too, move nearer that he might understand her 
singing.283 A good deal more occurs, too, some of which we will revisit, but it is 
important to mention now how the encounter between Dante’s pilgrim and Matelda 
grounds Heinrich’s dream most fundamentally. In the earthly paradise, Dante’s pilgrim 
witnesses a stunning procession of allegorical figures, each of which represents a book of 
the Bible; amidst these figures on a chariot rides Beatrice, whose words for the pilgrim 
are not those of a long-lost, mourning lover: instead of seeing to a happy reunion, she 
fiercely chides him for turning to wantonness after her death, stirring in him such acute 
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compunction that he is purified to the point of attaining access to paradise itself.284 At the 
moment of repentance, however, he faints, with Matelda drawing him into the earthly 
paradise’s river, Lethe, as she walks on it as lightly as a bark; she embraces him, 
submerges him, and in so doing, purges him of the memory of sin.285 Afterward, as the 
pilgrim approaches the shore, he hears the psalm asperges me being sung, yet Dante the 
poet remarks that it was so sweet that he can neither remember nor write it.   
 As Dante had done with myriad classical sources, Novalis transforms this scene, 
adapting it to the logic of his protagonist’s quest for poetic self-actualization in a golden 
age marked, above all, by love. The parallels to Heinrich’s dream are unmistakable: both 
Mathilde’s singing and her separation by water from Heinrich, who attempts to overcome 
this gap, represent a clear reworking of Purgatorio 29. The loss of consciousness, the 
submersion, the association of Matelda/Mathilde with a small boat, as well as a final, 
secret word all point to a poetic reworking in Novalis’s novel that, even if it does not 
signify the same sort of salvific purification it does in the Commedia, nonetheless 
effectively translates Purgatorio 31 for the sake of marking Heinrich’s transition to full-
fledged poet and lover. Yet the parallels are more profound, and indeed, Novalis’s 
reliance on Dante is more striking than this would first indicate. That Mathilde functions 
(partially) as an allegory for the spirit of poetry seems no mere invention of Novalis, but 
rather a manipulation of Dante’s Matelda, who at nearly every juncture is marked by her 
delight in song. The significance of Dante’s Matelda for Novalis, however, extends 
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further yet, for even before the centrality of her song — which, in the context of the 
Commedia, exemplifies her active service to God — stands her role as the new Eve, an 
embodiment of pure erotic love.286  
 Such is the nature of Novalis’s Mathilde, who is not to be reduced to a mere 
allegory of poetry, for her inspiration for Heinrich’s poetic development is inseparable 
from her undeniably erotic dimensions. This combination of traits renders her character 
more clearly intelligible in light of Novalis’s concept of a golden age: influenced by the 
Dutch Platonist Franz Hemsterhuis’s theorization of history and its culmination in an 
eternal golden age, Novalis’s own postulation of a future age of unity relied not only on 
the approximation of that age via the power of poetry, but also, and crucially, via the 
power of love. Just as Hemsterhuis had written of a moralisches Organ that, in contrast to 
the organs of sense, could provide for a direct intuition of nature and hence the 
immediacy required of union with other beings, so too did Novalis theorize this 
possibility, writing of love as the “alleinige, ewige Basis aller wahrhaften, 
unzertrennlichen Verbindung.”287 As the emblem of the earthly paradise, Mathilde, like 
Matelda, unites celestial song with pure love: “die Liebe,” Klingsohr says while 
observing Mathilde, “ist selbst nichts, als die höchste Naturpoesie.”288 The remarkable 
relationship between Mathilde and Matelda lies not, as Vietta suggests, in a contrast 
whereby Matelda points to the Jenseits and Mathilde points to the Diesseits; this is to 
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simplify a matter of metaphysics that, on the one hand, is in actuality far more complex, 
and on the other, seems to be beside the point.289 What is at stake in the link between 
these figures is the transfigurative experience each affords to the pilgrim-poet: in both 
cases, Matelda/Mathilde subjects the pilgrim-poet to a rite of baptism that necessarily 
precedes his transformation to poet-prophet. It is true that in the case of Dante the ritual 
prepares his pilgrim for a symbolically Christian representation of paradise, whereas in 
the case of Novalis, the baptismal scene paves the way to the transformation of 
Heinrich’s world into a realm of poetry. Yet the notion that Novalis’s adaptation amounts 
to a secularization of Dante’s mediatrix relies so heavily on the narrative of secularization 
that it loses sight of the novel’s more immediate context, the Romantic project of a new 
mythology. 
The Function of the Dantean Dream 
For all the talk of common imagery, we ought not overlook the fact that the dream itself 
features as a constitutive device in the narrative of both the Commedia and Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen. Just as Novalis begins the first chapter of his novel with an extended 
dreamscape, Dante too uses structural markers to foreground the centrality of the dream 
to his poem; indeed, in addition to flanking his poem with references to sleep, he signals 
                                                           
289 In his groundbreaking explication of the metaphysical system that underlies the Commedia, Christian 
Moevs challenges the casual attribution of a generically medieval worldview to Dante by arguing instead 
that Dante’s metaphysics rests on five principles: (1) the world of space and time actually exists in Intellect; 
(2) matter denotes not material, but rather distance from being; (3) creation is limitation of Intellect and 
exists only insofar as it participates in Intellect; (4) creation and creator are not two, nor however are they 
the same; (5) one cannot experience God; one can only “know” God to the extent that one knows oneself as 
God. While I would not suggest that Novalis, or even Schelling, understood Dante’s metaphysics quite as 
carefully as does Moevs, this metaphysical outline nonetheless complicates Vietta’s thesis of Novalis as 
secularizing Dante’s largely medieval worldview inasmuch as it aligns Dante’s worldview much more 
closely with the monism of the Romantics. See Moevs, The Metaphysics of the Comedy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), 4-5.   
 
 
 
116 
the cardinal importance of the dream as technique by bracketing the literal center of the 
poem (Purgatorio 16) with a dream in the preceding and following cantos. Beyond 
functioning as mere citations of a visionary genre, however, the dreams of the Commedia 
constitute narratival maneuvers that span the spheres of poetry and prophecy. This much 
is true of Heinrich, too, of course, where the dream marks a liminal space defined by its 
ambiguous relation to both truth and fiction.290 It is to this point that we now turn, for I 
wish to show that Novalis not only repurposes the imagery of Dante in his dreams, but 
that his very use of these dreams as a technique of narration fulfills the role accorded the 
dream in the logic of the Commedia. In making this claim, I want to suggest that it is 
through the dreamscape that Novalis realizes the possibility of harmonizing the ideality 
of the subject and the objectivity of external reality — i.e., the possibility of a poetics of 
myth. 
 The proximity of Novalis’s unfinished novel project to the Romantics’ new 
mythology has been probed since Friedrich Schlegel’s 1803 review in the journal 
Europa, where he characterized it as an “Übergang vom Roman zur Mythologie.”291 
What it is that constitutes the mythology of the novel, however, has eluded scholarly 
consensus, in large measure because the novel has proven intractable in yielding reliable 
signs of the mimetic principles by which it operates. In Klingsohr’s fairy-tale, for 
example, Dilthey saw the “Verkörperung einer die Natur erklärenden Weltansicht,” 
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which led him to call it “Mythologie.”292 Haym regarded the novel as a work of 
“mythologischer Einkleidung,” but that which lay under the cloak of myth, he wrote, was 
“die Gemüthsgeschichte, die poetisirte Lebensgeschichte des Dichters selbst.”293 In her 
influential reading of the novel’s unfinished second half, “Die Erfüllung,” Elisabeth 
Stopp located the mythology in the novel’s apparent poeticization of a doctrine of 
metempsyochosis, citing the reiterations of the novel’s female type — Zulima, Mathilde, 
Cyane — as evidence.294 Dennis Mahoney, on the other hand, has located the novel’s 
mythic character not in metempsychosis, but rather in what he sees as a motif of death 
and resurrection.295 
 The readings of Stopp and Mahoney, in identifying the mythological dimension of 
the novel in the eschatological events within the narrative, overlook the more essential 
quality of the new mythology as an aesthetics predicated not on action that resembles 
myth, but on what Schlegel and Novalis understood to be symbolism (Symbolismus). 
Schlegel, we will recall, would describe the neue Mythologie as a “symbolische Ansicht 
der Natur.” This implies that any reading of Heinrich von Ofterdingen as an attempt at 
the realization of a mythology needs necessarily to consider not first and foremost the 
actions of the novel’s agents, but rather the mimetic system from which that action is 
generated. As Novalis himself wrote of the task of the novelist, “Es kommt also alles auf 
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die Weise an, auf die künstlerische Wählungs und Verbindungskunst [Poësie 
hervorzubringen].”296 In point of fact, it is a disagreement over how this question ought to 
be answered that begets the tension between the seminal readings proposed by Dilthey, 
on the one hand, and Haym on the other: whereas the former reads the novel as a poetic 
articulation of a science of nature, the latter reads the novel as a narrative of the interior, a 
poetic memoir of Heinrich’s artistic development that, while featuring elements like the 
transmigration of souls, has as its true backdrop Heinrich’s own soul.297 We are dealing, 
in other words, with a question of subject-object primacy within the realm of the 
aesthetic. That is to say, the difference between the readings of Dilthey and Haym hinges 
on determining whether it is a worldview ordered by idealism or realism that guides the 
mimetic practice of the novel. Whereas Dilthey’s reading would suggest the primacy of 
the object, and thus imply that the novel assumes a mimesis of realism, Haym’s reading 
inclines in the other direction: “Die Metaphysik des Menschenlebens, zusammenfallend 
mit der Metaphysik des Universums, wird in geschichtlicher Form, in Form einer 
Erzählung von dem Lebenslauf eines Dichters mit der unbedingten Freiheit 
metaphysischer, transcendentaler Poesie vorgetragen.”298 
 In his notes from the composition of the novel, Novalis expresses it in the 
following way: “Poësie ist wahrhafter Idealismus — Betrachtung der Welt, wie 
Betrachtung eines großen Gemüths — Selbstbewußtseyn des Universums.”299 While he 
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seems to offer an easy answer, calling poetry “wahrhafter Idealismus,” his definition of 
the term reveals that poetry is hardly reducible to Fichte’s idealism of the ego. On the 
contrary, it is a mode of observation that acknowledges the reality of the universe while 
comprehending it as mind or spirit. Contrary to the mythic cloak of nature proposed by 
Dilthey, as well as to the thesis of idealism suggested by Haym, the definition of poetry 
that Novalis develops corresponds precisely to what Frederick Beiser describes as 
Novalis’s philosophy of absolute idealism. Novalis believes, namely, that “the absolute 
has both a subjective and objective aspect, that it unites idealism and realism.” His goal, 
as Beiser shows, “is to synthesize Fichte and Spinoza.”300 On this note, we will recall that 
in the theoretical manifesto of the new mythology, F. Schlegel’s Rede über die 
Mythologie, there had been heralded a new mythology that would rest upon the 
“Harmonie des Ideellen und Reellen.”301 It is this aesthetic imperative, articulated in 
Novalis’s notes, that animates the poetics of his novel project and which, I believe, Paul 
Kluckhohn alluded to when writing that the novel was neither realistic nor allegorical, but 
“ein symbolischer Roman, der die Immanenz des Transzendenten im diesseitigen Leben, 
die tiefere Wesenheit, das Göttliche im Irdischen aufzeigen will.”302  
 That Heinrich von Ofterdingen can be regarded as a project conceived under the 
rubric of a symbolic new mythology can be deduced, apart from any reading of the novel 
itself, from the letters exchanged between Novalis and F. Schlegel in the years prior to 
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the novel’s composition. Novalis, for his part, urged Schlegel to write “etwas Ganzes.”303 
And Schlegel, on the basis of Novalis’s (recently announced) transition to poetry, 
recruited him for what must have seemed like tantalizing plans: “Du kannst denken,” he 
writes to Novalis, 
 […] daß Projekte die Menge gewachsen sind, beynah so viel wie in der Philosophie. 
Einige versuche ich gewiß mit Ernst, und von Einem hoffe ich schon mit Zuversicht 
Gelingen. – Alle sind so, daß kein Mensch der Jezigen sie machen kann, auch Goethe 
nicht, und doch kann ich aus Urschriften und Philosophie beweisen, daß sie kommen 
müssen, es mag sie machen wer will, und wann er will. Die Ideen würden aber auch 
beym ersten Blick grade Dich plötzlich treffen und Dir ganz gefallen.304  
 
Novalis, whose letters evince a continuing fascination with an aesthetics of totality, teases 
Schlegel meanwhile with a plan that “nichts minder betrift, als die mögliche, evidente 
Realisirung der kühnsten Wünsche und Ahndungen jeder Zeit — auf die analogste, 
begreiflichste Art von der Welt.”305 Remarks of this sort in the Novalis-Schlegel 
correspondence, as we will have noticed from their subsequent resonances in the Rede 
über die Mythologie, foreground the rhetoric in which the project of the new mythology 
would ultimately be framed. 
 Yet what underwrites the conspicuous excitement in such statements is not merely 
the promise of a new Romantic poetry, the Verschmelzung of literature and philosophy 
that Schlegel describes in the Athenäumsfragmenten. It is the conviction that their poetic 
endeavors were very nearly about to transcend the limits of even Fichte’s idealism and 
Schelling’s realism. We witness this, for example, in Novalis’s letter of July 20, 1798 to 
Schlegel:  
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In meiner Philosophie des täglichen Lebens bin ich auf die Idee einer moralischen / im 
Hemsterhuisischen Sinn / Astronomie gekommen und habe die interressante Entdeckung 
der Religion des sichtbaren Weltalls gemacht. Ich denke hier, Schelling weit zu 
überfliegen. Was denkst Du, ob das nicht der rechte Weg ist, die Physik im allgemeinsten 
Sinn, schlechterdings Symbolisch zu behandeln? Auf diesem Wege denk ich tiefer, als je, 
einzudringen und aller Campanen und Oefen entübrigt zu seyn.306  
 
In language that clearly anticipates Schlegel’s own formulae, Novalis articulates a 
symbolic program that serves the very same absolute idealism described above by Beiser. 
Art would not merely poeticize the laws of nature in a form already prevalent in the 
fundamentally didactic fables of an anti-aesthetic Enlightenment; on the contrary, it 
would stage the convergence of nature and spirit, alternate aspects of the one absolute, in 
the concrete revelation of a symbolic “Religion des sichtbaren Weltalls.” In locating the 
essence of religion in an intuition of the universe provided for by art, Novalis displays 
signs of the same Platonism and Spinozism that simultaneously guided Schleiermacher in 
the composition of his speeches on religion. And by theorizing the relationship of ethics 
and physics, indeed conceiving of subject and object as alternate valences of one and the 
same absolute, Novalis does indeed fly past Schelling, who would not formulate the 
principles of his Identitätsphilosophie for some time yet. Enamoured by the idea of a 
“Galvanismus des Geistes,” Schlegel even enjoined Novalis to begin with him a 
publishable correspondence in which they would unite religion and physics.307 
 The question facing Novalis was how to forge the representation of that which is 
marked by its equally subjective and objective dimensions, how to write a “Betrachtung 
der Welt” that is a “Betrachtung des großen Gemüths.” If taken in the direction of 
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Dilthey, Novalis would seem to have granted the fantastical aspect of the narrative the 
full weight of reality, while if taken in the direction of Haym, he would have 
subordinated the fantastical aspect of the narrative to the imaginative power of Heinrich’s 
interior. For interpreters of the novel to choose between the horns of this mimetic 
dualism, however, is as unnecessary as it was for Novalis to have chosen between Fichte 
and Spinoza, between idealism and realism. Schlegel’s note that the novel represents an 
“Übergang vom Roman zur Mythologie,” referencing Novalis’s own note that “der 
Roman soll allmälich in Märchen übergehn” — indeed that it would be a “glückliche 
Mischung” of novel and fairy-tale308 — signals not an either/or that either absolutizes the 
ego or absolutizes nature, but rather a spectrum along which the novel itself moves.  
 The primary authorial technique whereby Novalis manages to dance across the 
spectrum of subject and object, present throughout the novel, is his use of the dream. The 
major dream sequence of the opening chapter, for example, which stages an 
incrementally deepening penetration into the interior of Heinrich via dreams within 
dreams and caverns within caverns, turns out to be not merely the solipsistic 
representation of a poeticized idealism, but rather the subjective dimension of an 
aesthetic strategy that depicts its objective complement in the subsequent action of the 
novel: that is to say, the apparently narcissistic quality of the dream vanishes when 
readers see that it delineates not only the workings of Heinrich’s interior, but rather that it 
prophesies the actual events of his life that are yet to come. The same is true, of course, 
of the tragic dream in which Heinrich sees Mathilde drown. For inasmuch as it is 
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foregrounded by Schwaning’s song and fulfilled by the death of Mathilde, it functions as 
a thread with which Novalis intertwines the interior of his protagonist with the actuality 
of the world in which he exists.  
 Far more than a poetic device that serves to foreshadow, the dream is a vehicle 
that concentrates the force of narrative foreshadowing by transferring it from the 
epistemological domain of the reader to that of the protagonist; the dream is thus the 
prophetic space in which the interior of the protagonist intersects with the actuality of his 
existence. When Heinrich asks his father, for example, “Ist nicht jeder, auch der 
verworrenste Traum, eine sonderliche Erscheinung, die auch ohne noch an göttliche 
Schickung dabei zu denken, ein bedeutsamer Riß in den geheimnisvollen Vorhang ist, der 
mit tausend Falten in unser Inneres hereinfällt?,”309 the image of the torn curtain that 
grants a glimpse of the interior likewise signifies a passage of mediation between the 
subject and the stage of the world upon which he lives. It is true, as Schlegel and Novalis 
noted, that Heinrich von Ofterdingen becomes increasingly mythological in character as 
the narrative transitions from part one to part two, yet this passage from novel to 
mythology hinges not on the mere introduction of the fantastic, which is present from the 
beginning, but rather on the increasing interpenetration of subject and object, of spirit and 
nature. This finds its clearest expression in the pantheistic song of Astralis, Heinrich and 
Mathilde’s child, who in addition to singing of the hen kai pan proclaims that “Die Welt 
wird Traum, der Traum wird Welt.”310  
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 Assuming, as I have demonstrated, that the dreamscapes themselves operate 
within the narrative as a technique whereby Novalis mediates between the poles of 
idealism and realism, thus fulfilling the aesthetic imperative of his and Friedrich 
Schlegel’s theorization of a new mythology, there remains the question why Dante’s 
Commedia should have seemed apt for this mode of art that would take as its task the 
union of spirit and nature, ego and world, subject and object. As we know, in his Rede 
über die Mythologie, Schlegel had identified Dante in a fairly general way as the lone 
figure capable of providing a model for such an endeavor, yet in Heinrich von 
Ofterdingen we witness a concrete attempt to manipulate the Commedia in the service of 
the new mythology. What in certain respects is striking about its adaptation of Dante is 
the silence in which Novalis deploys the Commedia: whereas notes and letters indicate a 
preoccupation with Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, for example, there exists no truly helpful 
documentation — let alone conspicuous markers within the novel — that would betray 
Novalis’s appeal to the Commedia.  
 Without ascribing too much significance to this curiosity of the novel’s 
composition, it seems reasonable nonetheless to deduce two points from it. First of all, 
with the exception of his use of the name Mathilde, Novalis’s appropriation of the 
Commedia is so subtle that it can hardly be read as a form of literary citation, according 
to which the reader’s ability to recognize a familiar scene, for example, would in some 
way be constitutive of how Novalis imagined the novel ought to be read. A corollary of 
this observation would seem to be the proposition that Novalis discovered in the 
Commedia something of legitimate use value for the construction of his own novel. On 
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the basis of the Dantean character of Heinrich’s dreams, the present reading argues that 
Novalis’s use of the dream as a means of bridging subject-object dualism finds its source 
in the Commedia.  
 The challenge to Novalis lay in avoiding the basic dichotomy represented by the 
readings of Dilthey and Haym: Heinrich von Ofterdingen, having emerged in the years of 
Novalis’s reconciliation of idealism and realism, could neither give the impression of 
pure mimesis of nature nor that of pure expression of interiority. In some way, it had to 
do both. As I have shown, the fusion of subject and object was provided for by Novalis’s 
interpenetration of dreamscape and reality, a fiction so effective that it has prompted 
readers like those I have noted to debate whether Novalis is actually propagating 
something like a doctrine of the transmigration of souls or whether such elements of the 
narrative are not simply reflective of Heinrich’s own subjectivity. This feat, when 
granting the indebtedness of the dreams’ depictions to Dante’s Commedia, is virtually 
impossible to read apart from one of the fundamental debates that has long governed the 
interpretation of the Commedia: that, namely, over whether the Commedia ought to be 
read as the poet’s viaggio or his visione, his voyage or his vision. Since perhaps the time 
of Boccaccio’s biography of Dante, in which he relates the story of a group of Veronese 
women who, upon seeing Dante, note “how his beard is crisped and his complexion 
browned by the heat and smoke that is below,” the voyage/vision question has been in 
play — albeit at a usually more elevated level of inquiry.311 In essence, however, the crux 
of the debate is the following: if the Commedia is to be read as a voyage, its author must 
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be deemed a poet (and not a space traveler, as the Veronese suggest!); if, on the other 
hand, the Commedia is to be read as a vision, its author is to be deemed a prophet. The 
history of the interpretation of the Commedia includes prominent voices on both sides, 
with Bruno Nardi, for example, asserting that Dante continued the tradition of the Old 
Testament prophets and medieval visionaries, while Charles Singleton, on the other hand, 
famously writes that “the fiction of the Commedia is that it is not fiction.”312  
 In recent years, the dantista Teodolinda Barolini has very convincingly exposed 
this debate as predicated upon a false dichotomy by reassessing the dream qualities of the 
poem and arguing that Dante’s empiricism (i.e. his poetry of voyage) operates in tandem 
with his mysticism (i.e. his theology of vision). Barolini’s argument relies, in the first 
place, on the elliptical remarks at the beginning and end of the Commedia, both of which 
allow readers to infer, though not conclude, that the experience of the Commedia is 
underwritten by sleep.313 According to Barolini, these subtle but essential remarks form 
“part of Dante’s Pauline strategy, stemming from his need to veil in mystery the ultimate 
mode of an experience that he himself — like St. Paul — was unable to explain: […] ‘I 
know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago — whether in the body I known not or out 
of the body I know not, God knows — was caught up to the third heaven.’”314 In 
following the example of Paul, therefore, the nature of whose rapture is famously 
ambiguous, Dante suggests the corporeality of his experience all the while that he veils it 
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in the language of sleep. As Barolini writes of Dante’s allusions to Paul, “Dante chooses 
a precursor who ‘went’ as well as ‘saw’ […] who left his mode of going notoriously 
unexplained, so that an exegetical tradition grew up devoted to explaining what the 
apostle says he does not know and, increasingly, to debating whether or not Paul saw 
God in his essence.”315  
 What I want to emphasize in Barolini’s argument, and what I believe is crucial for 
Novalis’s own narrative, is that Dante uses sleeping and dreaming as a poetic device not 
for the sake of undermining the reality of his experience, but in order to blur the lines that 
would otherwise allow for the distinction between voyage and vision. As Barolini 
explains, “Transition in the Commedia is regularly represented by sleep, a 
quintessentially liminal condition that participates in both life and death, standing on the 
thresholds of both worlds and fully committed to neither.”316 Dreams, for Dante, are 
never mere fiction, for the sleep that he depicts is the waking sleep of John the 
Evangelist, who goes “dormendo, con la faccia arguta” (“sleeping, with a vigilant 
face”).317 As Barolini argues so cogently, sleeping and dreaming function within the logic 
of the Commedia so as to mediate between the apparently opposed experiences of voyage 
and vision, participating in the reality of both of them without privileging either. As a 
narrative technique that in this way sustains both the actuality of experience and the 
subjectivity of vision, Dante’s poetics of waking sleep afforded Novalis the means 
whereby he could in fact unite the apparent antipodes of idealism and realism, thus 
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preserving and indeed intertwining both the cognition of the subject and the reality of 
objective experience. The potency is perhaps diminished in Novalis’s third-person 
narration, which lacks the same ability to collapse the space between action, narration, 
and reading that Dante’s first-person poem possesses, but the history of the novel’s 
reception suggests nonetheless that Novalis’s convergence of dream and reality has the 
effect of clouding distinctions between reality and subjectivity just as in the Commedia. 
 That Novalis should have adapted his poetics of the dream from Dante, even 
incorporating the Commedia into the dreams of his novel, may likewise owe to 
circumstantial factors. Not least of these is the commentary of A.W. Schlegel on the 
Purgatorio, published in 1796 in W.G. Becker’s Taschenbuch zum geselligen Vergnügen, 
in which Schlegel discusses dreams in relation to the scenes that Novalis actually adapts, 
those namely from the earthly paradise. Schlegel focuses in particular on Dante’s dream 
of Rachael and Leah at the end of Purgatorio 27. Whereas in the Commedia the dream of 
these sisters prefigures the appearance of Beatrice and Matelda, with the latter 
representing a forerunner of the former in the biblical story of Jacob, Schlegel focuses on 
the theological differences between sisters and writes of Rachael as a model of 
“himmlischer Beschauung” in a manner that would no doubt have intrigued Novalis: 
“Hieraus ist es nun begreiflich, warum die ursprünglich schöne Seele, der das Ideale 
natürlich ist, die Seele eines Plato, eines Petrarca oder Hemsterhuys, den stärksten Hang 
zu himmlischer Beschauung fühlt. Mit hingegebner Liebe verliert sie [Rachael] sich aus 
ihrem eignen Innern, um sich in der Gottheit wiederzufinden” In point of fact, it is Leah 
— singing, picking flowers, and winding a garland — who prefigures Dante’s Matelda 
 
 
 
129 
and, ultimately, Novalis’s Mathilde. But in all likelihood, Schlegel’s exegesis of the 
passage would have at the very least roused the curiosity of Novalis, who at the time of 
writing Heinrich von Ofterdingen had been enthralled not only by Hemsterhuys, but by 
his engagement with Neoplatonism in the philosophy of Plotinus.318 This is to say 
nothing, by the way, of the attention that A.W. Schlegel devotes to Dante’s frequent use 
of early-morning dreams, noting that such dreams are “am wirksamsten,” a lesson that 
Novalis clearly adapts to the depiction of dreams in his novel.   
 A final component of Novalis’s dreamscapes that has not yet been discussed, but 
which merits more than a modicum of our attention, is the specifically biblical-revelatory 
character of the dream in his novel. Heinrich’s father, an incorrigible philistine, 
admonishes Heinrich after he has awoken from his first mesmerizing dream: 
 Träume sind Schäume […] Die Zeiten sind nicht mehr, wo zu den Träumen göttliche 
Gesichte sich gesellten, und wir können und werden es nicht begreifen, wie es jenen 
auserwählten Männern, von denen die Bibel erzählt, zu Muthe gewesen ist. Damals muß 
es eine andere Beschaffenheit mit den Träumen gehabt haben, so wie mit den 
menschlichen Dingen.319  
 
Importantly, within the medieval setting of the novel, dreams are linked to the dream-
visions of biblical authors. This diatribe thus calls to mind those visions of prophets and 
scribes like Ezekiel, Paul, and John, all of whom inform the religious-visionary character 
of the Commedia in unique ways.320 Dante’s “Pauline strategy,” noted above in the 
discussion of Barolini, culminates in what may well be the most astonishing image of the 
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Commedia, the allegorical pageant that Dante’s pilgrim witnesses in the earthly paradise. 
There, after having met Matelda, he beholds a parade of celestial figures who represent 
each of the books of the bible. The procession, which ends with the sleepwalking man 
with the alert face (John, author of Revelation), constitutes of course more than a 
mesmerizing Johannine vision. It signifies nothing less than Dante’s own effort to 
arrogate the sacred authority of the prophets to himself. When he writes that the beasts of 
his vision had six wings, rather than four, and thus asserts that “John is with me and 
departs from him [Ezekiel],”321 he professes not that his vision thereby resembles that of 
John — amazingly, John’s vision resembles his own. And indeed, before the end of 
Purgatorio, Dante will be commissioned by Beatrice to write what he has seen and 
heard.322 The hermeneutic import of this entire dynamic has been amplified, of course, by 
the (perhaps forged) letter of Dante to his patron, Can Grande della Scala, in which Dante 
purportedly claims that his work ought to be read according to the fourfold method of the 
medieval exegetical tradition.   
 The literary-religious legacy of Dante’s having inscribed himself in the canon of 
sacred scripture by means of a poetics of the dream-vision is not to be underestimated. 
Peter Hawkins, a scholar who has written on this topic as much as anyone, has expressed 
in a personal reflection the effect of this biblical poetics on his own practice of reading:  
 Dante seemed to bring the Bible to life for me precisely by appropriating it so boldly for 
himself. He saw the Exodus of Israel out of Egypt as none other than his story, chose 
Good Friday as the day that he, too, would descend into hell, and appointed Easter dawn 
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as the time of his emergence on the shores of purgatory. I found myself reading the Bible 
because of what I found in the Commedia.323  
 
Indeed, this aspect of the Commedia was not without its effect on Romantic readers of 
Dante. A.W. Schlegel, for example, commented on the prophetic dimension of the poem, 
noting that “Dante gleicht […] einem Propheten des alten Bundes […].”324 The 
hermeneutic imperative of the letter to Can Grande, likewise familiar to Schlegel, seems 
both to have perplexed as well as to have impressed him.325 
 For Novalis, whose adaptations of the Commedia derive from precisely those 
cantos surrounding Dante’s Johannine vision, the manipulation of such a biblical poetics 
must have been particularly engaging. He and Friedrich Schlegel, as we know, had been 
tantalized by the throwaway remark in Lessing’s Die Erziehung des 
Menschengeschlechts (1780) in which Lessing, anticipating a coming age of peace and 
enlightenment, had augured that the appearance of a new, eternal gospel. In their 
correspondence, Novalis and Schlegel had theorized the possibility of writing a new 
Bible, with Novalis calling Schlegel a new Lessing, Schlegel calling himself a new Paul, 
and most notably, Schlegel calling Novalis a new Christ.326 The prospect of writing a new 
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bible appeared realizable, in fact, with Novalis even considering a collaborative effort 
between himself and Schlegel, Tieck, and Schleiermacher.327 The plans for such a project 
are indeed pervasive in Novalis’s notes from the period around the composition of the 
Christenheit essay and Heinrich von Ofterdingen,328 and the topicality of the notion of a 
new Bible likewise emerged in Friedrich Schlegel’s fragments on religion, the Ideen, 
published in the third volume of Athenäum in 1800 and critiqued by Novalis.329 To be 
clear, the project of a new Bible is to be understood within the framework of the new 
mythology, and not external to it; as Schlegel wrote, “In der Welt der Sprache, oder 
welches ebenso viel heißt, in der Welt, der Kunst und der Bildung, erscheint die Religion 
notwendig als Mythologie oder als Bibel.”330 Or, as Novalis himself wrote in Heinrich 
von Ofterdingen, “Die Bibel und die Fabellehre sind Sternbilder Eines Umlaufs.”331 
Indeed, in their correspondence over Schlegel’s Ideen, Novalis and Schlegel had 
determined that there was a structural equivalence between the Bible and the Greek 
mythology.332 
 In addition to locating in Dante the dream poetics wherewith he could begin to 
craft a novelistic mythology of absolute idealism, therefore, Novalis found in the 
Commedia a particularly apt model for the new mythology qua Bible. In his fragmentary 
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encyclopedia of the sciences, the Allgemeine Brouillon, Novalis had written an especially 
telling entry in this respect: 
 Hist[orik]. Die Bibel fängt herrlich mit dem Paradiese, dem Symbol der Jugend an  
 und schließt mit dem ewigen Reiche -- mit der heiligen Stadt. Auch ihre 2   
 Hauptbestandtheile sind ächt Großhistorisch. (In jedem Großhistorischen Gliede muß  
 gleichsam die große Geschichte symbolische verjüngt liegen.) Der Anfang des neuen  
 Testaments ist der 2te, höhere Sündenfall -- und der  
   (Eine Sünde, was gesühnt werden muß.) 
  Anfang der neuen Periode: Jedes Menschen Geschichte soll eine Bibel seyn –  
wird eine Bibel seyn. Xstus ist der neue Adam. Begr[iff] der Wiedergeburt. Eine Bibel ist  
die höchste Aufgabe der Schriftstellerey.333 
 
Heinrich von Ofterdingen commences, of course, with a dream of paradise; its division 
into two segments, Erwartung and Erfüllung, replicates the typological reading 
established in this particular fragment; and as a novel that loosely approximates the genre 
of the Bildungsroman/Künstlerroman, it too is a “Menschengeschichte.” What we should 
not fail to reiterate in this respect is the conspicuously biblical dimension of the dreams 
that Novalis mined from the Commedia. Not only are they linked in conversation, by 
Heinrich’s father, to the dream-visions of the biblical prophets that had inspired Dante’s 
Johannine visions, but they are likewise linked in the narrative to St. John. It was on 
Johannistag, for example, that as a youth Heinrich’s father had experienced the 
premonitory dream that he had long since supressed, while it is just near Johannistag that 
Heinrich, too, experiences the prophetic dream that launches the action of the novel.334  
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 The Commedia represented to Novalis, we might conclude, a complex and 
dynamic source for what was not conceived of, as Vietta has written, as a project of 
straightforward secularization through art. Rather it guides the poetic devices whereby 
Novalis seeks to realize the new mythology, which, to the extent that its philosophy of art 
is one predicated upon the revelation of the absolute, seeks to reintroduce the possibility 
of religion after the disenchantment of the Enlightenment. This of course did not signal a 
return to medieval Catholicism, as I have written above, but nor does this mean that the 
impetus behind Novalis’s novel and other poetic work ought to be aligned with general 
impulses toward secularization. On the contrary, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, like the 
broader project of the new mythology itself, constitutes one outcome in the struggle to 
redefine religion according to the intellectual currents driving the German Frühromantik, 
among which featured prominently, but not exclusively: Plato, Kant, Fichte, Spinoza, and 
yes — Dante, too. 
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4 
 
Mythologies of Nature: Schelling, Goethe, and the Reanimation of the Commedia 
 
 
Ich verhehle meine Ueberzeugung nicht, daß in der  
   Naturphilosophie […] die erste ferne Anlage jener  
   künftigen Symbolik und derjenigen Mythologie  
gemacht ist welche nicht ein Einzelner, sondern die  
ganze Zeit geschaffen haben wird.335 
        — Schelling, Vorlesungen  
über die Philosophie der Kunst  
        
On December 31st, 1800, in his Haus am Frauenplan, Goethe toasted the end of the 
eighteenth century and welcomed the nineteenth while in the company of two Swabians, 
Friedrich Schiller and Friedrich Schelling. His guests from Württemberg shared more 
than a name and origin: each had overcome Goethe’s initial skepticism and won his 
friendship by having engaged the poet in a rigorous discussion of the natural sciences. In 
the case of Schiller, a friendship first blossomed six years earlier, after the two had left a 
botanical lecture in Jena and agreed that the lecturer had taken too narrow a view of his 
subject, thereby losing sight of its broader implications. Engrossed by the discussion, 
Goethe accompanied Schiller home, where he shared with him his theory of the 
metamorphosis of plants. Schiller judged Goethe’s theory critically, remarking famously, 
“Das ist keine Erfahrung, das ist eine Idee.”336 Goethe, who had already deemed Schiller 
too rigidly Kantian a thinker, was reminded of the reasons he disliked him in the first 
place and responded, not without a measure of smugness, “Das kann mir sehr lieb sein 
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daß ich Ideen habe ohne es zu wissen, und sie sogar mit Augen sehe.”337 A congenial 
debate ensued, the gist of which pivoted on Schiller’s thoroughly Kantian objection: 
“Wie kann jemals Erfahrung gegeben werden, die einer Idee angemessen sein sollte?”338 
Goethe, for his part, did in fact deem the theory of metamorphosis to be rooted in 
experience. When neither could overcome the other in debate, they discovered something 
altogether more valuable: a profound, intellectual friendship that would shape their work 
for years to come. 
 Goethe’s other guest on the eve of the new century, the twenty-five-year-old 
Wunderkind Friedrich Schelling, had likewise found his way into the poet’s good graces 
via Goethe’s abiding interest in the sciences. Unlike Schiller, however, who drew on 
Kant’s hegemony in eighteenth-century philosophical thought, Schelling would lead 
Goethe into the nineteenth century by attempting to transcend the limits of Kantianism 
with a new system of philosophy that could sanction Goethe’s longstanding devotion to 
the observation of nature. This friendship, too, was not without its initial hurdles. In 
January of 1798, Goethe had labored through Schelling’s recent contribution to 
transcendental idealism, the Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur (1798), and — despite 
finding aspects of the tract remarkable — he had come away disappointed. Searching at 
this time for a reasoned mediation between idealism and realism, Goethe’s reading of 
Schelling left him with the distinct impression that “von den neuern Philosophen wenig 
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Hülfe zu hoffen ist.”339 As was the case with Schiller, it was a personal meeting that 
would convince Goethe otherwise, and the meeting was arranged by no one less than 
Schiller himself. Thus on May 28, 1798, Goethe and Schelling met at Schiller’s in Jena, 
with the philosopher Niethammer likewise present. In the days that followed, Goethe and 
Schelling conducted optical experiments that, as Jeremy Adler writes, “will have entailed 
Goethe explicating (and Schelling accepting) the principles of Goethe’s colour theory 
and, therefore, denying Newton.”340 Schelling must have performed admirably, as Adler 
points out, for already on May 29, 1798, Goethe enthusiastically recommended to 
Geheimrat Voigt that Schelling be appointed to the University of Jena.341   
 That in the company of Schiller and Schelling Goethe bid adieu to one century 
and welcomed another is richly symbolic, for Schelling’s prodigious contributions to the 
development of German idealism, particularly in the years he spent in Jena (1798-1803), 
would open new philosophic possibilities to Goethe and influence his reception of 
idealism in the last three decades of his life. If in the final years of the eighteenth century 
Schiller had, by dint of his Kantian philosophy, softened Goethe’s “steifen Realism,”342 
Schelling’s incipient Identitätsphilosophie ultimately afforded Goethe the long-sought 
possibility of conceiving Idealism and Realism as the unopposed complements of one and 
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the same absolute. And in the late 1790s, it was above all Goethe’s hope for the future of 
philosophy that a path between Idealism and Realism be paved:  
Mir will immer dünken daß wenn die eine Partey von außen hinein den Geist niemals 
erreichen kann, die andere von innen heraus wohl schwerlich zu den Körpern gelangen 
wird, und daß man also immer wohl thut in dem philosophischen Naturstande […] zu 
bleiben und von seiner ungetrennten Existenz den besten möglichen Gebrauch zu 
machen, bis die Philosophen einmal übereinkommen wie das was sie nun einmal getrennt 
haben wieder zu vereinigen seyn möchte.343  
 
After his initial debate with Schiller, Goethe had displayed a greater receptivity to 
Kantian philosophy and, without sketching his own credo, acknowledged at least that 
Schiller had been able to formulate his worldview in nuce, if only provisionally.344 The 
meteoric rise of Schelling at the turn of the new century, along with his string of tracts in 
the area of Naturphilosophie, elicited from Goethe however a new confession. To the 
young philosopher, he proclaimed “Ich wünsche eine völlige Vereinigung, die ich durch 
das Studium Ihrer Schriften, noch lieber durch Ihren persönlichen Umgang, so wie durch 
Ausbildung meiner Eigenheiten ins allgemeine, früher oder später, zu bewirken hoffe.”345 
Just as Schiller had once undertaken a systematic study of Kant, so too did Goethe 
undertake a study of Schelling’s texts in the summer of 1800 — employing Immanuel 
Niethammer, no less, as a private tutor in the endeavor. Schelling would move on from 
Jena, of course, taking positions in Würzburg and Munich, among others; but throughout 
his career, Goethe followed his publications with great interest and continued to 
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correspond with him periodically in letters marked by warm reminiscences of Schelling’s 
years in Jena.346 
The present chapter traces how, from the collaboration of Goethe and Schelling, 
there emerged a series of attempts to realize a new mythology of nature that would 
recuperate and manipulate the poetics of Dante and the Commedia. In modes untested by 
the Jena Romantics, Schelling and Goethe, who were outsiders in their own right anyway, 
would accommodate Dante and the new mythology to the tenets of Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie and Identitätsphilosophie. These efforts, fragmentary though they may 
have been, validated nonetheless Friedrich Schlegel’s earlier dictum that Spinozistic 
philosophy — which lay at the heart of the Goethe-Schelling alliance — could find 
successful expression only in a mythology like that of Dante’s Commedia. To this end, 
the chapter opens with an account of Schelling’s early aesthetic philosophy (1799-1800), 
in which his statements on the advent of a new mythology will be elaborated. We will see 
that, for a brief time, Goethe and Schelling were poised to render a joint poetic 
contribution to the Romantic goal of uniting art and science, but that when Goethe 
backed out under the strain of other projects, Schelling strove under the influence of his 
Romantic contemporaries to imitate the model of Dante’s mythology in a long 
Lehrgedicht. Failing to complete this Dantean mythological venture, however, Schelling 
would still supply two of the most groundbreaking Romantic statements on the 
Commedia: an essay Ueber Dante in philosophischer Beziehung and a series of lectures 
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on the Philosophie der Kunst, in which Dante figures prominently. The chapter returns 
again to Goethe when I argue that Schelling’s work on Dante, together with that of the 
other Romantics, is indispensable for understanding Goethe’s approach to the Commedia. 
To this end, I offer new readings of Goethe’s terza rima poems, as well as an account of 
Goethe’s last and most successful attempt at a naturalist mythology, which I term here 
Faust: Eine Commedia.  
Schelling and the Philosophy of Revelatory Art 
When Schelling arrived in Jena in 1798, he was just beginning to formulate the tenets of 
his Naturphilosophie and was not quite ready to transform it into the subsequent 
Identitätsphilosophie that would so radically alter the philosophical landscape. It was a 
period of remarkable transition in his thinking, such that even as he still pledged 
allegiance to Fichte and his first principle of the absolute ego, he was already articulating 
the doctrines that would ground the Naturphilosophie. In this way, Schelling’s work had 
begun to show signs of what was to come: having attended lectures on physics, 
mathematics, and chemistry in Leipzig, his tracts in transcendental philosophy revealed a 
concern for the natural world — i.e., for objective reality — that was conspicuously 
absent from Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. The Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur 
(1797), for example, in which Schelling still maintained the ego’s freedom from nature, 
nonetheless opened with an entire first book dedicated to the empirical study of topics 
like light, electricity, and magnetism. An interest in the underlying forces of nature 
received more radical expression in the tract Von der Weltseele (1798), which Schelling 
shared with Goethe. Here he sought to resolve the dilemmas inherent in mechanistic and 
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dualistic philosophy — namely, determinism in the former and the mind-body problem in 
the latter — by postulating for the first time that nature was not so much a mechanism as 
it was an organism: by this view, the mind ought not be regarded as a predetermined cog 
in the mechanism of nature, nor the antipode of nature, but rather its highest degree of 
organization. Here too, however, the tremendous potential of the Naturphilosophie was 
tempered by Schelling’s willing subordination to Fichte; thus the forces of attraction and 
repulsion, which he explained as grounding the operation of the organism of nature, were 
ultimately traced to the activity of the mind.  
 In one of Schelling’s most conspicuously Fichtean texts of these years, the System 
des Transcendentalen Idealismus (1800), we find articulated the beginnings of an 
aesthetic philosophy that revealed the influence of Schelling’s Romantic 
contemporaries.347 This preliminary aesthetics would prove a crucial step in Schelling’s 
approach to Dante in that it granted an epistemological authorization for the Romantics’ 
enthusiastic veneration of art, transforming Jena’s reverential but fragmentary approach 
to aesthetics into the pinnacle of a philosophical system. Written in late 1799, the System 
wrestled with the problematic legacy of Kant’s philosophy, seeking a resolution to the 
fundamental contradiction, “wie können die Vorstellungen zugleich als sich richtend 
nach den Gegenständen, und die Gegenstände als sich richtend nach den Vorstellungen 
gedacht werden?”348 How do we square the contradiction, that is, that the subject seems 
to be determined by nature and yet capable of determining nature through volition? 
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Schelling’s attempt at an answer represents in large measure a consolidation and 
reinterpretation of Fichte’s own philosophy of the absolute ego: the contradiction can be 
resolved only if between both worlds, the ideal and the real, there obtains a 
predetermined harmony, which itself can be conceived of only if the activity that 
produces the objective world is ultimately one and the same as the activity that produces 
the ideal world. Schelling affirms that the activity producing both worlds is in principle 
one and the same, with one important distinction: the activity that produces volition in the 
ideal world is conscious (bewußt), whereas the activity that produces the objective world 
is unconscious (bewußtlos). Accordingly, Schelling establishes the identity of subject and 
object in a form of ontological monism, but not without ultimately subsuming it under the 
Fichtean first principle of the absolute ego. As Andrew Bowie explains, the conceptual 
grounding of Schelling’s philosophy of nature appears in the System, “but as descriptions 
of the I. […] Instead of a conception in which both nature and consciousness have their 
source in a higher activity, the Absolute, consciousness is given priority […].”349 Thus, in 
the history of consciousness that Schelling subsequently traces in the System, nature is to 
be understood as an unconscious phase of the ego; it is the unconscious, objective form 
that results from the original division of the Absolute into subject and object. 
The originality of this broadly Fichtean account of subject-object identity, at least 
from the perspective of Schelling’s burgeoning interest in art, lies in the book’s final 
sections, in which Schelling posits the artwork as the revelation of the union of conscious 
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and unconscious activity in the Absolute. In general, objective representations of the 
Absolute lie beyond the realm of possibility, according to Schelling, because the 
objective arises in the first place only from the division of the Absolute. The artwork, 
however, presents a unique set of circumstances: it is created consciously by an artist 
who nonetheless stands “unter der Einwirkung einer Macht […], die ihn […] Dinge 
auszusprechen oder darzustellen zwingt, die er selbst nicht vollständig durchsieht, und 
deren Sinn unendlich ist.”350 In this sense, then, the artwork is the product of the 
contradiction that had propelled the System in the first place, that namely between 
determinism and freedom, and so functions as an objective representation of the union of 
the subjective and objective, conscious and unconscious principles of the Absolute. 
Schelling elucidates the implications of art for philosophy and knowledge in the final 
pages of the System: 
Die ganze Philosophie geht aus, und muß ausgehen von einem Prinzip, das als 
das absolut Identische schlechthin nichtobjectiv ist. Wie soll nun aber dieses absolut 
Nichtobjective doch zum Bewußtseyn hervorgerufen und verstanden werden, was 
nothwendig ist, wenn es Bedingung des Verstehens der ganzen Philosophie ist? Daß es 
durch Begriffe ebensowenig aufgefaßt als dargestellt werden könne, bedarf keines 
Beweises. Es bleibt also nichts übrig, als daß es in einer unmittelbaren Anschauung 
dargestellt werde, welche aber wiederum selbst unbegreiflich, und da ihr Object etwas 
schlechthin nichtobjektives seyn soll, sogar in sich selbst widersprechend zu seyn scheint. 
Wenn es denn nun aber doch eine solche Anschauung gäbe, welche das absolut 
Identische, an sich weder Sub- noch Objective zum Object hat, und wenn man sich 
wegen dieser Anschauung, welche nur eine intellektuelle seyn kann, auf die unmittelbare 
Erfahrung beriefe, wodurch kann denn nun auch diese Anschauung wieder objectiv, d.h. 
wie kann außer Zweifel gesetzt werden, daß sie nicht auf einer bloß subjectiven 
Täuschung beruhe, wenn es nicht eine allgemeine und von allen Menschen anerkannte 
Objectivität jener Anschauung gibt? Diese allgemein anerkannte und auf keine Weise 
hinwegzuläugnende Objectivität der intellectuellen Anschauung ist die Kunst selbst. 
Denn die ästhetische Anschauung eben ist die objectiv gewordene intellectuelle. Das 
Kunstwerk nur reflectirt mir, was sonst durch nichts reflectirt wird, jenes absolut 
Identische, was selbst im Ich schon sich getrennt hat; was also der Philosoph schon im 
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ersten Act des Bewußtseyns sich trennen läßt, wird, sonst für jede Anschauung 
unzugänglich, durch das Wunder der Kunst aus ihren Producten zurückgestrahlt.  
Aber nicht nur das erste Prinzip der Philosophie und die erste Anschauung, von 
welcher sie ausgeht, sondern auch der ganze Mechanismus, den die Philosophie ableitet, 
und auf welchem sie selbst beruht, wird erst durch die ästhetische Production objectiv.351  
 
This lengthy but important excerpt provides several crucial insights into Schelling’s 
emergent understanding of the limits of philosophy and the possibilities of art: (1) 
concepts (Begriffe) will not suffice to represent philosophy’s non-objective first principle 
to consciousness; (2) nor will an intellectual intuition on its own suffice, however, since 
the first principle is still non-objective; (3) an aesthetic intuition, on the other hand, 
functions as the objective form of the intellectual intuition; (4) in this respect, the artwork 
serves as the objective representation of the non-objective first principle, the Absolute 
that eludes the grasp of both philosophic reasoning and intellectual intuitions.  
Nicholas Boyle has written that the System’s aesthetic capstone served as an 
homage to Goethe, the man who at the time seemed to have attained the pinnacle of 
aesthetic achievement.352 There may well be some truth to this, but Schelling’s first steps 
toward a philosophy of art resonated in overwhelming ways with statements sketched as 
early as the Systemprogramm (1795/96) and as recently as Friedrich Schlegel’s Rede über 
die Mythologie (1800), each of which had voiced the imperative for a new mythology. It 
was in this tradition then that Schelling, whose interest in mythology stretched back to his 
years in Tübingen,353 crowned the entire System des Transcendentalen Idealismus not 
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with just another call for a new mythology, but with the prediction that philosophy itself 
would eventually transform into a new mythology: just as the sciences first sprang from 
poetry, so too would they return to the ocean of poetry, he writes, asserting that this 
reversion of science to poetry would take the form of a new mythology: “Wie aber eine 
neue Mythologie, […], dieß ist ein Problem, dessen Auflösung allein von den künftigen 
Schicksalen der Welt und dem weiteren Verlauf der Geschichte zu erwarten ist.”354   
 Even if Schelling did not yet know how the new mythology would arise, it was 
his very own philosophic conclusions that signaled to Friedrich Schlegel, the most vocal 
of the mythology’s proponents, the trajectory leading to a new mythology. Schelling had 
outlined a model of Idealism that — even if it did not ultimately cede equality to 
objective reality — nonetheless accounted for it and demonstrated its potential for 
knowledge attained in the form of an aesthetic intuition. This was, not incidentally, 
precisely what Schlegel was predicting would happen when in the very same year he 
wrote the following in the Rede über die Mythologie:  
Der Idealismus in jeder Form muß auf ein oder die andre Art aus sich herausgehn, um in 
sich zurückkehren zu können, und zu bleiben was er ist. Deswegen muß und wird sich 
aus seinem Schoß ein neuer ebenso grenzenloser Realismus erheben; und der Idealismus 
also nicht bloß in seiner Entstehungsart ein Beispiel für die neue Mythologie, sondern 
selbst auf indirekte Art Quelle derselben werden.355  
 
Not having quite thrown off the yoke of Fichte’s Idealism, which Schelling himself 
would only manage in 1801-1802, Schlegel at the very least sensed the direction of 
Schelling’s thought and, together with his own growing interest in Spinoza’s philosophy 
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of nature, saw the new evaluation of realism vis-à-vis idealism as the locus of the coming 
mythology.   
 In the Systemprogramm, there had likewise been enthusiastic talk of a modern 
mythology that would function in much the same way that Schelling described in his new 
tract. The fragment, possibly authored by Schelling himself, explained the utility of a new 
mythology using a less technically rigorous account of the relationship of art and 
philosophy, but one that was nonetheless still written in the same spirit as the closing 
chapters of Schelling’s System. Its author wrote of the need for the philosopher 
“ebensoviel ästhetische Kraft [zu] besitzen als der Dichter,” of poetry as the “Lehrerin 
der Menschheit,” and of a “Mythologie der Vernunft” that would transform philosophical 
reason into its primordial aesthetic form.356 These latter two features, both of which lay 
particular emphasis on the didactic capacity of the new mythology, depart from the more 
Schlegelian notion that conceived of mythology primarily as a common worldview and 
articulate instead a vision of a new mythology that works very much in concert with the 
Enlightenment’s goals of universal education. The seriousness with which Schelling 
understood these claims is evidenced nowhere better than in his plans, together with 
Goethe, to write a great Naturgedicht. The ambitious undertaking would lead Schelling to 
Dante. 
The Great Naturgedicht and Schelling’s Romantic Turn to Dante 
Around the end of May 1798, while still under the spell of his first encounter with 
Schelling, Goethe composed what is widely acknowledged as his greatest naturalistic 
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poem, “Die Metamorphose der Pflanzen.”357 He conceived of it as a “Versuch das 
Anschauen der Natur, wo nicht poetisch doch wenigstens rhythmisch darzustellen,” as he 
described it in a letter to the poet and naturalist Carl Ludwig von Knebel.358 The 
descriptor “Anschauen der Natur” is telling, of course, for it exemplifies the Spinozism 
inherent to Schleiermacher’s speeches on religion, which bound Goethe and the 
Romantics once their infatuation with Fichte had given way to a new estimation of nature 
in its reality.359 In his speeches on religion, for example, Schleiermacher would define 
religion as the “Anschauung des Universums,” a dictum echoed by Friedrich Schlegel in 
the Ideen of 1800.360 Schlegel himself intended for the Rede über die Mythologie to 
promulgate a “symbolische Naturansicht.”361 Indeed, Spinozistic philosophy had 
prompted the Romantics around the turn of the century to endorse the representation of 
nature in art as a means of intuitive religious experience. Goethe, for his part, had been 
ahead of the curve, writing of Spinoza’s religious-epistemic praxis already years earlier 
in his correspondence with Jacobi. In what has now become an oft-quoted passage, he 
explained to Jacobi: 
Wenn du sagst man könne an Gott nur glauben so sage ich dir ich halte viel aufs schauen, 
und wenn Spinoza von der Scientia intuitiva spricht und sagt: Hoc cognoscendi genus 
procedit ab adaequata idea essentiae formalis quorundam Dei attributorum ad 
adaequatem cognitionem essentiae rerum; so geben mir diese wenigen Worte Muth, mein 
                                                           
357 One might include with it, however, “Die Metamorphose der Tiere,” characterized by H.B. Nisbet as a 
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ganzes Leben der Betrachtung der Dinge zu widmen, die ich reichen und von denen 
essentia formali ich mir eine adäquate Idee zu bilden hoffen kann.362  
 
The “Metamorphose der Pflanzen” embodied the ideal of Anschauen der Natur in its 
profound reflection on the life of the plant, but its scope was hardly that which the 
Romantics had in mind in the following years when they heralded the coming of a new 
mythology.363 
 Between 1798 and 1800, however, Goethe and Schelling both conceived the 
possibility of writing a Naturgedicht that would be epic in scale, a modern counterpart to 
Lucretius’s poem, De rerum natura.364 The essence of the poem, which never 
materialized, remains nebulous, and even its plans can be pieced together from only a 
handful of letters and diary entries in that two-year span. Having sent “Die 
Metamorphose der Pflanzen” to Knebel, who himself was at work on a translation of 
Lucretius and the composition of his own elegies, Goethe continued to share with him his 
aspirations for the great nature poem, especially in the six months or so after having met 
Schelling, i.e. from the summer of 1798 into the following winter.365 In the month or so 
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before lectures at the university resumed, in September 1799, Goethe spent several weeks 
in Jena pursuing the topics that lay at the heart of the project of the nature poem: he 
learned about Naturphilosophie from Schelling, he discussed the relation of empirical and 
transcendental philosophy with Schiller, he discussed elegies with A.W. Schlegel, and 
prompted by the Romantic figures in Jena, he read Schleiermacher’s speeches on religion 
and works of romantic literature written by Friedrich Schlegel and Ludwig Tieck. No 
matter how fruitful the friendship with Schelling had proven to be for Goethe, however, 
he ultimately relinquished the plan, as we read in a letter from Caroline to Schelling: 
“Goethe tritt Dir nun auch das Gedicht ab, er überliefert Dir seine Natur. Da er Dich nicht 
zum Erben einsetzen kann, macht er Dir eine Schenkung unter Lebenden.”366 At the time, 
Goethe had resumed work on Faust, the scope of which no doubt would have lent the 
plan for an epic Naturgedicht the semblance of impossibility. 
 Schelling, however, had already taken his own first steps toward granting the 
principles of Naturphilosophie a poetic form.367 In 1799, while at work on the System des 
transcendentalen Idealismus, he composed the satirical poem “Epikurisch 
Glaubensbekenntnis Heinz Widerporstens.”368 As its title suggests, the poem amounts to 
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a profession of faith as rendered by a natural philosopher who has lost all patience for the 
“hohen überirdschen Lehren” of Christians (l. 5).369 In this spirit, it lampoons the 
Romantic encomia of Christianity that had recently been written by Schleiermacher and 
Novalis.370 The latter, for example, found the contents of his epigonal speech on medieval 
religious unity reformulated to comedic effect. Whereas Novalis had reverentially spoken 
of the “schönen glänzenden Zeiten” when Europe was united by a single, spiritual 
“Oberhaupt.”371 Schelling now wrote of the same age but employed the doggerel of Hans 
Sachs: “in den alten Zeiten, / da gab es nicht Zanken noch Streiten, / Waren alle Ein Mus 
und Kuchen […]” (ll. 87-89). The faithful of this period, he writes, “hielten die Erde für’s 
Centrum der Welt, / Zum Centrum der Erde Rom bestellt, / Darin der Statthalter residirt / 
[…] Und lebten die Laien und die Pfaffen / Zusammen wie im Land der Schlaraffen” (ll. 
93-98). Schleiermacher’s redefinition of religion likewise suffered at the hands of 
Schelling, since in the end, he could do no better than to propose Christianity as the 
ultimate expression of religion anyway.  
                                                                                                                                                                               
face each other, stare at each other, and in a certain sense disfigure each other in the same satire of the 
work, in what amounts to a double parody of theory—or of religion—in the Work” (80). This tendency to 
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 What bespeaks the poem’s proximity to the plans for a great Naturgedicht are the 
naturalistic metaphysical confessions of its purported author, Heinz Widerporst. His 
derision of transcendent religious doctrines, in fact, is probably less incendiary than the 
positive claims he asserts: “Die Materie sei das einzig Wahre, / Unser aller Schutz und 
Rather, / Aller Dinge rechter Vater, / Alles Denkens Element, / Alles Wissens Anfang 
und End” (ll. 68-72).372 This standpoint leads Widerporst not just to abandon the ethical 
models of transcendent religious systems, but also to invert and vulgarize them: “Mein 
einzig Religion ist die, / Dass ich liebe ein schönes Knie, / Volle Brust und schlanke 
Hüften, / Dazu Blumen mit süssen Düften [...]” (ll. 77-80). Christianity, he writes, would 
merit attention only should there be a natural temple revealed to him in which there were 
bells suspended by magnetic power, crucifixes formed through beautiful crystals, and 
petrified Capuchins (ll. 150-61). Widerporst revels in irreverence, claiming that until this 
day should come, he will “in Gottlosigkeit verharren” (l. 165). The poem draws to its 
conclusion with an acknowledgment of the doctrine of the Weltseele (ll. 190 ff.) and an 
elaboration of Schelling’s own views on nature’s process of unfolding self-
consciousness. 
 It is little wonder that, despite Friedrich Schlegel’s intention to publish the poem 
together with Novalis’s speech,373 neither would appear in the pages of the Athenäum. 
Fichte, after all, had been officially dismissed from the University of Jena on April 1st 
                                                           
372 For a philosophic summation of the tenets of Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, see Beiser’s German 
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1799, on charges of atheism leveled against him by the Elector of Saxony. Goethe, who 
had endured Karl August’s ire over the affair,374 advised A.W. Schlegel not to publish the 
two texts that, despite their diametrically opposed religious sensibilities, could prove 
equally inflammatory to the region that had borne Martin Luther and the Protestant 
Reformation. And yet there was something profoundly Goethean about Schelling’s poem: 
composed in Knittelvers, it was described by Friedrich Schlegel as having been written 
“in HansSachsGoethens Manier […].”375 In fact, Schelling had evoked the formal 
character of Faust’s opening monolog in “Nacht,” using the sixteenth-century verse to 
sanction the sixteenth-century doctor’s apostasy – a circumstance no doubt inseparable 
from Goethe himself, whose “Prometheus” had some decades prior wrought religious 
upheaval in its own right. “Heinz Widerporsten” was too audacious, in any event, to 
fulfill its own didactic goals, as Schelling himself knew. He remained adamant that his 
name not be associated with it, to the point that when he did publish a short excerpt of it 
in his Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik (1800), he introduced the poem as if it were the 
product of an unknown poet.376   
 Far from discouraging him, the problems of “Heinz Widerporsten” gave way to 
new endeavors on Schelling’s part to formulate a poetic vision of the worldview that had 
begun to emerge from his Naturphilosophie. As Friedrich Schlegel wrote in late summer, 
1799, Schelling’s turn to poetry would serve him as “der nächste und der wahre Weg sich 
aus der Rohheit herauszuarbeiten und ein Genosse der Hanse zu werden.” And indeed, 
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while Goethe continued to exert an influence on him, and their cooperation in matters 
philosophic, poetic, and scientific proceeded congenially, it was through intellectual 
commerce with the Schlegel household that Schelling now began to flourish. Early in 
1799, Friedrich Schlegel and his future wife, Dorothea Veit, had moved in with A.W. 
Schlegel and his wife, Caroline. This coterie, together with Schelling, formed an earlier, 
German equivalent of the more famous American “Dante Club,” which would count 
Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and James Russell Lowell as its 
members. Dorothea’s letters to Schleiermacher and Sophie Bernhardi attest to the 
conviviality of the group’s Dante reading: “Auf den Abend wird Italiänisch in der 
Communautät getrieben. Nemlich Dante.—Schlegels sind Meister, wir übrigen die 
Schüler. Gegen 10 Uhr, ist jeder wieder in seiner Clause.”377 Again: “des Abends wird 
der Dante gelesen, Friedrich giebt Carolinen und Schellingen Unterricht darin, und ich 
habe auch Lust Antheil daran zu nehmen.”378 Dante propelled Schelling as well as the 
residents of the Schlegel household through the autumn and winter of 1799, such that by 
the new year they had finished reading the first half of the Commedia.379 Friedrich 
Schlegel, entranced at the time by Schleiermacher’s defense of religion, pled with him 
just after the new year, “Den Dante mußt Du doch auch einmal lesen; komme ich einmal 
wieder nach Berlin, so muß es mit mir geschehn.”380  
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Schelling’s Adaptations of Dante 
The effect of the Commedia on Schelling, who cared enough to solicit specific editions 
and commentaries from friends and family,381 was profound.382 By Christmas 1799, he 
had not only abandoned “Heinz Widerporsten,” but he had even composed the opening of 
a new Naturgedicht for which he ultimately planned to relinquish the irregular and 
colloquial character of Goethe’s Knittelvers in favor of the ordered regularity of Dante’s 
terza rima.383 The project excited Friedrich Schlegel, who wrote of it to Schleiermacher:  
Schelling ist allerdings voll von seinem Gedicht, und ich glaube es wird etwas Großes 
werden. Bis jetzt hat er nur Studien gemacht und sucht Stanzen und Terzinen zu lernen. 
Er wird wahrscheinlich die letzten fürs Ganze wählen [...]. Gesehn habe ich noch nichts 
als 13 Stanzen die er zum Weihnachten an Caroline, mit der er sehr gut 
zusammenstimmt, als Ankündigung seines Werks gemacht hatte. Sie waren sehr schön 
und voll Begeistrung.384  
 
What Schlegel describes, a poem of some thirteen stanzas that presumably would have 
been transformed into rhyming tercets,385 is nearly all that remains of Schelling’s 
endeavor to compose the Naturgedicht according to the model of Dante’s mythology. It 
serves nonetheless as crucial attestation of how the Jena Romantics, including Schelling 
among them, adapted the model of Dante’s Commedia for the purposes of a new 
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Weissberg, “Weimar and Jena: Goethe and the New Philosophy,” in Goethe und das Zeitalter der 
Romantik, ed. Walter Hinderer (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002), 173.  
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mythology. Written just after the Schlegels had begun tutoring Schelling in Dante, the 
thirteen stanzas contrast sharply with “Widerporsten,” particularly given the satirical 
poem’s composition just several months prior. Indeed, the transition from folksy 
Knittelvers to elegant stanzas of ottava rima only adumbrates the even more striking 
transformation of poetic tone: whereas Heinz Widerporst, a bawdy and blasphemous 
rogue, had spent equal time professing his own naturalistic credo and lambasting others’ 
faith in transcendence, there is no trace of irreverence or humor in the lyricist of the 
stanzas. While he deems glorious “nur, was mit uns geboren [ist]” (l. 17), and in this 
respect proves a devotee of Widerporsten’s same cult of nature, he employs a tone more 
reminiscent of Novalis than the epicurean who had mercilessly mocked him. If 
Widerporst, moreover, had professed the tenets of Naturphilosophie as plainly as a 
children’s fable, as if they were manifest to all, Schelling’s new lyrical voice suggests on 
the contrary that ultimate knowledge of nature is granted to the elect alone. The shift is a 
dramatic one, but one that was presaged shortly beforehand by Friedrich Schlegel, who 
wrote to Schleiermacher that “[Schelling] muß erst durch Poesie aus der Philosophie 
gerettet werden, ehe er zur Mystik gelangen kann.”386  
 At their core the stanzas represent Schelling’s attempt to depict the process of 
election to divine gnosis: whereby does one attain ultimate knowledge of nature, he sets 
out to answer. In this respect, Schelling again echoes Goethe’s Faust — not this time in 
                                                           
386 KFSA XXV, 5 (September 16, 1799). The transition in Schelling’s attitude toward the religious, which 
began in 1799 and must be regarded as inseparable from his reading of Dante, has been overlooked by 
accounts that neglect Schelling’s unpublished poetry. Williamson, for example, devotes a chapter of his 
excellent book to Schelling but fails to see him as anything but a “defender of the material world in the 
spirit of Goethe,” at least, that is, until his lectures on art in 1802-03. See Williamson, 56.  
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comedic mimicry, but rather in a quasi-sacral reflection on how one comes to union with 
“was die Welt im Innersten zusammenhält” (ll. 382-83).387 Schelling’s poetic response to 
this question of epistemology, which he had answered discursively already in the final 
pages of the System, was obvious: unimpeded access to the Absolute lay in aesthetic 
intuition alone — the poet himself would have to be the hero of the poem. This theory 
finds expression in the account of a process of revelation that is marked by images of 
both Christian and naturalistic provenance : the rigid earth is sealed off and only to be 
unlocked by the power of love “denn in das Herz, wo Liebe sich beweget, / […] / Ist jede 
Gabe der Natur geleget” […] (ll. 11-13). While the apparent inscrutability of nature 
alienates most men, “wen das Schicksal Einmal auserkoren, / […] / Den hebt es früh 
empor aus dem Getümmel / Und öffnet über seinem Haupt den Himmel” (ll. 21-24). The 
process commences with the initiate’s being struck by a ray of eternal love (ll. 25-26), 
which in turn exposes his chest to all that heaven can offer: sacred fire, eternal ambition, 
the highest anguish, and the loftiest air. The ray of love brings with it the force of poetry; 
for powerful though love may be, it risks burning out should it not be sustained by poetry, 
which has provided form to the world itself from time immemorial (ll. 38-40).  
 This broad outline of revelation occupies the poem’s first five stanzas; its next 
four recount the specific process of election enjoyed by the particular lyrical subject of 
the poem. The lyrical subject addresses a specific recipient, identified as the “Leben 
meines Lebens,” and requests that she listen to “Was ich im innern Heiligthum 
vernommen” (ll. 41-42). What follows is the record of an apparently divine voice that has 
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charged our poem’s subject with a cosmic poetic commission. It informs him that he has 
been elevated to new heights “Damit zu Höherem sich sollte schwingen / Die Kraft, die 
sie in deiner Brust genährt” (ll. 49-50). The one who will accomplish greatness, it tells 
him, must “überspringen [gar viele Stufen]” if he would fly to heaven, climb down, and 
unseal the eternal night of the earth (ll. 53-56). Indeed, the only one who can dispel the 
magic that has banished humanity from union with nature is he who “sich zum Abgrund 
gesellt,” i.e. only he who dares “zum Quell des Lichts zu steigen” (ll. 57-64). The lyrical 
subject is admonished to fend off fear by steeling himself with strength, to maintain his 
course by following the stars, and to fly on love’s wings when his own strength fails him 
(ll. 65-72). While the object of the poet’s quest is entirely naturalistic, and thus distinct 
from any form of Christian transcendence, this account of the poet’s path toward union 
with nature clearly recycles the imagery of the Commedia: a poet-pilgrim depends on the 
grace of love to lead him through the obstacles of a cosmological drama of salvation.   
 Schelling’s fragment ends on the note of love’s sustenance with four stanzas that 
contain an appeal to the recipient already identified as the “Leben meines Lebens.” 
Described as a “himmlisch[es] Bild,” she is commanded to go before him and to blaze the 
trail “Zur ew’gen Wahrheit” (ll. 74-76). She must, the lyrical subject says, draw him on 
with reminders of her love when his strength has diminished. In essence, Schelling 
formulates prescriptively what Goethe would write descriptively some thirty-three years 
later in the final line of Faust: “Das Ewig-Weibliche zieht uns hinan” (l. 12110). The 
fragment culminates in what, from a biographical perspective, proved to be both a painful 
and an awkward account of the love between poet and recipient. The subject states that a 
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god has wed (vermählt) the addressee to his very soul for eternity, and even if no future 
song should tell posterity of their love, “Doch wird aus des Gedichtes dunklen Chiffern / 
Sie das Geheimniß unsrer Lieb’ entziffern. / Was sorgsam wir dem Aug’ der Welt 
verborgen, / Das Glück, das nur die Unsichtbaren sehn, / Wird an des künft’gen Tages 
schönem Morgen / Aus dem Geheimniß glorreich auferstehn” (ll. 95-100). Dedicated to 
Caroline at Christmas 1799, the stanzas recount of course the illicit love that had 
blossomed between Schelling and Caroline, the wife of Schelling’s friend and teacher, 
A.W. Schlegel. Schelling’s affair with Caroline clearly constituted one of the 
fundamental impulses behind the scrapping of “Widerporsten” and the articulation of a 
great new Naturgedicht; but the other, which in its own way provided a model for 
incorporating Schelling’s new love in the poem, was Dante’s Commedia. The lessons that 
Schelling had learned from the Commedia were twofold.  
 First, and most conspicuously, the union of poetry and natural science in the 
formulation of a grand nature poem no longer seemed suited to the profane invective of 
an imp like Heinz Widerporst, but demanded instead a lyrical subject who could lay 
claim to the type of revelatory authority that had been dramatized in the Commedia.388 
Dante the pilgrim, for example, who when he first learns of his mission from Virgil and 
denies his affinity to Saint Paul and Aeneas (Inferno 2.32), is later informed by Beatrice 
of his divine commission atop Mount Purgatory.389 Throughout the narrative, however, 
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Albert Russell Ascoli, Dante and the Making of a Modern Author (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011). 
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Dante the poet has carefully maintained for readers the illusion of his authority, to the 
point that even the pilgrim’s initial reluctance to identify with Christian and classical 
prophets serves only to align him all the more closely with Biblical prophets like Moses, 
Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel – all of whom had doubted their divine assignments. At the 
commencement of the Paradiso, he can thus claim with all seriousness, “I was in the 
heaven that receives more of [God’s] light and I saw things that he who descends from 
there neither knows how to nor is able to recount” (Paradiso I, 4-6).390 As Albert Ascoli 
has written, “to read the Commedia is to know that Dante […] may well have hoped to be 
accorded authority greater than the pagan auctores, comparable, perhaps, to that of the 
fathers of the Church, or the human authors of the Bible.”391 For his part, Schelling 
dispenses with the trope of ineffability, but in his lyrical subject’s appeal to the reader (ll. 
41-42), which is based on the pretense of his experience of revelation, he stylizes the 
identity of the author of his Naturgedicht according to the model of the fictive persona 
that recounts the action of the Commedia.  
 Like Dante, moreover, Schelling clearly employs a lyrical subject whose identity 
is intended to be read as one and the same with that of the poem’s historical author: for 
while his name does not appear in his stanzas, it would be all but impossible — 
particularly given the references to a secret love — that Schelling wished for the lyrical 
subject to be identified as anyone but himself. His turn to poetry in the latter half of 1799, 
together with the overwhelming impression made by Dante, appears to have convinced 
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him that it was not sufficient that the great Naturgedicht should simply articulate in 
poetry what Naturphilosophie could say using discursive language: the great 
Naturgedicht, and more broadly any Romantic project of a new mythology, demanded 
the valorization of the poet himself. This notion would find theoretical expression in 
Schelling’s lectures on aesthetics, in which he writes that in the age of Christianity, in 
which the infinite and the universal (as opposed to the finite and particular) predominate, 
religion can spread only through individuals who are “persönlich vom Allgemeinen und 
Unendlichen erfüllt, demnach Propheten, Seher, gottbegeisterte Menschen […].” In these 
cases, precisely as we notice in Schelling’s stanzas, “die Religion nimmt hier nothwendig 
den Charakter einer geoffenbarten Religion an […].”392 This sacralization of the poet as 
mediator, which had already been discussed in Schleiermacher’s Reden, was in any event 
an inevitable corollary of the crowning lesson of the System that, namely, experiential 
knowledge of the Absolute is to be had in aesthetic intuition alone. The force of Dante’s 
own mythology owed in no small measure to the efficacy with which he had forged his 
own poetic authority, and Schelling — who was in almost constant contact with the 
Schlegels in Jena and Goethe and Schiller in Weimar — perhaps found it necessary to 
justify his authorship of a new mythological project by asserting a poetic persona. This 
justification lay, as the stanzas suggest, in his unique understanding of nature, which was 
altering the landscape of German idealism at the time.  It is not just the stanzas, 
however, that reveal how Schelling’s reading of Dante had led him to begin constructing 
an authoritative poetic identity, for the lyrical subject in another of his major poems from 
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the same period strikes precisely the same pose of divine election. In “Lebenskunst,” a 
poem comprised of some thirty-three lines of terza rima, and thus a Dantean work in its 
own right, Schelling begins with the following imperative: “Die goldnen Lehren hört aus 
treuem Munde; / Wie sie ein Gott mir selbst hat eingegeben, / Empfangt von mir des 
Lebens sichre Kunde. / Zum Leben ward uns selber nur das Leben” (ll. 1-4).393 The last 
of these verses, which reformulates the stanzas’ proclamation that glorious is “nur, was 
mit uns geboren [ist]” (l. 17), continues to herald the stanzas’ relatively subdued doctrine 
of Naturphilosophie; more noteworthy, at least from the perspective of his poetics, 
however, is that Schelling’s renewed adaptation of Dante’s verse for the purpose of a 
Naturgedicht begins immediately by again foregrounding the privileged revelation that 
has been granted to the poetic subject. With Goethe having given up his stake in the 
project of a nature poem by October 1800, it was perhaps not imprudent for Schelling to 
have asserted himself so authoritatively. His work inspired confidence in Caroline, who 
called him her prophet and wrote to him that his work would assuredly culminate in a 
“herrliche[m] Gedicht.”394  
 Henrik Steffens, one of Schelling’s pupils in Jena, was so impressed by the poetic 
quality of Schelling’s System des transcendentalen Idealismus, though not necessarily by 
Schelling’s poetry, that he hailed him nonetheless as a philosopher-poet worthy of the 
laurel wreath:    
Nichts hat mich so begeistert wie Ihre Transcendental-Philosophie. […]. Ich […] vergrub 
mich immer tiefer und tiefer in die Hölle der Philosophie hinein, um von dort aus den 
Himmel zu schauen, weil ich ihn nicht, wie der dichtende Gott, unmittelbar in meinem 
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Busen habe. – Hier sahe ich nach und nach die Sterne hervortreten – bis plötzlich die 
göttliche Sonne des Genies aufstieg und alles erhellte. […]. Nicht eine Stelle in dem 
Buch war mir dunkel. Es ist das wichtigste Geschenk, der transcendentale Idealismus. – 
Und hier lege ich – ich darf mitsprechen – den Kranz vor Ihre Füße, den ein künftiges 
Zeitalter Ihnen sicher reichen wird.395 
 
It is almost certainly no accident that Steffens describes Schelling’s philosophy as a 
poetic revelation of the divine heavens that had helped to draw him out of philosophy’s 
hell; on the contrary, his words allude to the Dantean persona that Schelling himself had 
begun to forge. 
 In addition to inspiring in Schelling a poetics of the absolute that was grounded in 
an absolute poetic identity, the Commedia convinced Schelling of something that 
rendered the content of his poetry far more traditionally Romantic: the priority, namely, 
of a poetics of love. In his Rede über die Mythologie, Friedrich Schlegel had asked what 
the new mythology were to be, if not the “hieroglyphischer Ausdruck der umgebenden 
Natur in [der] Verklärung von Fantasie und Liebe?”396 Novalis, in the biblical novel 
Heinrich von Ofterdingen, as well as in a myriad of other poetic fragments, had written of 
the unitive force of romantic love as the condition of the Golden Age, which the new 
mythology would seek to evoke. In the drama of the lyrical subject’s cognition of nature 
in Schelling’s stanzas, it is the experience of love that both awakens him to nature and 
draws him onward to experiential knowledge of it. This account, which as I have already 
suggested will surface again in Goethe’s Eternal Feminine, represents a reformulation of 
the central interpersonal dynamic of the Commedia itself, wherein the romantic object of 
Dante’s earthly desire, Beatrice, functions as the pilgrim’s guide through the spheres of 
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Paradise.397 The repeated insistence toward the end of Schelling’s stanzas, moreover, that 
love would sustain the faltering lyrical subject’s quest for knowledge echoes the very 
final lines of Dante’s Paradiso. In beholding the Trinity, when the pilgrim’s power of 
vision fails (“A l’alta fantasia qui mancò possa”), it is the synchronization of his will and 
desire with the momentum of the “love that moves the sun and all the other stars” that 
preserves for the pilgrim his harmony with the divine. Schelling’s “pilgrim,” if we may 
so identify him, aims of course not for knowledge of the Trinity, but rather of Nature or 
the Absolute; and despite this difference, it is precisely the propulsive force of love that 
Schelling suggests will sustain him. 
 The thirteen stanzas constitute Schelling’s most ambitious poetic attempt at 
adapting the lessons of the Commedia that he had gleaned from the Schlegels’ Dante 
primer in the winter of 1799; however fragmentary, they were the beginning of a grand 
work that, if ever carried through to completion, might have formed the beginnings of a 
Romantic mythology on the scale of Goethe’s Faust. As Schelling wrote to A.W. 
Schlegel, “Ich glaube die Mythologie gefunden zu haben, welche allein alle Ideen in sich 
dargestellt enthält, welche ich darzustellen wünsche [...].”398 Without mentioning Dante, 
Schelling’s words nonetheless evince the brightest hopes that the Commedia had inspired 
in him after his first encounter with it between the autumn and spring. As it turned out, 
Schelling abandoned the project while nonetheless continuing to compose poetry, and 
indeed, a rash of new Dantean poems. “Lebenskunst” (1802), a didactic lyric in terza 
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rima, reasserted the pretense of Schelling’s gnostic privilege while preserving the 
generally naturalist doctrines that stretched back to “Heinz Widerporsten.” “Die letzten 
Worte des Pfarrers zu Drottning auf Seeland” (1802), a ballad composed in terza rima, 
resembled nothing else in Schelling’s small poetic oeuvre and seemed to anticipate 
instead the poetic output of the English gothic.399 Yet another poem in terza rima, “An 
Dante,” was affixed to the manuscript of Schelling’s lectures on aesthetics and grants at 
least the outline of Schelling’s idiosyncratic view of the Commedia.400 His lyrical subject 
states that Dante did not travel through “das Thor der göttlichen Gerichte”; instead, he 
went through the “Herz der Erde selbst zum ew’gen Lichte” (ll. 10-12). This particular 
distinction is noteworthy, for in it we find that Schelling reads the geography of Dante-
pilgrim’s journey in the Commedia as a validation of the primary assumptions of the 
Naturphilosophie: the pilgrim does not attain “den höchsten Sieg” through transcendence, 
but rather through nature itself (l. 9). The essence of this triumph, furthermore, is 
characterized by the activity of “schauen” (l. 3), which underscores that Schelling had 
located the uniqueness of Dante-pilgrim not in his guarantee of salvation but first and 
foremost in his penetration of “nie gesehnen Orte” where he arrived at experiential 
knowledge (l. 2). Dante was an intellectual explorer, in other words, the terrestrial 
character of whose poetic journey impressed Schelling precisely because it was not 
celestial. 
                                                           
399 Appeared in the Musen-Almanach für das Jahr 1802, edited by AW Schlegel and L. Tieck; Schelling 
published under the pseudonym Bonaventura, recommended to him by AW Schlegel in place of Venturus, 
and he likewise included three other poems: “Lied,” “Thier und Pflanze,” and “Loos der Erde.” 
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From Poetry back to Philosophy  
Schelling’s initial encounter with and subsequent adaptations of Dante span a period in 
which the mercurial young philosopher abandoned old alliances, forged new friendships, 
and began reformulating his system of philosophy from the perspective of an objective 
rather than subjective first principle. These transformations would come to bear on both 
Schelling’s interpretation of Dante as well as on his estimation of the potential of the 
Commedia to mold the shape of a new mythology. Between 1800 and 1802, after he had 
taken up his post in Jena, Schelling’s collaboration with the Schlegels was strained by the 
weight of his affection for Caroline, while his relationship with Fichte, his first 
intellectual idol, had likewise suffered setbacks. Having rigidly adhered to his first 
principle of the ego, Fichte would not brook Schelling’s radicalization of the 
Naturphilosophie, which the latter no longer preached as a regulative doctrine of nature 
under the framework of the Wissenschaftslehre but rather as a constitutive doctrine that 
grounded the possibility of self-consciousness in the first place. As Frederick Beiser has 
written, Schelling turned the Wissenschaftslehre on its head by positing the 
Naturphilosophie as its precedent, doing so most forcefully and clearly in the Darstellung 
meines Systems der Philosophie (1801).401 There, following the model of Spinoza’s 
Ethics, Schelling had articulated the tenets of his philosophical system in so 
geometrically rigid a method that he released a philosophical dialogue in the following 
year in the hope of rendering his system more intelligible. 
                                                           
401 Beiser, German Idealism, 507. 
 
 
 
166 
 Bruno, oder über das göttliche und natürliche Princip der Dinge (1802) functions 
both as a popular articulation of the doctrines of the Darstellung as well as a mild 
corrective to Schelling’s System des transcendentalen Idealismus, which had garnered 
much attention in the preceding years. In particular, Schelling used the dialogue to 
redefine the relationship of art and philosophy that had figured so prominently in the 
System; indeed, since Bruno began with the same discussion of art in which the System 
had culminated, it almost seemed as if the dialogue were a sequel designed to mitigate the 
flaws of the earlier tract. Schelling now pursued the question of the relationship of beauty 
and truth and asserted that what the artist achieved objectively in aesthetic intuition the 
philosopher achieved subjectively in intellectual intuition.402 Indeed, the philosopher had 
become the poet’s equal. Douglas W. Stott explains the logic whereby Schelling arrived 
at this conclusion: 
The fundamental notion is that the more closely a particular, actual thing approximates 
the perfection of its universal or idea, such that the idea itself (the universal) can be 
intuited in the particular, the more closely does that particular participate in beauty, 
which is thus defined as the concurrence of universal and particular intuited in the 
particular. This is the object of aesthetic intuition. The object of intellectual intuition, on 
the other hand, is the concurrence of the universal with its particular in the abstract, such 
concurrence them constituting truth. Hence, beauty (in the concrete) can be equated with 
truth (in the abstract), and the objects of aesthetic and intellectual intuition are actually 
the same identity of the universal and the particular, though viewed from opposite 
directions.403 
 
In the System, Schelling had argued that the identity of the subjective and objective in the 
Absolute would come to consciousness not through the concepts of reason but through 
objective representation in the aesthetic intuition of the artwork. The positive force of this 
earlier conjecture is maintained in Bruno, but Schelling now asserts that intellectual 
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intuition, too, provides for the consciousness of the Absolute in the abstract. 
Consequently, he can claim equality for the philosopher and the poet, saying that both 
perform the same “Gottesdienst.”404 
 This apparently diminutive shift in the operation of Schelling’s epistemology 
represents a transition in his thinking that marks more than just a distinction from the 
System, for if Schelling is to be identified with the author of the Systemprogramm, then 
his new esteem for the discipline of philosophy marks an important distinction from the 
position of one of the earliest calls for a new mythology. One cannot help but read the 
gradual dissipation of Schelling’s poetry and the abandonment of his plans for a new 
mythology, changes that occurred simultaneously with the development of the 
Identitätsphilosophie, as logical consequences of the new privilege afforded to 
philosophical knowledge. These changes likewise affected a transformation in 
Schelling’s appraisal of Dante: while art suffered no loss of potency in Schelling’s new 
system, and Dante’s poetry thus remained sacrosanct, Dante himself became the object of 
a curious new philosophical reception that Schelling did the most among the Romantics 
to advance. This particular reading, which anticipated Ossip Mandelstam’s 
pronouncement that “the future of Dante criticism belongs to the natural sciences,” 
treated seriously the possibility that in addition to being a world-class poet Dante was a 
world-class natural philosopher.405  
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 Fragmentary evidence of this development in Schelling’s Dante reception 
emerges in his own philosophical writings in the years 1801 and 1802. In the second 
volume of his Zeitschrift für spekulative Physik (1801), for example, in an entry in which 
he discusses the natural scientist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s doctrine of the 
Bildungstrieb — a formative drive that according to the school of vitalism is responsible 
for an organism’s nourishment and reproduction — Schelling attempts to undermine the 
originality of Blumenbach’s teaching by locating its source in Dante’s Commedia.406 The 
same maneuver had been made, he writes, when one learned that William Harvey’s 
discovery of blood circulation had already been taught by Salomonis; now “ein großer 
Gelehrter” (in all likelihood Schelling himself) could show that the pivotal new doctrine 
of vitalist biology had its origins in Dante’s Purgatorio. Schelling thus excerpts the 
Italian of Purgatorio 25.37-51, 88-90, in which Statius explains to Dante-pilgrim why 
souls on Mount Purgatory grow thin despite the fact that they require no nourishment. 
The solution to the quandary, he explains, lies in the “virtute informativa” of the blood (l. 
41), which Schelling then equates with Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb.407 The tendency to 
cite Dante in respect to either philosophical or natural scientific discussions continued, 
with Schelling even applying Dantean imagery from the Commedia to descriptions he 
provided of the Absolute in Bruno. Xavier Tilliette has written, for example, that 
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Schelling’s metaphors for the Absolute and its cognition rely as much on Dante as on 
Spinoza.408 
 What are we to make of these apparent shifts in Schelling’s reception of Dante, in 
which his preoccupation with poetic authority and romantic love gives way to a 
scientific-philosophic reading of the Commedia? First of all, we might recall, Schelling’s 
stanzas from 1799 and his subsequent poems in terza rima displayed a naturalism of their 
own that even then resonated with the tenets of his Naturphilosophie; second, the shift in 
emphasis occurs nearly simultaneously with Schelling’s many adaptations, overlapping in 
fact with the composition of some of the poems. What the philosophic reinvigoration of 
Schelling’s Dante reading signifies, therefore, is not so much a transformation of his 
initial Dante reception as much as an augmentation and enrichment of that reading. 
Indeed, as Schelling’s own poetic ventures dwindled and he returned to composing 
philosophical tracts and lecturing on art, it was perhaps inevitable that he would have to 
account in more rigorously systematic fashion for the reason why Dante had elicited so 
powerful an initial response in him. While his turn from poetry to philosophy spelled the 
end of any potential Romantic mythology of nature undertaken in the style of Dante, it 
provided something that Schelling was far more capable of rendering: a series of 
expository statements that, including even A.W. Schlegel’s remarks on the poem, still 
represent the pinnacle of the Romantics’ theorization of the Commedia.409 These are 
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found first and foremost in Schelling’s essay Ueber Dante in philosophischer Beziehung 
(1802), published in the Kritisches Journal der Philosophie, which Schelling edited 
together with Hegel, and second of all in his lectures on the philosophy of art, delivered 
in Jena between 1802 and 1803 (and published posthumously).  
 A cursory reading of these documents displays the Romantics’ well attested yet 
still almost inconceivably profound veneration of Dante, which was so absolute that 
neither Shakespeare nor Goethe, no matter how emblematic of Romantic theory they 
were, could match it; a more careful reading, however, confirms what has already been 
shown in the case of Schelling’s poetry: that, namely, the veneration for Dante centered 
on the unparalleled mythology that had been realized in his Commedia. Schelling’s essay, 
deeply indebted to the Schlegels’ theories of art and poetry, spells out this Romantic 
reading of Dante clearest of all; but its primary assertion — the exemplarity of the 
Commedia as a modern mythology — makes little sense without an understanding first of 
all of Schelling’s idiosyncratic philosophy of art, and second of all a grasp of Schelling’s 
interpretation of literary history, particularly the glaring fissure between ancient and 
modern (Romantic) poetry. To begin, then, one must know that Schelling, for all of his 
interaction with the Schlegels, does not construct a theory of artworks based on aesthetic 
observation; nor is it a theory of aesthetic pleasure. Instead, Schelling’s theory of art 
operates on the level of philosophic necessity, deriving the forms of art as the a priori 
consequences of his metaphysics of the Absolute. When he writes of mythology, 
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therefore, he is referring to a very particular manifestation of the Absolute — and, 
indeed, a pivotal one, for Schelling defines mythology as “die nothwendige Bedingung 
und der erste Stoff aller Kunst.”410 In the framework of the Identitätsphilosophie, which 
underlies this aesthetics, Schelling proceeds from a first principle of the Absolute that is 
understood as the absolute identity of universal and particular, the All that is 
simultaneously simple and infinitely complex. The relation of mythology to the Absolute 
is one of representation in the particular: in its union of the gods in a totality, mythology 
represents in art the simultaneity of differentiation and simplicity as they coincide in the 
Absolute.411 As Schelling explains  
 Der nervus probandi  liegt in der Idee der Kunst als Darstellung des absolut, des an sich  
 Schönen durch besondere schöne Dinge; also Darstellung des Absoluten in Begrenzung 
 ohne Aufhebung  des Absoluten. Dieser Widerspruch ist nur in den Ideen der Götter 
 gelöst, die selbst wieder keine unabhängige, wahrhaft objektive Existenz haben können  
 als in der vollkommenen Ausbildung zu einer eignen Welt und zu einem Ganzen der  
 Dichtung, welches Mythologie heißt.412  
 
From a pragmatic standpoint, Schelling explains, there is only one way for the artist to 
execute the union of particularity and universality in the Absolute, i.e., to execute a 
mythology, and this occurs via the application of an artistic method that synthesizes the 
particular and the universal. Schelling locates this synthesis of particular and universal in 
the mode of symbolism (Symbolismus). Symbolism, he explains, is a mode of artistic 
                                                           
410 SW V, 405. 
411 That the gods represent particularity and their sphere of action represents universality may be less than 
intuitive to Schelling’s readers, but he renders a painstaking derivation of this concept from his first 
principle, with which the entire lecture series commences. In short, Schelling’s first principle is the 
Absolute, or God, which is understood as the absolute identity of the infinitely affirming (ideal) and 
infinitely affirmed (real) (think here of Spinoza’s natura naturans, natura naturata). Particulars that exist 
in the Absolute are called Ideas (Ideen) (par. 27), which when viewed under the guise of the real are known 
as gods (Götter) (par. 28). Their nature is that of limitation and absoluteness. Together the gods constitute a 
totality (par. 34), a fantastical world without which the gods (ideas) could not co-exist (par. 38).      
412 SW V, 405. 
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production whereby allegory (representation of particular in universal) is reconciled to 
schematism (representation of universal in particular) and both are subsumed under the 
mode of symbolic representation. While mythology affords the possibility of both 
allegorical and schematic interpretation, it is ultimately comprehensible only as 
symbolism, i.e., as the synthesis of these competing modes of representation.   
 When Schelling published his essay on Dante, his notion of mythology was not 
yet as robust as the outline above, which first emerged in its entirety in the lectures on the 
philosophy of art; after all, the Identitätsphilosophie itself was still just blossoming. Thus, 
rather than referring to a synthesis of allegory and schematism in the Commedia, 
Schelling describes its narrative as a synthesis of allegorical and historical modes of 
representation. This is nevertheless significant, for the essay reveals that under the 
descriptors allegorical and historical, Schelling still understands universal and particular, 
infinite and finite. He cites Beatrice, for example, as a figure who wears the allegorical 
cloak of theology, yet who appears in equal measure as Beatrice Portinari, the woman 
whom Dante Alighieri loved.413 This balance of allegorical and historical identity holds 
true, Schelling notes, for the Commedia’s other characters as well. Insofar as he thus 
underscores the uniqueness of the Commedia’s reconciliation of universal and particular 
practices of representation, Schelling designates Dante’s poem an exemplary 
manifestation of what would be deduced as mythological art in the following year’s 
lectures; indeed, one might even speculate whether the essay on Dante, the initial 
judgments of which must have been crystallizing since winter 1799, did not foreground 
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the subsequent theory of mythology itself. Schelling’s own statements in the Dante essay 
would seem to indicate as much: 
 Dante ist […] urbildlich, da er ausgesprochen hat, was der moderne Dichter zu thun hat,  
 um das Ganze der Geschichte und Bildung seiner Zeit, den einzigen mythologischen 
 Stoff, der ihm vorliegt, in einem poetischen Ganzen niederzulegen. Er muß aus absoluter 
 Willkür Allegorisches und Historisches verknüpfen, er mus allegorisch seyn, und ist es 
 auch wider seinen Willen, weil er nicht symbolisch seyn kann, und historisch, weil er 
 poetisch seyn soll. Die Erfindung, die er in dieser Rücksicht macht, ist jedesmal einzig, 
 eine Welt für sich, ganz der Person angehörig.414  
  
 Spectacular though this achievement of poetics may be, there is a grander vista 
yet from which Schelling marvels at Dante’s synthesis of the universal and particular. 
This is perceptible only from the perspective of Schelling’s historical understanding of 
the production of ancient and modern poetry.  
 Man kann die moderne Welt allgemein die Welt der Individuen, die antike die Welt der 
Gattungen nennen. In dieser ist das Allgemeine das Besondere, die Gattung das 
Individuum; darum ist sie […] die Welt der Gattungen. In jener bedeutet das Besondere 
nur das Allgemeine, und eben darum ist, weil in ihr das Allgemeine herrscht, die 
moderne Welt die der Individuen, des Zerfallens. Dort ist alles ewig, dauernd, 
unvergänglich, die Zahl hat gleichsam keine Gewalt, da der allgemeine Begriff der 
Gattung und des Individuums in eins fällt, hier — in der modernen Welt — ist Wechsel 
und Wandel das herrschende Gesetz.415  
 
 Appealing to this observation, Schelling describes the genesis of Homeric poetry, 
arguing in his lectures that his aesthetic conviction that the composition of mythology 
occurs as a collective endeavor is evidenced even in the philologist Friedrich August 
Wolf’s thesis that the poet identified by the name “Homer” comprised perhaps dozens of 
poets. The difference in circumstances between ancient and modern poetic subjectivity 
leads Schelling to charge modern poets with an onerous imperative: “Das nothwendige 
Gesetz [der modernen Poesie] […] ist: daß das Individuum den ihm offenbaren Theil der 
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Welt zu einem Ganzen bilde, und aus dem Stoff seiner Zeit, ihrer Geschichte und ihrer 
Wissenschaft sich seine Mythologie erschaffe.”416 Given the individual character of the 
modern subject, however, this endeavor could occur only by means of the poet 
absolutizing or universalizing his individuality, thus rendering individuality itself 
universal and indeed mythic in scope. Having laid out these imperatives of modern 
poetics, Schelling concludes with four words: “Dieß hat Dante gethan.”417 The rest of the 
essay, which underscores qualities of the poem that could be of use to modern poets — 
e.g., the notion that a tripartite division signals a prophetic work just as a five-act work 
signals a drama — spells out theories of the poem that are at once emblematic of 
Schelling’s philosophy as well as Romantic aesthetics. 
 No matter how neglected Schelling’s Ueber Dante in philosophischer Beziehung 
remains,418 it is difficult to overstate its potential significance for our understanding of the 
period; indeed, it is a critical document in at least four respects: (1) first and foremost, the 
Dante essay constitutes one of the clearest and fullest statements in the Romantic 
discourse on the genesis of a new mythology, for which reason alone it deserves a place 
alongside the Systemprogramm, the Rede über die Mythologie, and Schelling’s 
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418 Unlike Herder’s Shakespeare essay, for example, which became a canonical text of the Sturm und 
Drang, Schelling’s Dante essay has remained a curiosum of Schelling scholars, despite its philosophical 
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Century,” in Dante in the Long Nineteenth Century, ed. Aida Audeh and Nick Havely (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 228. A treatment that touches on Schelling’s reading of Dante in relation to his 
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statements on mythology in Philosophie der Kunst; (2) by means of philosophical 
argument, it legitimates the Schlegel brothers’ historiography of modern European 
literature, which commences with Dante, and thus fortifies the historical teleology that 
informs the project of a new mythology;  (3) the essay launches a new mode of writing 
about Dante and the Commedia, the influence of which would surface in the scholarship 
of A.W. Schlegel and Erich Auerbach, two of the most respected dantisti in the European 
tradition, and certainly the most authoritative in the German tradition;419 (4) finally, it 
constitutes a vital document for understanding Schelling in at least two respects: first, 
because it supplies an illuminating glance into the significance of Jena Romanticism for 
the astonishingly complex system of aesthetics that Schelling was about to formulate in 
his lectures, and second, because it sheds light on Schelling’s self-understanding as a poet 
and attests to the significance of his Dante adaptations in the longer Romantic narrative 
of a new mythology. It is to the last of these points that we will turn our attention, for it 
builds a bridge to Goethe’s Dantean mythology of nature. 
 In characterizing the Commedia as an expression of absolute individuality, 
Schelling was able to dismiss all traditional theorization of the Commedia as insufficient: 
Dante’s poem is neither an epic, nor a novel, nor a drama, nor a didactic poem, Schelling 
writes: “Nicht ein einzelnes Gedicht, sondern die ganze Gattung der neueren Poesie 
repräsentirend und selbst eine Gattung für sich, steht die göttliche Komödie so ganz 
abgeschlossen, daß die von einzelneren Formen abstrahirte Theorie für sie ganz 
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unzureichend ist, und sie als eine eigne Welt auch ihre eigne Theorie fordert.”420 In its 
universalization of the individual, Schelling claims, Dante’s poem transcends all hereto 
existing theory and inaugurates modern poetry itself. To be clear, the mythology achieved 
by Dante is not to be confused with that which had been created by “Homer.” Greek 
mythology had sprung from a different source altogether: its creation was necessarily 
collective and its roots, as Schelling would explain in the lectures, lay not in history and 
the spirit, as in Christian art, but rather in nature. The distinction between antique 
mythologies and modern mythologies was complemented in Schelling’s thought by the 
postulation of a third historical stage of mythic creation, one that — as we saw earlier — 
Schelling had written of at the end of the System des transcendentalen Idealismus.421 
Whereas the task of the modern poet was to follow the example of Dante by 
universalizing his individual existence in a new mythology, there was to come, Schelling 
wrote, an age in which one, universal mythology would comprehend all others.422 This 
vision represents of course a reiteration of the historic-aesthetic teleology of Friedrich 
Schlegel’s Rede über die Mythologie, in which Schlegel anticipates the materialization of 
a universal mythology that is sustained by an all-encompassing worldview furnished by 
the reconciliation of Idealism and Realism. Indeed, just as Schlegel envisions the new 
mythology issuing from the philosophical promise of Idealism and Realism, so too does 
Schelling, with an important qualification. It is not in a generic Idealism, nor in a purely 
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Spinozistic Realism, that he locates the seed of the new mythology; rather, it is in his 
very own doctrine of Naturphilosophie: “ich verhehle meine Ueberzeugung nicht, daß in 
der Naturphilosophie, wie sie sich aus dem idealistischen Princip gebildet hat, die erste 
ferne Anlage jener künftigen Symbolik und derjenigen Mythologie gemacht ist, welche 
nicht ein Einzelner, sondern die ganze Zeit geschaffen haben wird.”423 Schelling’s 
naturalistic poems, in particular “Heinz Widerporsten” and the stanzas, thus represent 
Schelling’s attempts to realize not just any modern mythology, but the much anticipated 
mythology whose governing principle of Naturphilosophie would provide for true 
universalizability. We know, of course, from Schelling’s thirty-nine lines of ottava rima 
that, even if he were correct in exalting the doctrine of Naturphilosophie, he was not the 
poet to accomplish this tall order. In Schelling’s general reliance on Dante for the poetics 
of myth in the years 1799-1803, however, we document one more effort to realize what 
Friedrich Schlegel had called for: the formulation of a new universal mythology in the 
style of Dante’s Commedia. 
Goethe and the Romantic Campaign for a New Dante 
In the years around the turn of the eighteenth century, specifically 1799-1803, one thing 
was clear to the Romantics in Jena: none of them was remotely close to beginning let 
alone accomplishing the single greatest goal of merging art, philosophy, religion, and 
science in a new mythology. The Schlegels had always understood themselves first and 
foremost as critics; Schelling, for all his enthusiasm, had compiled little more than what 
would amount to negligible poetic fragments, as is attested by the unfortunate dearth of 
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scholarship on them; and Novalis, the most promising among the figures in the Schlegels’ 
orbit, had died of tuberculosis in March, 1801. To be sure, the theorists of Romanticism 
— the Schlegel brothers and, to a lesser extent, Schelling — probably never truly 
harbored genuine hope that one among their coterie would realize so ambitious a project. 
To use Ernst Behler’s words, the new mythology was “not a research project to be carried 
out in the near future, but one of those more fundamental tasks that, upon reflection, 
manifest both the impossibility and the necessity of their realization.”424 Even Schelling, 
whose poetic ventures reveal no small degree of ambition, seems not to have deceived 
himself any longer than a couple of years into believing that he would be the one to do 
so. Amidst all the blustery theory, however, there existed the expectation and, of course, 
the rhetoric, that a new mythology would be realized by a new Dante; it just happened 
that the one capable of bringing it to life lived not in Florence or Jena, but in Weimar.    
 The belief in Goethe’s herculean ability to create a new mythology, no matter 
how much it may have rested on the Romantics’ conviction of his general transcendence 
as a poet, appears also to have originated in specific projects that Goethe had undertaken. 
If Schelling, for example, had imagined the new mythology to be a poeticization of 
Naturphilosophie and F. Schlegel regarded it as a “symbolische Ansicht der Natur,” an 
artistic harmony of idealism and realism, then they both must have seen in Goethe’s plan 
for a great naturalistic Lehrgedicht the template for a new mythology. Schelling, a 
collaborator in these years with Goethe, had been one of the impulses behind Goethe’s 
desire to realize the project. The model of Lucretius’s De rerum natura, moreover, 
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seemed to indicate a poem of significant proportions. Even if not a collaborator of 
Goethe, A.W. Schlegel was tangentially involved in these plans to the extent that he 
frequently met with Goethe throughout 1799 and did Goethe the favor of commenting on 
his friend Knebel’s translation of Lucretius. Knebel, not incidentally, was Goethe’s 
primary correspondent regarding the plan for a new Lucretian poem, rumors of which 
seem to have inspired F. Schlegel to begin reading Lucretius.425 Henrich Steffens, a pupil 
of Schelling, would remark in his memoirs that “In dem Kreise der Goethe, Fichte, 
Schelling, Schlegel bestand der bewußte, leidenschaftliche Wille, gemeinsam die 
philosophische Weltansicht zu vollenden, ihr in der Dichtung ergreifenden Ausdruck, im 
Leben Anwendung und Herrschaft zu verschaffen.”426  
 As we know, Goethe’s great Naturgedicht never came to fruition; he would settle, 
in fact, for cycles of naturalistic poems that he assembled as Gott, Gemüt und Welt (1815) 
and Gott und Welt (1822).427 But the Romantics’ expectations of Goethe far exceeded the 
unrealized poem. Indeed, since at least the mid 1790s, they had witnessed in Goethe the 
potential of a new Dante: for a time, Wilhelm Meister came to represent the ideal of the 
Romantic novel, and the Faust fragment furthermore suggested that Goethe’s novels, 
dramas, and lyrics would indeed give way to a poem of universal proportions. In point of 
fact, when Schelling had all but relinquished poetry and published his essay on Dante, he 
singled out Goethe’s Faust as the only German work of so universal a scope that it 
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approximated the Commedia. After declaring Dante urbildlich, therefore, he wrote that 
“Das einzige deutsche Gedicht von universeller Anlage knüpft die äußersten Enden in 
dem Streben der Zeit durch die ganz eigenthümliche Erindung einer partiellen 
Mythologie, die Gestalt des Faust, auf ähnliche Weise zusammen.”428 Schelling repeated 
the comparison in his lectures on the Philosophie der Kunst, noting that Goethe’s Faust 
“eine wahrhaft Dantesche Bedeutung [hat], obgleich es weit mehr Komödie und mehr in 
poetischem Sinn göttlich ist, als das Werk des Dante.”429  
 The Goethe-Dante comparisons likewise emerged prominently in F. Schlegel’s 
Gespräch über die Poesie, the roots of which lay in Schlegel’s plans to transform his 
earlier essay on Wilhelm Meister into a broader treatment of Goethe.430 After having just 
asserted earlier in the dialogue that a new mythology could arise only in the style of 
Dante’s Commedia, Schlegel clearly lays the mantle of modern, mythic poetry on 
Goethe’s shoulders in the subsequent Versuch über den verschiedenen Styl in Goethes 
früheren und späteren Werken, which culminates in the claim that Goethe could be for 
modern poetry what Dante was for medieval poetry: 
Goethe hat sich in seiner langen Laufbahn […] zu einer Höhe der Kunst heraufgearbeitet, 
welche zum erstenmal die ganze Poesie der Alten und der Modernen umfaßt, und den 
Keim eines ewigen Fortschreitens enthält. Der Geist, der jetzt rege ist, muß auch diese 
Richtung nehmen, und so wird es, dürfen wir hoffen, nicht an Naturen fehlen, die fähig 
sein werden zu dichten, nach Ideen zu dichten. Wenn sie nach Goethes Vorbilde in 
Versuchen und Werken jeder Art unermüdet nach dem Bessern trachten; wenn sie sich 
die universelle Tendenz, die progressiven Maximen dieses Künstlers zu eigen machen 
[...] so wird jener Keim nicht verloren gehen, so wird Goethe nicht das Schicksal des 
Cervantes und des Shakespeare haben können; sondern der Stifter und das Haupt einer 
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neuen Poesie sein, für uns und die Nachwelt, was Dante auf andere Weise für das 
Mittelalter.431  
 
These flattering remarks — together with the proclamation that a new mythology would 
demand a Dantean poem for a Spinozistic worldview — were composed in 1799, just as 
A.W. Schlegel was busy doing Goethe the favor of overseeing his friend Knebel’s 
Lucretius translation. 
 Indeed, even the rather prosaic Romantic, A.W. Schlegel, who as a professional 
philologist generally forewent the fervid statements of his brother, seems to have been 
convinced that from Goethe’s poetry there had emerged the possibility of infusing a 
Dantean poem of universal scope with a Spinozistic philosophy. We witness this 
conviction in Schlegel’s lengthy narrative composed in terza rima, “Prometheus.”432 A 
clear product of Schlegel’s interest in Dante, “Prometheus” was no less conspicuously 
indebted to what was perhaps the most inflammatory poem of the eighteenth century, 
Goethe’s “Prometheus,” which had indirectly sparked the Pantheismusstreit that would 
embroil Lessing, Mendelssohn, Jacobi, and others. While the action of Schlegel’s poem 
took place in a more recognizably Greek antiquity and thus diminished the radical 
contemporaneity of Goethe’s original, it nonetheless echoed the same contempt for the 
gods in the unmistakably Dantean verse form; in this respect, the poem renewed Goethe’s 
Spinozistic “atheism” in a new aesthetic shell — that, namely, of Dante’s Commedia. 
That Schlegel held the poem for especially meaningful can be gathered from the letter in 
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which he suggestively introduces the poem to Goethe, implying its wealth of meaning: 
“Um dem Eindrucke [des Gedichtes] auf keine Weise vorzugreifen, füge ich nichts über 
die Idee und Anlage des Ganzen, über den Styl der Ausführung und das gewählte 
Sylbenmaaß hinzu: hoffentlich ist das Gedicht nicht so stumm, daß es nicht Kenner über 
alles Nöthige durch sich selbst sollte verständigen können.”433 Too modest, perhaps, to 
state baldly that his poem revises an earlier “Prometheus,” Schlegel suggests rather that 
Goethe conclude its obvious potential for himself. The Kenner in Weimar, however, had 
a different response, complaining to Schiller that the terza rima “gar keine Ruhe hat und 
man wegen der fortschreitenden Räume nirgends schließen kann.”434 No matter how 
Goethe may have read the newly composed “Prometheus,” however, it embodied two of 
the dominant impulses that had begun to govern the imperative of Romantic poetics: the 
religious-philosophic radicality of Spinoza and the aesthetic universality of Dante.  
 The flattering, often obsequious manner in which Schelling and the Schlegels 
seemed to have conveyed this imperative of Romantic poetics to Goethe raised eyebrows 
in Weimar. The critic Karl Böttiger, for example, more or less implied that Goethe had 
allowed the Schlegels to blow smoke up his ass.435 Through their influence, he claimed, 
Goethe became “täglich herrischer und gewaltsamer in seinen Maßregeln.”436 Schiller 
was asked how Goethe “bei der Vergötterung [benimmt], die er mit Shakespeare, Dante 
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theilen muß.”437 And Wieland wanted to know from Goethe how one could let himself be 
praised in such disgusting fashion by the Schlegels.438 In this context, by the way, one 
might call to mind the caricatures of Johann Gottfried Schadow and August von 
Kotzebue, both of whom mocked the Goethe-veneration practiced by the Romantics.439 
For his part, Goethe knew well how over-the-top the Romantics’ Schwärmerei was, so in 
friendly fashion, he reminded A.W. Schlegel that “Was meine jüngern Freunde gutes von 
mir denken und sagen will ich wenigstens durch unaufhaltsames Fortschreiten verdienen 
[…].”440  
 The notion that Goethe should have become a new Dante must have seemed less 
than improbable to Weimar’s resident classicist. In learned circles around 1800, 
excepting that of the Romantics in Jena, Dante still counted for little more than a 
barbarian poet of the Catholic middle ages. When Goethe traveled to Italy, and later 
wrote of his sojourn, only his silence over Giotto’s frescoes in Assisi was more deafening 
than the little he had to say of Dante. Terza rima meant nothing to him when he received 
Schlegel’s “Prometheus,” indeed, its only effect on him was that of aversion. And when 
several of Schelling’s Dantean poems were published in the Musenalmanach of 1802, 
edited by A.W. Schlegel and Tieck, Goethe seemed to mock their debt to the Italian poet, 
writing to Schelling of the volume’s contributors, “Die Theilnehmer befinden sich weder 
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auf Erden, noch im Himmel, noch in der Hölle, sondern in einem interessanten 
Mittelzustand, welcher theils peinlich, theils erfreulich ist.”441 This is to say nothing, by 
the way, of the fact that Goethe would label Dante’s poetry “widerwärtig” and 
“abscheulich” when making notes to himself on Italian literature.442  
Goethe’s Romantic Dante 
Despite all this, a glance at Goethe’s poetry complicates the bromide that his view of 
Dante was wholly negative; indeed, Dante seems to have exerted creative influence on 
him on at least a few significant occasions.443 In the poem “Ilmenau,” for example, an 
ode dedicated to Karl August, Goethe clearly adapted the geography of the Commedia to 
his poeticization of the landscape of Ilmenau. The lyrical subject, a wanderer almost 
ubiquitous in Goethe’s early verse, loses his path in the middle of a dark forest: “Im 
finstern Wald, bei’m Liebesblick der Sterne, / Wo ist mein Pfad, den sorglos ich verlor?” 
(ll. 29-30).444 Like Dante’s pilgrim, the archetypical wanderer lost in a wood, Goethe’s 
                                                           
441 WA IV, 15, 294 (December 5, 1801). 
442 FA 17, 331. 
443 Arnd Bohm summarizes the sometimes brilliant, though often disappointing scholarship on Goethe’s 
reception of Dante in detail. See Bohm, Goethe’s Faust and European Epic (Rochester: Camden House, 
2007), 66-74. Bohm’s own readings of Faust, however, in which he sees an intertextual link between 
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Entwicklungsgeschichte und Erklärung (Heidelberg: Winter, 1907). For yet another overview of the 
scholarship, see Hölter, Der Dichter der Hölle und des Exils, 258-272, who reserves strong criticism for the 
interpretation of Gaier. 
444 FA I, 1, 263-268. 
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lyrical subject arrives at an earthly paradise, “ein neues Eden” (l. 10). And just as Dante’s 
pilgrim bathes in Lethe, forgetting his earthly troubles, so too does Goethe’s subject 
bathe in the edenic landscape and experience a dream so powerful that (ll. 21-28), when it 
has vanished, he awakens to “[e]in neues Leben” (l. 165), itself of course a distant echo 
of Dante’s Vita Nuova. These images would all be recycled in “Anmuthige Gegend” 
when Faust delivers his famous terza rima monolog, and they would likewise reverberate 
faintly in Torquato Tasso, also without explicit reference to the Commedia, when the 
eponymous character paints a similar portrait in a passionate discussion with the princess 
of Ferrara.445 And, as some scholars have remarked,446 Goethe’s famous sonnet 
“Mächtiges Überraschen” reiterates the Dantean refrain of new life in the final lines of its 
sestet: a river that issues from the mountains rushes toward a valley but is held back by a 
dike, thus forming a sea, “ein neues Leben” (l. 14).447 Composed in the years just 
following Schiller’s death, the sonnet would prove prescient, for Goethe himself would 
continually seek new life, be it in his engagement with medieval German and Persian, in 
his publication of scientific poetry and research, or in his attempts to forge new life from 
old in biographical projects like Dichtung und Wahrheit and the Italienische Reise.  
 The Dantean moments to have emerged in Goethe’s poetry can best be described 
as sporadic and, with the exception of Faust, which we will discuss below, superficial. 
The character of his interest in Dante would change, however, beginning in the 1820s. 
                                                           
445 FA I, 5, 748. 
446 I first heard reference to a Dante allusion in “Mächtiges Überraschen” when David Wellbery discussed 
it in his keynote address at the Atkins Goethe Conference in Chicago, 2011. See also Andrew Piper, 
“Reading’s Refrain: From Bibliography to Topology,” ELH (Summer 2013), 392. See also Dieter 
Borchmeyer, Schnellkurs Goethe (Köln: Dumont, 2005), 148.  
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First of all, there exists good documentary evidence of a growing admiration for the 
Italian poet that seems not to have been present much earlier in Goethe’s life. In 
December 1824, for example, Eckermann recounts a momentous encounter with Goethe 
in which the latter contemplates a bust of Dante and marvels over the poet’s imposing 
greatness:  
Ich ging […] zur Zeit des Lichtanzündens zu ihm. Er saß […] vor einem großen Tisch, 
auf welchem gespeist worden und wo zwei Lichter brannten, die zugleich sein Gesicht 
und eine kolossale Büste beleuchteten, die vor ihm auf dem Tische stand und mit deren 
Betrachtung er sich beschäftigte. “Nun?” sagte Goethe […] “wer ist das?” “Ein Poet, und 
zwar ein Italiener scheint es zu sein,” sagte ich. “Es ist Dante,” sagte Goethe.448 
  
Goethe’s subsequent words intrigued Eckermann, who writes that Goethe spoke of Dante 
“mit aller Ehrfurcht, wobei es mir merkwürdig war, daß ihm das Wort Talent nicht 
genügte, sondern daß er ihn eine Natur nannte, als womit er ein Umfassenderes, 
Ahndungsvolleres, tiefer und weiter um sich Blickendes ausdrücken zu wollen schien.”449 
Was Goethe, at age seventy-five, beginning to measure his legacy against that of the poet 
whom the Romantics long ago suggested he might rival?450 
 Without Karl Streckfuß’s translation of the Inferno in 1824, it is likely that 
Goethe’s late engagement with Dante never would have occurred. Streckfuß, no 
acquaintance of Goethe, nonetheless sent the poet in Weimar a copy of his translation, 
which Goethe took up late in the summer of 1826. Inspired by it, he dedicated to 
Streckfuß a short poem in which he refers to a discussion between Dante and Virgil 
(Inferno 11.94-111). 
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450 An additional spark for Goethe’s interest in Dante around 1826 may have been Bernhard Rudolph 
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   Von Gott dem Vater stammt Natur, 
   Das allerliebste Frauenbild, 
   Des Menschen Geist, ihr auf der Spur, 
   Ein treuer Werber, fand sie mild. 
   Sie liebten sich nicht unfruchtbar, 
   Ein Kind entsprang von hohem Sinn; 
   So ist uns allen offenbar: 
   Naturphilosophie sei Gottes Enkelin.451  
  
Goethe alludes to a discussion in the Inferno concerning usury, a topic that lies far afield 
of the poem he dedicates to Streckfuß. There Dante asks how it is that usury offends God, 
to which Virgil responds by explaining that usury inverts the natural order of the 
universe: insofar as nature takes its course from God, and human art takes its course from 
nature, there exists an order that permits one to speak of human art (vostr’ arte) as God’s 
grandchild (nepote); but usury inverts that order in that it uses artificial means rather than 
the natural order to compound money.452 Goethe’s poem displays the same preoccupation 
with tracing a natural genealogy back to the divine, though in his case, the plots on the 
chart are somewhat different: the union of male Geist and female Natur bears God’s 
grandchild, but the offspring is not human art as in Dante, but rather Naturphilosophie.453 
The liberality, indeed audacity, of Goethe’s interpretation of the passage is telling, for it 
shows precisely how mediated his understanding of Dante had been by his association of 
the Commedia with the Romantics, and above all, with Schelling.454 Indeed, he translates 
                                                           
451 FA I, 2, 813. 
452 See Charles Singleton, Inferno, v.2 Commentary (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 179ff. 
Note in particular the explanation of Aquinas, cited by Singleton, 182.  
453 Nisbet insults Schelling’s poetry, singling out in particular his antiquated application of male-female 
sexuality in the self-consciously Goethean poem “Tier und Pflanze” as a “crass example of male 
chauvinism” (Nisbet 110); in actuality, Goethe’s poem to Streckfuß, manifestly indebted to Schelling, 
displays a no less simplistic and traditional application of the male/female binary to the concepts of 
Naturphilosophie.  
454 Sulger-Gebing identifies three phases of Goethe’s Dante-reception: (1) 1799-1824, the period marked by 
Romantic influence; (2) 1826-1827, the period sparked by the translation of Streckfuß; and (3) 1828-1830, 
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Dante’s Aristotelian-Aquinian vision of the cosmos into a fundamentally Schellingian 
formulation that accommodates both nature and spirit. Goethe was no doubt aware of 
Schelling’s attempts to blend the Naturphilosophie around 1800 with the poetics of the 
Commedia; it just so happened that his gracious thank-you poem for Streckfuß, one of the 
first times that he truly engaged with Dante, was also the first statement to register this 
fact. Significantly, though, it was not the last, for in his review of the letters of Jacobi in 
the following year, for example, Goethe scolded the polemicist for having undervalued 
both nature and Naturphilosophie, writing “Da lobe ich mir unsern Dante, der uns doch 
erlaubt, um Gottes Enkelin zu werben.”455 More strikingly yet, the identification of Natur 
as feminine will provide a clue to the enigmatic concept of the Ewig-Weiblichen when we 
come to the final lines of Goethe’s Faust.  
 Between Goethe’s first reading of Streckfuß’s Inferno and his review of Jacobi’s 
correspondence, he composed two poems that were even more symptomatic of his new 
esteem for both Dante and the Romantics: the terza rima monolog of Faust in 
“Anmuthige Gegend” and the terza rima poem “Im ernsten Beinhaus war’s,” or as it is 
better known, “Bei Betrachtung von Schillers Schädel.” That he would even deign to 
write in Dante’s verse shows a marked change since the time when he had received 
Schlegel’s “Prometheus” and deemed its metrics too restless; indeed, in a discussion of 
Eduard von Schenk’s terza rima poem on the occasion of Antonio Canova’s death, 
                                                                                                                                                                               
a final phase initiated by the translation of Prinz Johann von Sachsen (Sulger-Gebing, Goethe und Dante, 
65). This heuristic seems largely accurate, but I would urge us not to regard it as anything more than a 
heuristic – for, as my reading shows, the Romantic mediation of Dante never seems wholly absent in 
Goethe’s adaptations.  
455 FA I, 22, 815. 
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Goethe remarked that “Terzinen müssen immer einen großen, reichen Stoff zur Unterlage 
haben, wenn sie gefallen sollen.”456 Certainly the two instances in which he employs 
Dante’s verse fit the bill: Faust’s recommencement and Goethe’s encounter with 
Schiller’s skull could hardly be considered anything but singularly grand poetic 
statements in a career marked at every stage by monumental striving. Yet what do they 
have to do, specifically, with the way that Goethe taps into Schelling’s synthesis of 
Naturphilosophie and the Commedia and, more broadly, with the Romantics’ theorization 
of a new mythology in the style of Dante? 
 The question itself presupposes a view that is not standard, though also not 
unheard of, in Goethe scholarship: namely, that the two poems share a fundament that 
girds their adaptation of the unmistakably Dantean verse. While scholars have been quick 
to point out that the poems represent the only instances in Goethe’s oeuvre in which he 
deploys Dante’s tercets,457 only Paul Friedländer seems to suggest the possibility that the 
two poems may have once been intended to serve as gems linked on a longer pendant.458 
That the one appeared in Faust and the other in the second version of Wilhelm Meisters 
                                                           
456 Herwig, Goethes Gespräche, Bd. 3.1, 590. 
457 Among the myriad scholarly treatments of the “Beinhaus” poem, I mention the following: Karl Viëtor: 
“Goethe’s Gedicht auf Schiller’s Schädel,” Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 
59 (1944), 142-183; Fritz Mautner, “’Ist Fortzusetzen’: Goethes Gedicht auf Schillers Schaedel,” 
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Wanderjahre would seem to dispute this notion, but in actuality, the composition history 
might indicate otherwise: fixing firm dates of composition is not possible, but both poems 
seem to have been composed in a roughly six-month span between 1826, i.e., just after 
the reading of Streckfuß’s Dante, and 1827.459 Whether Goethe had planned a 
Terzinenzyklus, as Friedländer suggests, or not, the fact remains that Goethe’s terza rima 
poems, no matter how often they are treated as discrete works, lend themselves on the 
basis of both philological reconstruction and hermeneutic investigation to a reading that 
treats them as contrasting counterparts.  
 Aside from the fact that Goethe used terza rima only twice in a span of more than 
half a century, and both times in a window of six months, the possibility that the two 
poems constitute a dialogue is above all evident in their lyrical subjects’ contrasting 
encounters with nature. Whereas Faust ultimately enjoys no more than a mediated 
experience of nature, attaining not the sun’s light itself but rather its refraction in the 
spray of a waterfall, the lyrical subject of the “Beinhaus” poem arrives at a mystical 
experience of the heart of nature, expressed most clearly in the poem’s closing words, 
which tell of the revelation of “Gott-Natur.” It is just such a revelation of nature, 
however, that is denied to Faust; indeed, in the moment in which the rising sun blinds 
him, he once again runs up against the same epistemological threshold that had been 
exposed in part one of the drama when he failed to comprehend the Erdgeist, signaling to 
readers Faust’s ultimate inability to know “was die Welt im innersten zusammenhält” (ll. 
                                                           
459 Goethes diary entry of January 11, 1827, seems to indicate a terminus ad quem for the Faust monolog. 
Eckermann would later explain the decision whereby Goethe chose to publish “Im ernsten Beinhaus war’s” 
in 1829 in the Wanderjahren. See FA II, 12, 485.  
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382-383). That Faust settles for knowledge of nature that is mediated, symbolized by the 
rainbow in the drama’s most indelible image, constitutes the definitive epistemological 
statement of the Faust project as a whole.  
 Yet to ascribe this stance unreservedly to Goethe would belie the fact that he 
himself postulated and wrote about the possibility of direct knowledge of nature, 
speaking indeed of a “geistigen Auges” with which the human subject could access the 
essence of nature.460 In point of fact, this more piercing mode of cognition characterizes 
precisely the way in which the lyrical subject of the “Beinhaus” poem comes to 
comprehend nature: he enters a dank charnel house and observes rows of skulls and 
bones, an initial act that thereby indicates the centrality of visual perception, but one from 
which there arises an intuition that is spiritual in character: “Doch mir Adepten war die 
Schrift geschrieben / Die heiligen Sinn nicht jedem offenbarte / Als ich in Mitten solcher 
starren Menge / Unschätzbar herrlich ein Gebild gewahrte” (ll. 15-18). The gnostic 
account of this experience, uncannily similar to that in Schelling’s stanzas, ultimately 
transitions to unabashed mysticism: “Wie mich geheimnisvoll die Form entzückte! / Die 
gottgedachte Spur, die sich erhalten! / Ein Blick der Mich an jenes Meer entrückte / Das 
flutend strömt gesteigerte Gestalten” (ll. 22-25). Finally, a rhetorical question that serves 
as a summation of the experience provides readers with an open clue to its interpretation: 
“Was kann der Mensch im Leben mehr gewinnen / Als dass sich Gott-Natur ihm 
offenbare?” (ll. 31-32). With the inclusion of Gott-Natur, Goethe alludes quite clearly to 
                                                           
460 On this topic see the excellent article by Eckhart Förster, “Goethe and the ‘Auge des Geistes,’” 
Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 75 (2001), 87-101. 
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the philosophy of Spinoza, whose mantra of deus sive natura (god or nature) was 
emblematic of the Dutch philosopher’s monistic ontology, as well as Goethe’s (e.g., Gott 
und Welt).  
 In treating the two terza rima poems as counterparts, the allusion to Spinoza 
assumes double significance, for it underscores the epistemic experience of the 
“Beinhaus” poem’s subject as immediate, direct, and intuitive in contrast to the mediated, 
sensory mode that Faust experiences in gazing upon the waterfall. Indeed, these 
contrasting models of knowledge and perception, far from being merely incidentally 
related, represent the two epistemological poles that had attracted Goethe since having 
learned of Spinoza through discussions with Herder and Kant through discussions with 
Schiller. Faust’s insight that life is to be had only “am farbigen Abglanz” points on the 
one hand to the Kantian theory that knowledge of Dinge an sich is only to be had as it is 
processed by the categories of the understanding,461 while on the other hand the 
“Beinhaus” poem portrays the possibility of a direct intuition of nature and thus envisions 
an act of knowing that had been widely postulated around 1800 as an alternative to the 
apparently restrictive epistemology of Kant. Even Goethe, inspired by Kant’s discussion 
in the third critique of the possibility of intuition,462 had written his own fragmentary 
essay in 1820 on the possibility of “Anschauende Urteilskraft.”463 If around the turn of 
                                                           
461 Although he does not cite Kant, Schöne reads Faust’s experience of the rainbow as formulation of a 
“Goetheschen Erkenntnistheorie.” See FA I, 7.2, 410.  
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Philosophy in the Age of Goethe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 488-91. For a 
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the eighteenth century the interest in the possibility of intellectual intuition had grown, 
this was largely due to the Spinoza reception that had occurred via the Pantheismusstreit, 
which proved just as crucial to epistemology as it did to metaphysics.464 In the Ethics, as 
we have seen, Spinoza formulated the possibility of three modes of knowledge: 
empirical, discursive, and intuitive, the last of which purportedly enabled not the 
perception of an empirical form, but rather of the essence inherent to that form. In this 
way, intuitive knowledge, or as Spinoza calls it scientia intuitiva, furnishes the immediate 
cognition of a whole without demanding that one perceive the whole by means of its 
parts. The doctrine had exerted a powerful impact on Goethe in the 1780s, and one that 
would remain vital to him well into his old age. Indeed, in the revelation of Gott-Natur in 
the “Beinhaus” poem, we find the doctrine poeticized as an epistemic alternative to the 
model proposed by Goethe’s other great poem of knowledge, the Faust monolog. Not to 
draw too poetic a point of it, but in actuality, the terza rima poems express in 1826 the 
competing philosophies of knowledge represented by Goethe’s dinner guests on the eve 
of the nineteenth century, Schiller and Schelling. Ironically, and perhaps rather morbidly, 
it is in the reflection on Schiller’s skull that Goethe seeks to articulate an experience that 
transcends the Kantian philosophy so deeply at the heart of their friendship. 
 What does it mean for Dante and the new mythology, now, if Goethe’s two terza 
rima poems stage experiences of the eighteenth century’s two dominant and competing 
                                                                                                                                                                               
contemporary philosophical account, read Gunnar Hindrichs, “Goethe’s Notion of an Intuitive Power of 
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464 The standard work on the topic is Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant 
to Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).  
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theories of cognition? To begin, it means that Goethe’s engagement with Dante in the 
1820s is inseparable, no matter how distant in time, from the Romantic and especially 
from the Schellingian reception of Dante around 1800. The “Beinhaus” poem, in 
particular, owes a debt to Schelling, for it revisits the Spinozistically charged 
Naturphilosophie that had animated Goethe’s friendship with Schelling between 1798 
and 1800 while deploying images that abound in Schelling’s own Dantean poems of 
those years, in particular his terza rima poem “Die letzten Worten des Pfarrers zu 
Drottning auf Seeland,” which Goethe had once appeared to mock.465 In adopting Dante 
as a poet of Naturphilosophie in 1826, moreover, Goethe had finally answered the 
Romantics’ campaign for a new Dante, stylizing himself as the one who would find a 
way to navigate the convergence of Spinoza’s philosophy of nature with Dante’s poetics. 
On the one hand, this endeavor to give Romantic expression to a philosophy of nature 
exemplified Goethe’s attempts in the mid-1820s to reconcile the classical and the 
romantic, of which he once wrote that “Es ist Zeit, daß der leidenschaftliche Zwiespalt 
zwischen Classikern und Romantikern sich endlich versöhne.”466 Simultaneously, 
however, these poems in terza rima were thoroughly and classically Goethean, dating all 
the way back to the intersection of science and poetry in “Die Metamorphose der 
Pflanzen” in 1798. What in any event the terza rima poems did not signify was a new 
mythology: just as the project of the great Naturgedicht in 1799 had been transformed 
into smaller cycles of theosophic poems in Gott, Gemüt und Welt and Gott und Welt, the 
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terza rima poems could at best be regarded as the microcosmic expressions of what was 
expected to be a more macrocosmic artwork of the same worldview. 
Faust: Eine Commedia 
This dissertation has reached a crossroads of sorts: the Romantic obsession with Dante’s 
mythology, born in the philological and theoretical work of the Schlegel brothers, 
attained only the most ephemeral expression in the efflorescence of Early German 
Romanticism: the fragmentary novel of Novalis, the abandoned poetic ventures of 
Schelling, and belatedly but relatedly, the minor terza rima poems of Goethe. These 
shards of a Romantic mythology, executed in the style of the Commedia, litter the path to 
what we must now regard as the era’s fullest expression of a new, Dantean mythology: 
Goethe’s Faust II. This statement will no doubt sound as reckless as it is comically grand, 
particularly given the contemporary wariness of anything resembling grand narratives; 
and while this prejudice has not yet impeded our path, there is admittedly something 
suspicious about pegging Goethe’s Faust as the apotheosis of Romantic striving — 
indeed, would this not be tantamount to recycling the same Romantic Schwärmerei that 
inspired both laughter and disgust when Goethe colloborated with figures in Jena at the 
turn of the eighteenth century?  
 I begin therefore by dispensing with the claims that the present argument does not 
stake: the assertion that Goethe’s Faust II represents a rescuscitation of the Romantics’ 
project of a new mythology, adopting Dante no less as one of its integral models, does 
not signify (a) that Goethe understood Faust II as the mythology so eagerly anticipated 
by the Jena Romantics; nor does it signify (b) that Faust II represents Goethe’s attempt to 
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measure himself against Dante, vying for a loftier perch in the pantheon of European 
poetry. What it does claim, however, is the following: (1) that Faust II, in addition to a 
myriad of other objects, engages the primary strands of German idealism that had 
preoccupied Romantic poets in Jena and that lay at the core of the project of a new 
mythology; (2) that like the Romantic poets in Jena, who had postulated mythology as a 
mode of art that could accommodate their intuitions of the universe, Goethe deployed a 
poetics of myth in Faust II as a means of providing for a symbolic representation of the 
universe; and finally, this argument claims (3) that Goethe consciously grounds his 
cosmic drama’s mythic poetics of Naturphilosophie by reimagining the narrative of 
Dante’s Commedia, appealing to the poet “der uns doch erlaubt, um Gottes Enkelin zu 
werben.”   
——— 
On his seventy-eighth birthday, Goethe received a surprise visitor: King Ludwig I of 
Bavaria had come, after a hunt with Karl August, to extend “dem Heros der deutschen 
Dichter” his wishes for a happy birthday.467 The unexpected visit aroused agitation in the 
Haus am Frauenplan, where other well wishers like August and Ottilie von Goethe, 
Chancellor Müller, Countess Julie von Egloffstein, Frau von Eichendorff, and some 
dozen English visitors now prepared for the king to call on the poet. Goethe himself, 
however, was unfazed; in fact, private meetings from a few hours later with the jurist 
Eduard Gans and the scholar Gustav Parthey reveal that Goethe was preoccupied not with 
royal visits, but rather with the reception of Hegel’s philosophy in Berlin. 
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 In recent months, in fact, Hegel and Karl Varnhagen von Ense had inquired 
whether Goethe would not like to assist them in the publication of the Jahrbücher für 
wissenschaftliche Kritik (which, to a very limited extent, Goethe did).468 So on a day 
when Goethe entertained royalty, it was not wholly surprising that by early afternoon the 
morning’s frivolity had been forgotten and Goethe was inquiring after philosophy in 
Berlin. Gans reports that, in respect to the efficacy of philosophy as a discipline, Goethe 
deemed it crucial that philosophy take it upon itself “auch auf die Sachen und 
Gegenstände, welche sie behandele, Rücksicht zu nehmen, so dürfte sie umso wirksamer 
werden, je mehr sie freilich auch mit den Empirikern zu tun bekomme.”469 The concern 
for objectivity implicit in Goethe’s statement recalls the “steifen Realism” that he once 
thought softened by Schiller’s Kantianism; indeed, the conviction that philosophy ought 
to treat objects is consonant with both Goethe’s abiding Spinozism and his longstanding 
engagement with Naturphilosophie. In Parthey’s account of his conversation with 
Goethe, we witness a similar report in which Goethe denigrates the subjectivist strand of 
transcendental idealism and privileges its objectivist successors: 
 Kant ist der erste gewesen, der ein ordentliches Fundament gelegt. Auf diesem Grunde  
hat man  denn in verschiedenen Richtungen weiter gebaut. Schelling hat das Objekt, die 
unendliche Breite der Natur, vorangestellt; Fichte faßte vorzugsweise das Subjekt auf, 
daher stammt sein Ich und Nicht-Ich, womit man in spekulativer Hinsicht nicht viel 
anfangen kann […] Wo Objekt und Subjekt sich berühren, da ist Leben. Wenn Hegel mit 
seiner Identitätsphilosophie sich mitten zwischen Objekt und Subjekt hineinstellt, und 
diesen Platz behauptet, so wollen wir ihn loben.470   
 
The dismissal of Fichte’s principle of subjective self-consciousness and approbation of 
Schelling and Hegel for their approach to nature and objectivity reverberate this 
                                                           
468 See Goethe’s letter of March 15, 1827, to Hegel and Varnhagen von Ense in FA II, 10, 453. 
469 FA II, 10, 516. 
470 FA II, 10, 521. 
 
 
 
198 
fundamentally Goethean stance; and indeed, the particular praise of Identitätsphilosophie 
— even if it does not acknowledge Schelling’s role in its articulation — evinces the same 
basic position that Goethe had taken three decades earlier when he wrote to Schiller that 
he wished to see a mediation between idealism and realism.471 The same sentiments 
emerge again in a letter to Sulpiz Boisserée in the following spring when Goethe 
evaluates Schelling as a philosopher: “Ich habe mich immer nah an Schelling gehalten, 
nachdem ich das Mögliche von Kritizismus, Idealismus und Intimismus genutzt hatte. 
Schelling wendete sich gegen die Natur, ehrte sie und suchte ihr Recht zu behaupten, dies 
war mir genug [...].”472 
 Statements like these furnish a unique retrospective of German idealism from the 
perspective of a civil administrator who had overseen many of the organs that enabled 
idealism to flourish, as well as from the perspective of a poet and natural scientist who 
had often wrestled with the implications of idealist philosophy for the practice of art and 
science. More to the point, however, these statements in 1827 and 1828 about the 
philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel illuminate the philosophical purview 
from which Goethe composed the bulk of Faust II. In his critical commentary, Albrecht 
Schöne makes certain bird’s-eye-view observations that would seem to confirm that 
Goethe’s last poetic project engages only secondarily with a particular instantiation of 
human subjectvity, for it takes as its primary object the world itself. As Schöne notes, a 
full thirty percent of the text in part one had been occupied by Faust’s own words, 
                                                           
471 FA II, 4, 477 (January 6, 1798). 
472 FA II, 10, 594 (March 2, 1828). 
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whereas this figure dwindles to thirteen percent in part two; conversely, collective speech 
accounts for a mere seven percent of the text in part one, whereas it expands to a full 
twenty percent by part two.473 As Goethe explained to Eckermann, “Der erste Teil ist fast 
ganz subjektiv; es ist alles aus einem befangeneren, leidenschaftlicheren Individuum 
hervorgegangen […]. Im zweiten Teile aber ist fast gar nichts Subjektives, es erscheint 
hier eine höhere, breitere, hellere, leidenschaftslosere Welt.”474      
 In concurring with the general scholarly consensus that Goethe more or less 
abandons the perspective of the eponymous hero in the drama’s second part, I would 
suggest that this shift arises from Goethe’s more intent interest in the epistemic dilemmas 
facing idealist philosophy; in its mythic poetics, I wish to show, Faust II comes to 
approximate the Romantics’ own views on the relation of knowledge, nature, and art. 
This much seems intuitive, for example, in a cursory glance at the “Klassische 
Walpurgisnacht,” a mesmerizing panorama of ancient Greek sea deities that, more than 
any other composition of Goethe, resembles a mythology in its own right.475 If we 
consider F. Schlegel’s definition of mythology as a Symbolsprache, a series of 
“allegorische Bilder und Darstellungen, die, abgesondert betrachtet, als eine Art von 
Naturphilosophie anzusehen sind,”476 the classical Walpurgis night certainly seems to fit 
the bill: one need only think of the natural-philosophical debates that assume dramatic 
                                                           
473 FA I, 7.2, 388. 
474 FA II, 12, 440-441 (February 17, 1831). 
475 T.J. Reed, without seeming to tie the classical Walpurgis night to Goethe’s plans for a Naturgedicht 
around 1799-1800, nonetheless links it with Lucretius’s De rerum natura and “Greek myths and monsters 
and early theories of the earth’s genesis.” See Reed, The Classical Centre: Goethe and Weimar, 1775-1832 
(London: Croom Helm, 1980), 238. 
476 KFSA XI, 14. As Ernst Behler writes, Schlegel came to understand ancient mythology as an anticipation 
of modern physics, a notion in keeping with the Ältestes Systemprogramm. See KFSA 2, XCI. 
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form there, including for example, the Neptunist/Vulcanist argument that erupts between 
Thales and Anaxagoras, as well as the accompanying geological, astronomical, and 
nautical activity. These representations correspond, too, to Schelling’s dictum — cited as 
the epigraph to this chapter — that imagined the new mythology as an offshoot of 
Naturphilosophie.477 Granting this aesthetics of myth, which we will explore further, we 
need to ask what it has to do with the basic problematic driving German idealism: how 
does a human subject arrive at knowledge of extra-subjective nature?  
 Questions of this variety emerge at various points in the drama’s first part: when 
Faust longingly observes the moon from his study, for example, and when he wishes to 
comprehend the Erdgeist, Goethe has already begun to mark Faust as a drama of 
knowledge. Yet the representations of this dynamic assume more narrowly philosophic 
connotations in the second part of Faust, with the indelible image of the rainbow, as I 
have indicated above, marking the commencement of action in the second part in a 
notably Kantian vein. If Goethe’s poetic account of Kant’s epistemology strikes an 
appropriately noble and tragic tone, then in the engagement with the philosophy of 
Fichte, comedy proves to be the more suitable mode. It is in the beginning of act two, 
when Mephistopheles enters Faust’s old study, that Goethe stages a discussion that 
underscores the inane consequences of Fichte’s first principle of an absolute ego. Dressed 
                                                           
477 On this note, we might point out that Goethe himself, in addition to seeking a reconciliation between 
classicism and Romanticism in the last decades of his life, had likewise expressed interest in theories of 
mythology spawned by the Romantic movement itself. Between 1815 and 1817, for example, he weighed 
in on the heated debate incited by Friedrich Creuzer’s attention to the ancient Orient in Symbolik und 
Mythologie der alten Völker (1810-1812), concluding that while he found Creuzer’s scholarship 
fascinating, his taste ultimately inclined toward Ionia and Homer. See his letter to Creuzer, October 1, 
1817. 
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in Faust’s old furs, Mephistopheles is called upon by the Baccalaureus, a smugly mature 
reincarnation of the naïve Schüler whom Mephistopheles had bamboozled in part one. An 
exchange with Mephistopheles quickly reveals that the Baccalaureus, for all his new 
learning, remains in essence a dolt. Yet Goethe seems not to revisit the character for 
merely dramatic effect — indeed, the introduction of the Baccalaureus is an otherwise 
awkward interruption in the narrative of Faust’s recovery from his disastrous attempt to 
seize Helena. The purpose of the scence resides rather in the comedic culmination of the 
Baccalaureus’s harangue: a ridiculous parody of Fichte’s philosophy: 
  Dies ist der Jugend edelster Beruf! 
  Die Welt sie war nicht eh ich sie erschuf; 
  Die Sonne führt’ ich aus dem Meer herauf; 
  Mit mir begann der Mond des Wechsels Lauf; 
  Da schmückte sich der Tag auf meinen Wegen, 
  Die Erde grünte, blühte mir entgegen. 
  Auf meinen Wink, in jener ersten Nacht, 
  Entfaltete sich aller Sterne Pracht. 
  Wer, ausser mir, entband euch aller Schranken 
  Philisterhaft einklemmender Gedanken? 
  Ich aber frey, wie mir’s im Geiste spricht, 
  Verfolge froh mein innerliches Licht, 
  Und wandle rasch, im eigensten Entzücken, 
  Das Helle vor mir, Finsterniß im Rücken. (ll. 6793-6806)   
 
The Baccalaureus, who prior to this eruption of Fichteanism had revealed himself to be a 
cocksure twit, now spews a philosophical creed that goes so far as to sanction his massive 
ego. Professing the “Helle vor mir, Finsterniß im Rücken,” he forms a direct contrast to 
Faust, who in “Anmutige Gegend” resigned himself to a different outlook: “So bleibe 
denn die Sonne mir im Rücken” (l. 4715).478 Kant’s philosophy of knowing, limited 
                                                           
478 On the Faust/Baccalaureus contrast, see Schöne’s commentary, FA I, 7.2, 502f. In the reference to an 
inner light and outer shadow, Gaier sees a possible reference to Novalis (Gaier 88).  
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though it may have been, did not incite the self-assuredness, indeed the arrogance, that 
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre had inspired in the youth, with whom Goethe associates it.479  
 What casts into relief Fichte’s philosophy of the absolute ego and its attendant 
devaluation of nature is the mythic drama immediately subsequent to it, that of the so-
called “Klassische Walpurgsnacht,” in which both Homunculus and Faust seem to escape 
confinement in their respectively solipsistic realms. Created in a vial by Wagner, yet 
bereft of a body, Homunculus stages Geist itself, a paradoxically visual representation of 
the immateriality of human existence. As Riemer reported, “Goethe habe [nach 
Eckermann] damit die reine Entelechie darstellen wollen […], den Geist des Menschen, 
wie er vor aller Erfahrung ins Leben tritt; denn der Geist des Menschen komme schon 
höchst begabt an und wir lernten keineswegs alles, wir brächten schon mit.”480 Having 
been created in the moments just after the Baccalaureus’s profession of transcendental 
idealism, this monad of pure spirit who simply wishes to “entstehen” (l. 7831) represents 
the absolute absurdity of the doctrine of absolute ego, which as the Romantics had come 
to realize, effectively precluded the reality of nature. Indeed, the entirety of 
Homunculus’s prominent role in the “Klassische Walpurgisnacht,” in which he seeks out 
the means by which to materialize in human form, stages the farce of a Fichtean ego 
detached from natural reality. But by the end of the festive evening, Homunculus has 
learned the means of Entstehen and pursues his plan: he smashes his jar of light into the 
                                                           
479 On Goethe’s stance toward German youth, particularly with reference to Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche 
Nation, see Dorothea Hölscher-Lohmeyer’s comments in MA 18.1, 807.  
480 Heinrich Düntzer, Goethes Faust. Erster und zweiter Teil. Zum erstenmal vollständig erläutert (Leipzig: 
Dyk, 1850-51), 525. 
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shell-throne of Galatea, the embodiment of feminine nature, and so conjoins Geist and 
Natur in a climax that rouses the communal voice of the cosmos and completes the 
mythic drama: “Heil dem Meere! Heil den Wogen, / Von dem heiligen Feuer umzogen! / 
Heil dem Wasser! Heil dem Feuer! / Heil dem seltnen Abenteuer! / Heil den 
mildgewogenen Lüften! / Heil geheimnisreichen Grüften! / Hochgefeiert seid allhier, / 
Element ihr alle vier!” (ll. 8480-8487).  
 While Homunculus undertakes his quest for actualization, Faust embarks on his 
own search for transcendent beauty as embodied in the person of Helena, the illusory 
vision of whom had cast him into a coma at the end of act one. And like Homunculus, 
who uses the opportunities afforded by the absolute beauty of the mythic realm to 
transcend the boundaries of Fichtean absurdity inscribed in his identity, Faust too 
discovers in the realm of myth the experiential possibilities that the tenets of subjective 
idealism would otherwise seem to deny. We mark this in his arrival at the lower Peneios, 
a scene that in various ways alludes to but inverts the epistemic limitations imposed by 
the idealist philosophical framework that underpins “Anmutige Gegend.” Whereas there 
Ariel had led a spirit chorus in tending to Faust, gently preparing him for the dawn, the 
river god, Peneios, now leads a group of nymphs who suggest to Faust that he slumber to 
the sound of their susurration (ll. 7263ff.). As in “Anmutige Gegend,” however, Faust 
wakes (“Ich wache ja!” [l.7271]) and finds himself at a river that, like Lethe in 
“Anmutige Gegend,” blurs the line between dreams and memories (l. 7275). The scene at 
the lower Peneios, in which Faust’s senses are titillated, recalls the intense sensory 
stimulation of “Anmutige Gegend.” Whereas there, however, he had settled for the sun’s 
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reflection in the water’s mirror, the reflection of the object of his gaze in the river now 
provides a double vision: “Gesunde, junge Frauenglieder, / Vom feuchten Spiegel 
doppelt wieder / Ergötztem Auge zugebracht!” (ll. 7283-7285). The efficacy of his 
vision, underscored again just five lines later, together with the imagery recycled from 
the earlier scene, signals that the sojourn in the mythic realm has enabled a mode of 
cognition that Faust was previously denied. Whereas nature had proven too 
overwhelming in “Anmutige Gegend,” its intuition in the world of myth now 
accommodates Faust’s powers of cognition and provides for an encounter with the 
beautiful — indeed, he is watching the very conception of Helena in the rendezvous 
between Leda and the swan.  
 Regarding the distinct quests of Homunculus and Faust, Cyrus Hamlin points out 
that the reader ought not overlook that the very creation of Homunculus occurs nearly in 
tandem with the comatose Faust’s dream of Helena’s conception.481 In fact, distinct 
though their quests might be, we can press Hamlin’s comparison further and assert that 
Homunculus’s and Fausts’s activities in the classical Walpurgis night together form a 
narrative pair that suggests the efficacy of mythic art in transcending the epistemic 
boundaries of idealist philosophy: that is, the sphere of myth enables each of them to 
transform dreams (quite literally, in the case of the sleeping Faust) into realities. The 
manner in which Goethe represents this efficacy, I would point out, is underwritten by an 
engagement with the Romantics’ reading of Dante. Inasmuch as Homunculus’s orgasmic 
eruption on Galatea’s shell performs the cosmos-quaking marriage of male Geist and 
                                                           
481 Hamlin, ed., Faust, trans. Walter Arndt (New York: Norton, 1976), 332. 
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female Natur, it enacts precisely that union Goethe had found sanctioned in his 
Schellingian reading of Dante’s Commedia, of which he had already written in his poem 
of gratitude to Streckfuß. Indeed, it renews Schelling’s gendered interpretation of the 
alternate aspects of the absolute,482 mapping the femininity of Natur onto the celestial 
goddess, Galatea, and in so doing, articulating an expression of Dante’s Eternal Feminine 
as mediated by Schelling.483 In Faust’s vision of Leda and the swan, which signals the 
birth of Helena, readers are of course to understand once again that it is the Eternal 
Feminine of nature herself that undergirds the objectivization of subjective, male spirit. 
This reworking of Faust’s mediated vision in “Anmutige Gegend,” the monolog of which 
had been composed in terza rima, even reverberates the tones of that scene in the clang of 
its verses, for Goethe now writes the account of Faust’s vision of the Eternal Feminine in 
a modified terza rima. Riffing on the traditional rhyme scheme of ABA / BCB / CDC / 
DED, etc., Faust’s tercets at the lower Peneios now take larger steps but ultimately 
preserve the earlier concatenation in a steady march forward: AAB / CCB / DDE / FFE / 
GGH / IIH, etc. This acceleration of the earlier tercets’ gait, now complemented by a 
plethora of participles of motion (e.g., schwebend, brüstend, segelnd, schwellend, 
wellend), both corresponds to the current of the river upon which Faust looks as well as 
his progression toward an experiential knowledge of beauty.  
                                                           
482 See above, note 453. 
483 On the topic of the eternal feminine, particularly as it is manifest in the classical Walpurgis night, see 
the perceptive article by Cyrus Hamlin, “Tracking the Eternal-Feminine in Goethe’s Faust II,” in 
Interpreting Goethe’s Faust Today, ed. Jane K. Brown, Meredith Lee, and Thomas P. Saine (Columbia: 
Camden House, 1994), 142-155. 
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 It is worth noting at this juncture that no small number of commentators have 
remarked on the Dantean resonances in the second part of Faust.484 Ulrich Gaier, in 
particular, has formulated what probably amounts to the most comprehensive, searching 
account of the parallels, allusions, and citations of the Commedia in Faust II.485 He reads 
the text as an inversion of Dante’s path to salvation: at the start of the drama’s second 
part, Faust awakes atop an alpine meadow in an earthly paradise, makes his way down 
the mountain and through the courtly affairs of earth in act one, wends his way through a 
modern-day inferno of war in act four before ultimately being assumed into paradise in 
the final scenes of act five. This sequence of events leads Gaier to draw the following 
conclusion:  
 Goethe hat also im Faust einen Gegen-Text zur Divina Commedia geschrieben. Nicht nur  
geht Faust Dantes Weg zurück, sondern, nimmt man die beiden Figuren als 
Repräsentanten der Menschheit, hat auch die Vergeistigung des Dante’schen Wegs in 
eine Einteufelung [...] verkehrt,  trotz und gerade wegen der ständigen Versuche 
Fausts, Gott zu werden – Divina Tragoedia.486  
 
Gaier’s reading is no doubt compelling: the scale of Goethe’s text, not to mention the 
mythic aura it has acquired, almost begs readers to draw comparisons between it and the 
Commedia, given that both occupy a sacrosanct domain in the canon of European 
literature. Yet Gaier, like many scholars before him, is at such pains to establish the 
                                                           
484 All of the major critical editions cite at least some of Goethe’s allusions to Dante, while missing many 
others. Cyrus Hamlin is one of the few to acknowledge the special significance of Dante to Faust without 
however theorizing wherein the significance lay. See the numerous references in his commentary, found in 
Cyrus Hamlin, ed., Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Faust: A Tragedy, trans. Walter Arndt (New York: 
Norton, 1998). I single out Gaier in particular because in addition to having identified many allusions to 
Dante, including more obscure ones, he has articulated a broader vision of how Goethe adapted the 
Commedia.  
485 Gaier, 305-307. 
486 Gaier, 307. 
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connections between texts that he loses sight of the specific history of Goethe’s reception 
of Dante.487  
 Unearthed, polished, and interpreted by his Romantic contemporaries, the 
Commedia did not preoccupy Goethe first and foremost as a drama of salvation, the 
comedic antecedent to his tale of Faust’s ostensibly tragic downfall; on the contrary, 
Dante’s poem intrigued Goethe just as it had the Romantics — as an artwork whose 
integration of theology, geology, astronomy, etc. had seemed to provide for an exemplary 
aesthetic articulation of Naturphilosophie. That is to say, the Commedia captivated him 
for its powers of execution and representation, not for its narrative of redemption.488 
Goethe had indicated as much in his review of Jacobi, as well as in his poem to 
Streckfuß. Inasmuch as his terza rima poems adopt the formal structure of the Commedia 
in sorting out contemporary theories of knowledge, they too embody this dynamic. It is 
from precisely this perspective that the adaptations of the Commedia in Faust II, 
composed in the same period, are to be read. To put a finer point on it: Faust is a drama 
that from its very beginning to its very end stages the question of how the apparently 
insuperable limits of subjective human experience can give way to an experiential unity 
                                                           
487 The temptation to postulate such overarching interpretations does so at the risk of distorting the text 
itself. Gaier claims, for example, that Faust’s journey is an inversion of Dante’s (Hell, Earth, Paradise), yet 
Faust’s begins not quite in Paradise, but rather in an earthly paradise; moreover, his “quest” ends not in 
Hell, but like Dante’s, in Paradise itself. Only in the most general of ways, therefore, and certainly not in 
the way Gaier traces it, should Faust II be regarded as an inversion of the Commedia. This observation 
entails that we be more critical of the notion that Faust II constitutes a “Gegen-Text” to the Commedia.    
488 In important respects, this is the thesis of Hirdt, who writes that “Es handelt sich […] um das ästhetische 
Vermögen, den dargestellten Gegenstand in seiner Plastizität und Farbigkeit in unverminderter 
Lebendigkeit zur Anschauung zu bringen”(69). Concurring with Hirdt’s focus on Goethe’s admiration for 
the plasticity of Dante’s representations, I would extend the reach of his thesis and argue that Goethe’s 
admiration for these representations arises precisely from the aesthetic imperative of Veranschaulichung 
that lay at the heart of the Symbolik/Allegorie of the new mythology.  
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with the objective realm of nature. It is along precisely this plane — and not that of 
Vergeistigung or Einteufelung, as Gaier suggests — that Goethe’s peculiarly 
Romantic/Schellingian adaptations of the Commedia ought to be read in Faust. 
 Hardly an inversion of the pilgrim’s path in the Commedia, the second part of 
Faust offers readers two profoundly Dantean bookends, “Anmutige Gegend” and 
“Bergschluchten,” that together suggest instead a directionally progressive parallel in the 
quests of Dante-pilgrim and Faust.489 As we saw above, Faust’s famous terza rima 
monologue announces, above all, the boundary between subject and object, between 
human Geist and divine Natur. His inability to glimpse the sun’s light exposes the 
threshold of human knowledge, signifying the human subject’s inability to experience 
nature in its cosmic, panpsychic divinity; to adopt a different lexicon, we might say that 
Faust’s intellectual faculties do not suffice to arrive at experiential knowledge of or 
mystical union with God. The shift in lexica is not wholly inappropriate, either, for 
Goethe appeals to a remarkably analogous moment in the Commedia in order to depict 
Faust’s limitations in seeking mystical union. “Anmutige Gegend,” a scene in which 
Faust awakens in an Edenic landscape, is bathed in Lethe’s waters, and glimpses the 
sun’s light in reflection, forms a direct parallel to Dante’s earthly paradise, the Edenic 
garden in which the pilgrim is bathed by Matelda in the waters of Lethe. But it is what 
happens there in the Commedia that proves vital for Goethe’s adaptation of it. Dante-
pilgrim witnesses a remarkable procession, introduced by melodious song, that 
                                                           
489 In “Anmutige Gegend,” Gaier cites allusions to the first canto of Inferno that seem unlikely. See Gaier, 
24-25.   
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culminates in the appearance of a griffin-drawn chariot, which Dante-poet describes as 
superior even to Apollo’s chariot.490 Leaving aside the biblical significance of the 
procession for the Commedia (and indeed for Dante’s own stunning arrogation of poetic 
authority), we note that the pilgrim’s vision of a procession resembles almost exactly the 
celestial object of Faust’s sight in the alpine meadow: just as Dante’s pilgrim witnesses a 
procession compared to Apollo’s chariot, reveling in particular in its musical glory, so 
too does Faust witness the approach of Apollo’s chariot, the entirety of which is 
introduced not by means of its visual appearance, but rather by its sonic effects (ll. 4666-
4678). It is the central figure of each procession, however, that reveals the proximity of 
the scenes, for each bears a divine nature that transcends the cognitive reaches of Faust 
and Dante-pilgrim. In the case of the former, as we know, Faust fails to perceive the light 
of the sun without means of mediation, the form of which is supplied by the waterfall. 
Yet in the case of Dante’s pilgrim, too, the divine figure in the procession eludes 
complete comprehensibility. Thus the griffin, an allegory of Christ in his two natures, 
appears to the pilgrim alternately as an eagle and a lion as he glimpses its image — not 
directly, but via the reflection in Beatrice’s eyes.491 Consider Dante-poet’s account: “A 
thousand desires, hotter than flame, drew my eyes to those shining eyes, which still 
                                                           
490 Purgatorio 29.117-120. 
491 Gaier suggests that the adaptation of Dante in “Anmutige Gegend” is based not on the reflection of the 
Griffin in Beatrice’s eyes, but rather on the reflection of the sun in her eyes in Paradiso I, 43-53. This too 
seems to be at the root of Goethe’s depiction of Faust’s vision of the sun, though it lacks the same 
theological force as the Griffin, a circumstance that seems to me to be at the heart of Faust’s inability to 
gaze at the sun. It likewise occurs no longer in Dante’s Paradiso terrestre, but rather in paradise itself. See 
Gaier, 24.  
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remained fixed upon the griffin. Just like the sun in the mirror, not otherwise did the 
double beast radiate within them, now with one nature, now with another.”492 
 Goethe drew yet again on the Commedia for the composition of the final scene of 
Faust II to portray the transcendent experience of Gott-Natur. As he explained to 
Eckermann, the scene was “sehr schwer zu machen”; in fact, Goethe says he could have 
lost himself in vagueness “wenn ich nicht meinen poetischen Intentionen, durch die 
scharf umrissenen christlich-kirchlichen Figuren und Vorstellungen, eine wohltätig 
beschränkende Form und Festigkeit gegeben hätte.”493 Dante, of course, had employed an 
entire rhetoric of ineffability, referring repeatedly throughout the final cantos of Paradiso 
to the difficulty of both remembering the experience of the Trinity and subsequently 
articulating it in poetry. Goethe, on the other hand, was able to avail himself of Dante’s 
already canonical imagery of the heavens. Having populated his celestial realm with a 
host of choirs and patristic figures, as well as angels, he alludes most explicitly to Dante’s 
paradise in the appearance of the very final figures, beginning with Doctor Marianus. The 
Marian doctor, who receives Faust and prays to Mary, the Queen of heaven, for the grace 
to ascend to loftier heights for a glimpse of God, forms a clear parallel to Bernard of 
Clairveaux, who in the final three cantos of Paradiso directs the pilgrim’s gaze to Mary, 
interprets for him the structure of the terraced rose upon which the blessed sit, and prays 
to Mary on his behalf.494 The governance of the celestial sphere in “Bergschluchten,” 
                                                           
492 Purgatorio 31.118-126. The limits of Dante’s own vision, especially as regards the light of heaven, will 
be discussed extensively again in Paradiso 30, which details the pure light of the Empyrean. 
493 MA 19, 456 (June 6, 1831). 
494 Paradiso 33.1-39. 
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where Mary reigns as queen of Heaven, mirrors that of the Commedia’s final cantos, with 
two important exceptions: first, whereas Mary is perched atop the white rose and 
surrounded by various figures in ecclesial history, including theologians and evangelists, 
we find her in Faust surrounded by a group of penitential women: the Magna Peccatrix, 
the Mulier Samaritana, Maria Egyptiaca, and of course Gretchen herself, described as 
una Poenitentum. The second difference, which rests less on the structure of the sphere 
than on its depiction, stems from the fact that whereas Dante does in fact offer a record of 
his vision of the Trinity — three self-reflecting circles that become comprehensible only 
in a flash of light495 — Goethe stops short of doing so. In fact, Mary, the Mater Gloriosa, 
proclaims: “Komm! hebe dich zu höhern Sphären, / Wenn er dich ahnet folgt er nach” (ll. 
12094-12095), and Marianus echoes her, saying “Blicket auf zum Retterblick / Alle reuig 
zarten, / Euch zu seligem Geschick / Dankend umzuarten” (ll. 12096-12099).  
Yet what follows is not a vision from the higher spheres, but rather the well 
known lines of Goethe’s Chorus Mysticus:  
Alles Vergängliche 
Ist nur ein Gleichniß; 
Das Unzulängliche 
Hier wird’s Ereigniß; 
Das Unbeschreibliche 
Hier ist es gethan; 
Das Ewig-Weibliche 
Zieht uns hinan (ll. 12104-12111). 
 
What I wish to underscore in citing the famous, oft-quoted last lines of Faust is and is not 
what the commentators seem so (justifiably) eager to emphasize, namely that the “Hier” 
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to which Goethe refers is Faust itself, i.e., the book in the reader’s hands. But what I wish 
to underscore first is what Goethe has not said, or more precisely, what the final lines of 
the drama have supplanted: they have replaced, namely, any record of the beatific vision 
to which Faust and Marianus presumably ascend at the behest of the Mater Gloriosa. This 
lacuna constitutes neither a failure on the part of Goethe, nor does it indicate authorial 
capitulation before the task of representing the divine. On the contrary, the inclusion of 
the Chorus Mysticus redefines the terms of salvation: if for Dante the experience of the 
divine had been transcendent, it is notably immanent for Goethe. Mystical union occurs 
not via one’s being raptured into the heavens, but rather via the intuition of the Gott-
Natur in the work of art. On this note, we will recall the intellectual-philosophical aim of 
the Romantics’ new mythology, evidenced above all by F. Schlegel and Schelling: the 
project of a new mythology strives to provide for an intuition of a Spinozistically 
conceived universe in the work of art. The degree to which Goethe consciously 
reanimates this particular historical project of Romanticism in writing Faust II is 
impossible to determine, yet the placement of and assertions in the final lines signify 
nothing less than the claim of having accomplished the selfsame task. 
 Yet what of the Ewig-Weiblichen, that enigmatic and quasi-sacred hieroglyph 
before which Emil Staiger could only genuflect in silence?496 We know from the myriad 
commentaries that with this puzzling term Goethe alludes to the centrality of feminine 
mediation in the Romantic poetic tradition — Dante’s Beatrice, Petrarch’s Laura, now 
Faust’s Gretchen and the host of penitential women surrounding the Mater Gloriosa. We 
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would do well, however, to recall Goethe’s verses to Streckfuß: “Von Gott dem Vater 
stammt Natur, / Das allerliebste Frauenbild, / Des Menschen Geist, ihr auf der Spur, / Ein 
treuer Werber, fand sie mild.” In concluding Faust II with a paean to the salvific force of 
the Eternal Feminine, Goethe reasserts for one final time the theology of his 
Naturphilosophie: the human subject attains to “salvation” only via nature, which Goethe 
repeatedly codes as feminine. In their essence, the final lines of the drama express 
conceptually that which had been sung by the community at the end of the classical 
Walpurgis night: a celebration of the manifold of nature. Just as there the goddess 
Galatea in a festival of Eros had enabled the materialization of Homunculus, Goethe now 
states categorically that it is in Mother Nature, so to speak, that human subjectivity finds 
its highest realization. 
 Gaier writes of Faust’s Einteufelung vis-à-vis Dante’s Vergeistigung, a structural 
inversion — as I have mentioned — that I think is not at play in the intertextual 
relationship of Faust and the Commedia. Yet this is not to say that the drama lacks an 
ethical dimension, only to say rather that, as the ethical dimension of Faust engages the 
Commedia, it issues from the same naturphilosophische interpretation that had led 
Goethe to commend Dante in contrast to Jacobi. This much seems clear from Goethe’s 
adaptations of the Inferno, particularly those that draw on the circle of the violent.497 In 
the Commedia, that circle consists of three rings: in the outermost ring there reside those 
who were violent against their neighbors, in the middle ring those who were violent 
against themselves, and finally, in the innermost ring, those who were violent against 
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God: specifically, sodomites and usurers. It seems to be the last of these groupings that 
stimulated Goethe’s imagination. It was a discussion on the nature of usury, for example, 
that had prompted him to praise Dante’s commitment to nature.   
 The notion that Dante’s representation of sodomites should have contributed to 
Goethe’s Faust is perhaps unexpected, but textual parallels make it worth inquiring after 
this particular connection. In this respect, we will recall the penultimate scene of the 
drama, “Grablegung,” when Mephisto and his devils attempt to ward off the heavenly 
angels who have come to claim Faust’s soul. In a dramatically puzzling moment, 
Mephisto’s concentration is broken because, rather than ward off the angels, he lusts after 
the young Cherubs (ll. 11767ff.). The bizarre scene has a notably Dantean hue, however, 
for amidst the strife between Mephisto and the heavenly hosts, the angels descend and 
ascend, strewing roses that turn to fire and burn the devils (ll. 11699ff.). This imagery of 
the flowers as well as the motion of the angels mirrors Dante’s depiction of the 
Empyrean, where flame-faced angels pollinate the celestial white rose of paradise by 
descending from above and distributing petals of love.498 Inasmuch as the roses catch 
fire, however, their representation breaks with the imagery of Paradiso and alludes 
instead to the violent circle of Inferno and the punishment by which the sodomites there 
are afflicted: for figures like Brunetto Latini and his companions are rained upon by 
burning flames, a punishment intended to recall that suffered by Sodom and Gomorrah. It 
is with respect to this background that Mephisto’s homoerotic interest in the angels, as 
well as the pain that he endures on their account, is to be understood. Goethe’s final 
                                                           
498 Paradiso 31.1-18. 
 
 
 
215 
depiction of Mephisto, while not a moral condemnation of same-sex love, nonetheless 
employs it as a trope to advance the general injunction of the drama against that which 
contravenes the laws of nature. The same lesson ought to be deduced, of course, from 
Faust’s monumental engineering project in act five, that namely whereby he seeks to 
reclaim land from the sea. The land-reclamation project, with its kinship to the endeavors 
of medieval Flemish engineering, likewise has its roots in the circle of Dante’s 
sodomites, for it is in that ring where Dante explains that dikes had been constructed in 
the manner of those between Wissant and Bruges to channel the flow of Hell’s rivers.499 
Insamuch as Faust’s project constitutes an overweening attempt to surmount and 
subjugate nature, it functions yet again as a creative manipulation of Dante’s circle of the 
violent against God. We ought not forget that paired with the sodomites who populated 
Dante’s ring of the violent against God are likewise the usurers, whose growth of capital 
via capital itself signified to Dante (as mediated by a tradition of medieval ethics) a sin 
against nature. There can be no doubt that insofar as this ethics of natural law impels 
Dante’s philosophy of money, it likewise bears upon the not insignificantly devilish plot 
of Mephisto to create paper money, the value of which he claims can later be dredged 
from the earth.  
 The adaptation of Dante’s Commedia in Faust II manipulates on the one hand the 
epistemological stakes of German idealism, and in a related vein, suggests an ethics 
predicated upon an absolute that is identical with nature. In these respects, Goethe’s 
engagement with Dante constitutes a radicalization of that which had been im Werden 
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since the days of Jena Romanticism. We ought not mistake Faust II for Goethe’s 
conscious intervention in a project whose contours had been sketched by Friedrich 
Schlegel in the Rede über die Mythologie, and yet it nonetheless falls squarely within this 
tradition in that its immensely creative repurposing of the Commedia clearly relies on 
Schelling’s own hypothesis in 1799 that Dante suited the project of writing a great 
Naturgedicht. What Goethe realized, a work so monstrous that he ensured the timing of 
its posthumous publication, was received with considerable puzzlement and scorn. 
Indeed, it was a work that belonged to a generation that had by then already passed.  
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5 
  
Death and New Life for the Romantic Dante 
 
On March 9, 1927, at 8 p.m. in Munich, hundreds of listeners — including the likes of 
Josef Bernhart, Hans Brandenburg, Karl Muth, Ernst Penzoldt, Rudolf Alexander 
Schröder, Karl Vossler, Willy Wiegand, and Hans Carossa — packed the Auditorium 
Maximum of the LMU in order to hear the poeta doctus Rudolf Borchardt deliver a 
lecture entitled “Schöpferische Restauration.” Carossa would write that it was more 
sermon than lecture, opining afterward that “große Forderungen und wilde Anklagen in 
die Allgemeinheit hineinzuschreien, das frommt nicht mehr.”500 The Bayerische 
Staatszeitung described it as a “Mahnruf,” 501 which was probably an understatement, for 
in his speech Borchardt had excoriated what he observed as indicators of modernization 
in a ruthless jeremiad that railed against the “Bestialisierung” of the German nation.502 
Sickened that the by-product of capitalist urbanization had been “eine Abfallsmenschheit 
und ein Menschheitsabfall,” that capitalism had transformed the German Volk to a Masse, 
Borchardt called for a program of schöpferische Restauration that would demand that 
“wir niemandem die Zugehörigkeit zur Nation konzedieren, der nicht […] entschlossen 
wäre, dadurch daß er den Geist der deutschen Geschichte und die Geschichte des 
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deutschen Geistes in sich wieder erlebt und wieder erbaut, bewahrt, selber zu einem 
lebenden Stücke deutscher Geschichte und deutschen Geistes, deutscher Art wird.”503  
In proposing such a bold plan, which would renew German national identity 
through identification with the Geist of what he saw as the harmony of antiquity and the 
Christian middle ages, Borchardt looked to the Romantic era for inspiration. For in 
addition to describing his plan for schöpferische Restauration as “das größte Programm 
[…], das seit den Anfängen der Romantik in Deutschland je an eine Fahnenstange 
gebunden worden ist,” Borchardt states that it involves rehabilitating German Romantic 
culture itself: “Wir ergreifen die deutsche nationale Tradition dort wo ihre zerfaserten 
Enden halten [...] und setzen das Werk der Romantik schöpferisch an den Stellen fort, an 
denen sie [unsere Zeit] es unter die Erde tauchend den Wissenschaften überließ [...].”504 
Indeed, throughout the speech, Borchardt alludes to his own activity as Wortführer as 
analogous to that ambassadorial role assumed by A.W. Schlegel in his seminal lectures 
on Romantic art in Berlin and Vienna.     
Given Borchardt’s reinvigoration of what he deemed a Romantic cultural 
program, it should hardly be surprising that one of the constitutive endeavors in his 
campaign for schöpferische Restauration happened to be foremost among the Romantic 
plans for the creation of a new mythology: namely, a modern appropriation of Dante’s 
Commedia. Between 1908 and 1928, Borchardt delivered some half-dozen public lectures 
on Dante to audiences in Bremen, Munich, Florence, and Rome. Indeed, he spent these 
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decades devoted to a radical translation of the Commedia, the publication of which in 
1930 constituted a landmark of sorts in Weimar-era arts and letters. The proposition by 
Borchardt that the Italian poet ought to contribute to the reshaping of German modernity 
suggests, however, that the Romantic engagement with Dante never truly came to 
fruition. Borchardt says as much himself, when in his essay Dante und deutscher Dante, 
he calls attention to the aborted Dante translations of the Romantics:  
Die Gestalt Dantes steht, zwar den wenigsten unter uns fühlbar oder kenntlich, seit längst 
im Hintergrunde unserer Zeit [...]. Die Romantiker entdeckten [Dante]: Ehe Wilhelm 
Schlegel sich durch die Eroberung Shakespeares für Deutschland zu einer nur ihm in der 
Weltgeschichte gehörigen Größe erheben sollte, streckte er die Hände nach diesem Raube 
aus; andere um ihn und mit ihm wandten wenn nicht die gleiche Übermacht so doch den 
gleichen Ehrgeiz einer gleichmäßig hochstehenden Zeit auf den gleichen Gegenstand. 
Diese Versuche sind bekanntlich gescheitert; keine dieser Terzinenreihen ist heut lesbar, 
auch nur für einen durchschnittlichen Anspruch akzeptierbar; die Gründe für dies 
Versagen mußten damals noch ganz undeutlich bleiben [...].505    
 
While Borchardt’s remarks refer solely to the unfinished translations of Romantics like 
A.W. Schlegel, his numerous lectures, essays, and translations suggest more than the 
failure of Romanticism to produce an adequate translation of the Commedia; they 
indirectly signal the failure of German Romanticism to have cemented Dante’s legacy for 
contemporary German culture. Had the Romantics succeeded, Borchardt’s endeavors 
seem to suggest, there would presumably be no need for the form of schöpferischer 
Restauration that takes its cue from Romanticism in the first place.  
 One could linger over such pointed interpretations, but in keeping with the focus 
of this dissertation, I wish merely to pose a question that arises from Borchardt’s 
reflections: what happened to the Romantics’ intensive recuperation and manipulation of 
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the Commedia, such that by the publication of Goethe’s Faust II in 1832, it seems to have 
lost all momentum? The obvious answer is that as the Age of Goethe gave way to the 
Age of Metternich, the aestheticizing propensity of Romantic literature itself fell out of 
favor. While this much is true, and quite readily accounts for the disappearance of myth 
as a legitimate mechanism for social transformation, it does not explain why a poet from 
whom the Romantics gained so much critical leverage, whom they deemed to be the 
father of modern European poetry, would once again recede into the “Schatten der 
Vorwelt” from which A.W. Schlegel had claimed to rescue him. On certain counts, of 
course, the reasons are clear: Novalis, whose affinity to Dante had occurred to A.W. 
Schlegel, Heinrich Heine, and Karl Immermann, died in 1801, just as his poetic career 
had begun to find traction. Goethe, octogenarian though he lived to be, only truly donned 
the Dantean mantle laid before him by the Romantics as he worked toward completion of 
the Faust project. Schelling’s attention to Dante, mediated by the Schlegels, hinged on 
his burgeoning interest in poetry and aesthetics, which, as we know, waned as his 
relationships to the Schlegels deteriorated. And A.W. Schlegel, crucial though he was to 
laying the philological foundation of the mythological project, never truly featured as a 
theorist who envisioned its realization nor as a poet who worked toward that realization. 
But what of Friedrich Schlegel, who, after all, had been the first and most vociferous 
herald of Dante, linking him with Spinoza and the new mythology in the canonical 
manifesto of this most ambitious of Romantic projects?  
To be clear, Dante never entirely disappears from the critical focus of Friedrich 
Schlegel, who continued to fill his notebooks with observations on the Commedia while 
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featuring Dante prominently in a variety of systematic works, like the Wissenschaft der 
europäischen Literatur (1804), Über deutsche Sprache und Literatur (1807), and the 
Geschichte der alten und der neuen Literatur (1812). But with the dissolution of the Jena 
circle in 1801, and his move to Paris in 1802, Friedrich Schlegel gradually relinquished 
his view of the Commedia as a programmatic document for the imminent unfolding of 
European literature, and instead began to assess the Commedia — as we might suspect — 
along the lines of his new allegiance to Christianity and, more specifically, Roman 
Catholicism. As the editors of the Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe have pointed 
out, while Friedrich and Dorothea Schlegel converted to Catholicism only in 1808, their 
turn toward the Roman church is evident already in the immediate aftermath of Jena 
Romanticism.506 Not surprisingly, this shift in worldview entailed a reassessment of art in 
general, with the result that previous projects, like that of the new Bible, which belonged 
more broadly under the rubric of the new mythology, now fell by the wayside.507  
Indeed, this much becomes clear when we examine the new criteria by which 
Schlegel extols the Commedia. While he still lavishes praise upon the poem, calling it for 
example the “vollendetste Meisterwerk” of Italian literature,508 he also contrasts it with 
and indeed exalts it over anything produced in antiquity by virtue of its theological value:  
Es enthält die reinste Theologie und Philosophie in dem lebendigen, glänzenden 
Gewande der Dichtkunst, das römische Gedicht De rerum natura ist eigentlich bloße 
Philosophie. Eine solche Darstellung der gesamten Natur und Gottheit, verknüpft und 
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modifiziert durch den katholischen Geist und Glauben, ausgeführt von einem denkenden, 
durch das gründlichste Studium aller Wissenschaften so literarisch gebildeten und das 
reichste Leben so schön und kräftig genährten poetischen Genie wäre im Geist der 
Griechen nicht möglich gewesen, weil dort Philosophie und Poesie zu sehr getrennt 
waren.509  
 
Clearly Schlegel’s assessment of the poem is still colored by those associations of early 
Romantic theory; indeed, the comparison to Lucretius’s De rerum natura is one that, as 
we know, Schelling had already contemplated, likewise deciding in Dante’s favor. Yet 
the paean to the poem’s theology, as well as its Catholic spirit and faith, suggest a 
departure from its most common previous associations for Schlegel with categories like 
myth, vision, and prophecy. Indeed, even Schlegel’s praise of the poem’s poetry — 
which, he says, sets it apart from Lucretius’s Naturgedicht — suggests an ornamental 
concept of poetry that ultimately displaces a criterion of aesthetic substance in favor of 
theological merit. Whereas during the height of Romantic theory the poem’s excellence 
was regarded as fundamentally representational, irrespective of the truth of the worldview 
that underlay it, by 1804 Schlegel writes in a quite different spirit that “Dantes große 
Dichtung ist nicht nachgeschöpft aus leichten anmutigen Märchen, willkürlichen 
phantastischen Erfindungen; sie entfernt sich daher auch mehr von dem Romantischen. 
Nein, die Wahrheit selbst scheint den Stoff dazu hergegeben zu haben […].”510  
 Schlegel’s earlier association of the Commedia with the theory of Romantic 
mythology persists in shaping his later interpretation of it, yet his gradual conversion to 
Catholicism begins to provide a different framework according to which he understands 
the relationship of myth and poetry. Whereas Greek mythology, he writes, had 
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interwoven its religious tenets with legendary historical events, Christianity “[gründet] 
sich auf wahre Geschichte […], nicht auf alte Sagen.”511 For this reason, he insists, 
Christian writers do not content themselves with legendary narratives that would in any 
way muddle the authentically historical dimension of their religion; instead, they 
generally maintain the strictest of divisions between allegorical and historical senses and 
thereby preserve the integrity of both. Under this rubric, “das Allegorische 
Mythologische hat bey Dante […] entschieden die Oberhand […].”512 Indeed, as he writes 
elsewhere: “Allegorie als Wesen der christlichen Dichtkunst. Ubi? Beym Dante.”513 
Dante, in other words, remains a preeminent figure in the poetics of myth, but Schlegel’s 
concept of myth has lost all the force that Romantic theory had once supplied it and 
becomes instead a reinstantiation of the Enlightenment notion of myth as allegorical 
fable. The interpretation of Dante as a primarily allegorizing poet undermines the 
readings of A.W. Schlegel and Schelling, who had maintained the equal validity of 
historical and allegorical senses of the Commedia, and makes Friedrich Schlegel the 
object of Hegel’s criticism in his lectures on aesthetics.514 
 In addition to his new exegesis of the Commedia, which reasserts the arguments 
of Dante’s earliest commentators and discounts the purely literary dimension of his 
poem, Schlegel begins during the years of his conversion to count Dante among a 
Christian theological tradition that looks conspicuously different from his earlier canons 
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of Romantic poetry. This much is evident in Schlegel’s increasingly Catholicizing 
contextualization of Dante: whereas in the Jena period Dante was frequently or 
prominently compared to figures like Goethe, Spinoza, Calderón, and Böhme, beginning 
around 1804 the comparisons change rather drastically, with Schlegel associating Dante 
most closely with scholastic theologians and poets. Bonaventure, for example, assumes 
such importance that Schlegel muses over whether it is not in his writing that poetry and 
philosophy find their fullest union, proclaiming of his relation to Dante, “Man sollte den 
Dante nie ohne ihn [Bonaventura] lesen.”515 Dante finds his place in Schlegel’s new 
canon of the “großen Riesengeister des Mittelalters und der katholischen Litteratur,” 
which, in addition to Bonaventure, includes the likes of Albertus Magnus and Thomas 
Aquinas.516 Whereas Schlegel had once envisioned a new mythology that would manifest 
the union of idealism and realism, by 1805, his notion of a modern counterpart to ancient 
mythology has become completely allegorical in character, an inkling of which he 
believes to have discovered in scholasticism: “Die scholastische Philosophie ist […] ein 
Keim der noch gar nicht ausgeführt ist, und so sehr zu billigen. […] Dadurch würde die 
christliche zur vollständigen Allegorie entwickelt sein, die so reich wäre, als die alte 
Mythologie. — Anlage dazu im Dante und Calderone.”517  
 Schlegel’s transition to a more distinctly medieval, Catholic conception of Dante 
and the Commedia, while diverging from the readings of the Jena Romantics and even 
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from those of Hegel, resonated on the other hand with more traditionally orthodox 
Catholic writers, like for example the late Romantic poet, Joseph von Eichendorff (1788-
1857), an admirer of the conservative impulses of Heidelberg Romanticism. 
Eichendorff’s first major foray into the German literary scene was Ahnung und 
Gegenwart (1812), a highly reflexive novel that charts the story of a pious and good-
natured young noble, Friedrich, as he makes unexpected friendships and undertakes a 
series of adventures. Like Novalis’s Heinrich von Ofterdingen, Eichendorff’s novel may 
be read as a Romantic Bildungsroman intended to refashion the mold first established by 
Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre; and like Novalis’s unfinished novel, Ahnung und 
Gegenwart reveals an assortment of veritably Dantean allusions and features. Yet much 
in the way of the novel, including the appropriation of the Commedia, can be read as a 
critique of the Frühromantik in general and of Novalis in particular. Indeed, Thomas A. 
Riley has put forth an elaborate interpretation of Ahnung und Gegenwart as an allegorical 
novel that emerged from Eichendorff’s engagement with Dante, arguing that the allegory 
stages fundamental conflicts between Catholicism and Protestantism, as well as between 
true and false Romanticism.518 It may well be that Riley’s reading, which pegs the novel a 
“poetisch-theologische Reisebeschreibung” a là Dante’s Commedia is overly 
ambitious;519 but his having located an affinity between Eichendorff’s novel and Dante’s 
poem is too rich not to contemplate within the space of this epilogue. We will content 
                                                           
518 Thomas Riley, “Die Allegorie in Ahnung und Gegenwart,” in Aurora: Jahrbuch der Eichendorff-
Gesellschaft 44 (1984), 23-31. 
519 Ibid., 27. 
 
 
 
226 
ourselves, therefore, with a glance at the novel’s pivotal twelfth chapter, in which 
Eichendorff lodges a withering critique of German Romanticism.  
 The action unfolds at an unnamed royal court, where Friedrich has arrived after 
searching for the object of his romantic interest, Rosa. Invited to a private residence for 
an evening of tableaux, he recognizes Rosa among the models — indeed, she is the 
central figure in the tableau, dressed in celestial white and holding a cross upward to the 
heavens. At her feet, there are gathered a host of shapes who bow before her heavenly 
glory, including a “lebenslustige” Greek figure who has been turned to stone “vor dem 
Glanze des Christentums.”520 The antipode implied by the tableau’s distinction between a 
pure Christianity and a carnal heathenism extends to the models themselves: Countess 
Romana, who portrays the Greek figure, tries brazenly to seduce Friedrich while Rosa, on 
the other hand, remains ever out of his reach. But the differences between these female 
characters emerge in other respects as well, with Rosa, for example, assuming clear 
associations with a northern, Germanic Volkspoesie and Romana, on the other hand, 
embodying the dangers inherent in a Kunstpoesie inflected by the south.521  
 The contours of this distinction, as well as their significance for Eichendorff’s 
reception of Romanticism, are sharpened as the evening unfolds, for Romana delivers a 
virtuosic poetic recitation in which she recounts the tale of a magical princess who lures 
men to her castle. When afterward a spectator suggests that Romana’s princess might be 
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an allegory of the Virgin Mary, the pious Friedrich has had his fill of the “künstlerischen 
Abendandachten” and launches into a tirade in which he harangues attendees, declaring  
Sind wir doch kaum des Vernünftelns in der Religion los und fangen dagegen schon 
wieder an, ihre festen Glaubenssätze, Wunder und Wahrheiten zu verpoetisieren und zu 
verflüchtigen. […] Wer aber hochmütig und schlau diese Geheimnisse und einfältigen 
Wahrheiten als beliebigen Dichtungsstoff zu überschauen glaubt, wer die Religion, die 
nicht dem Glauben, dem Verstande oder der Poesie allein, sondern allen dreien, dem 
ganzen Menschen, angehört, bloß mit der Phantasie in ihren einzelnen Schönheiten 
willkürlich zusammenrafft, der wird ebenso gern an den griechischen Olymp glauben, als 
an das Christentum, und eins mit den andern verwechseln und versetzen, bis der ganze 
Himmel furchtbar öde und leer wird.522 
 
The chapter ends when Romana — despite Friedrich’s outburst, which effectively ruins 
the frivolity of the evening — engages him in conversation and inspires such jealousy in 
Rosa that she decides to leave the salon.   
 The chapter that includes these events has become a locus of sorts for the 
interpretation of Ahnung und Gegenwart, for in the depiction of Romana, as well as those 
of several other effete poets, including the so-called “Schmachtende,” the 
“Dithyrambist,” and the “heilige Thyrsusschwinger,” scholars have been able to establish 
the guiding principles behind Eichendorff’s critique of contemporary German 
Romanticism. Indeed, Dirk von Petersdorff has described with great insight how 
Eichendorff uses parodies of poets Otto Heinrich Graf von Loeben and Gerhard Friedrich 
Abraham Strauß to criticize the manner in which early Heidelberg Romanticism (ca. 
1807-1808) had readily assumed the habit of consecrating art in the sort of aesthetic 
Catholicism evangelized by Novalis.523 In no uncertain terms, Eichendorff disapproved 
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profoundly of Romanticism’s reduction of Catholicism to a system of art. As he would 
write many years later, “die Romantik wollte das ganze Leben religiös heiligen. […] 
Aber die Romantik […] wollte es […] mehr oder minder durch eine unklare symbolische 
Umdetung des Katholizismus,” which, as Eichendorff goes on to write, could occur 
within the life of the Church alone.524 Concomitant with this disapproval of the confusion 
of art and religion is the broader and ultimately more damning judgment that 
Romanticism, in its unwavering faith in the salvific power of art, had lost touch with 
“life.” As Petersdorff writes of this whole chapter of the novel, “Eichendorff geht es um 
die kritische Darstellung eines Kunstsystems, in dem ästhetische Reize erzeugt und 
rezipiert werden, die außerhalb der Welt der Kunst keine Bedeutung und keine Folgen 
haben, nicht mentalitätsprägend wirken, keinen normativen Anspruch mehr erheben.”525  
 These criticisms basic to Eichendorff’s view of the Romantic movement, I wish to 
show briefly, are quite dexterously advanced by Ahnung und Gegenwart’s intertextual 
engagement with the Commedia, important signs of which we see at the outset of the 
chapter in question. There we find Countess Romana, whose enigmatic poem at the salon 
will cause such a stir, already engaged in a questionable act of narration. Playing host to 
Rosa, she regales her trusting guest with a tale from her adolescence. It is the story of her 
having fallen in love, and it begins with a trope familiar to us from the beginning of 
Dante’s Inferno: 
[U]nser Schloß lag sehr hoch zwischen einsamen Wäldern, ein schöner Garten war 
daneben, unten ging ein Strom vorüber. Alle Morgen, wenn ich in den Garten kam, hörte 
ich draußen in den Bergen ein Waldhorn blasen, bald nahe, bald weit, dazwischen sah ich 
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oft einen Reiter plötzlich fern zwischen den Bäumen erscheinen und schnell wieder 
verschwinden. Gott! mit welchen Augen schaute ich da in die Wälder und den blauen, 
weiten Himmel hinaus! Aber ich durfte, solange meine Mutter lebte, niemals allein aus 
dem Garten. Ein einziges Mal, an einem prächtigen Abende, da der Jäger draußen wieder 
blies, wagte ich es und schlich unbemerkt in den Wald hinaus. Ich ging nun zum ersten 
Male allein durch die dunkelgrünen Gänge, zwischen Felsen und über eingeschlossene 
Wiesen voll bunter Blumen, alte, seltsame Geschichten, die mir die Amme oft erzählte, 
fielen mir dabei ein; viele Vögel sangen ringsumher, das Waldhorn rief immerfort, noch 
niemals hatte ich so große Lust empfunden. Doch wie ich im Beschauen so versunken 
ging und staunte, hatt ich den rechten Weg verloren, auch wurde es schon dunkel. Ich irrt 
und rief, doch niemand gab mir Antwort. Die Nacht bedeckte indes Wälder und Berge, 
die nun wie dunkle Riesen auf mich sahen, nur die Bäume rührten sich so schaurig, sonst 
war es still im großen Walde. – Ist das nicht recht romantisch?« unterbrach sich hier die 
Gräfin selbst, laut auflachend.526  
 
Romana’s narrative, with its description of her lost in a dark and fearsome wood, 
constitutes a clear reimagining of the spectral landscape in which Dante’s pilgrim finds 
himself in Inferno 1; yet her interjection, directed to Rosa — “Ist das nicht recht 
romantisch?” — induces a moment of narrative dissonance inasmuch as the Dantean 
story she recounts is by no means romantic, but in actuality quite terrifying.  
 Why Romana, in narrating the experience, would so clearly misinterpret its 
character manifests itself in a subsequent remark to Rosa, whose response to the story is, 
quite appropriately, that of suspenseful terror:  
 Aber mir scheint gar, du glaubst mir wirklich alles das Zeug da, sagte hier die Gräfin, da 
 sie Rosa über der Erzählung ihren ganzen Putz vergessen und mit großen Augen 
 zuhorchen sah. – Und ist es denn nicht wahr? fragte Rosa. – So, so, erwiderte die Gräfin, 
 es ist eigentlich mein Lebenslauf in der Knospe. Willst du weiter hören, mein  
Püppchen?527  
 
Presumably, the novel’s readers are not as credulous as Romana’s puppet, Rosa, and see 
her tale for what Eichendorff intends it to be — namely, a fiction. Indeed, this would 
account in large measure for Romana’s insouciant narration of what Rosa takes to have 
been a dreadful experience. But what does the appropriation of Dante’s selva oscura have 
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to do with Romana’s artifice? Inasmuch as Romana, whose very name suggests her 
affinity to the Romantik, serves as a quasi allegorical representation of the dark side of 
the Romantic,528 her misreading of the Commedia’s central agon, the pilgrim’s spiritual 
crisis, paints the Dante-mania of the early Romantics as fundamentally misguided. For in 
using fiction to appropriate Dante’s crisis and then characterizing it as “recht 
romantisch,” Roman(a)tik commits what Eichendorff regards as the quintessential error 
of Romanticism: she reduces the ethical core of human existence to an object of art 
whose sole virtue lies in the aesthetic pleasure it affords. It is precisely this impulse 
toward aestheticization and away from “life” that Eichendorff locates and condemns in 
the Romantic reception of the Commedia.529     
 Needless to say, Friedrich Schlegel’s early approach to Dante, which involved 
appropriating the Commedia for the sake of a new mythology, would certainly not have 
won Eichendorff’s approval. Only with his shift toward evaluating poetry from the 
vantage point of his Catholicism could Schlegel have earned the respect of so thoroughly 
pious a critic of Romanticism as Eichendorff, who ultimately came to extol the once-
upon-a-time author of Romantic blasphemies like Lucinde:  
Schlegel […] erkannte, daß das Werk der Heiligung alles Lebens […] in der alten Kirche 
still fortwirke und daß die Romantik nur dann wahr sei und ihre Mission erfüllen könne, 
wenn sie von der Kirche ihre Weihe und Berechtigung empfange. Durch Fr. Schlegel 
daher, den eigentlichen Begründer der Romantik, ist diese in der Tat eine religiöse Macht 
geworden, gleichsam das Gefühl und poetische Gewissen des Katholizismus. Jene 
göttliche Gewalt der Kirche aber in allen Wissenschaften und Lebensbeziehungen zu 
enthüllen und zum Bewußtsein einer nach allen Richtungen hin zerfahrenen Zeit zu 
bringen, wurde von jetzt ab die Aufgabe seines Lebens.530  
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When viewed from the perspective of their respective receptions of Dante, however, there 
is rich irony in Eichendorff’s almost sanctimonious avowal of Schlegel. For, from that 
vantage point, Schlegel ultimately one-ups the orthodoxy of the Grand Inquisitor of the 
Romantic school by distancing himself from Dante on theological grounds.  
 To be clear, Schlegel neither repudiates Dante in his later writings, nor does he go 
so far as to dismiss him as heretical, but his comments on the Commedia eventually 
signal the poem’s insufficiencies as the representative work of Catholic poetry. This is in 
evidence nowhere more explicitly than in Schlegel’s 1812 lectures on the Geschichte der 
alten und neuen Literatur, where he states that the Commedia does not blend poetry and 
Christianity “in vollkommner Harmonie”; that it is only occasionally, but certainly not in 
its entirety, a theological Lehrgedicht; and, finally, that there reigns everywhere in the 
poem a “verbreitete gibellinische Härte.”531 Indeed, Schlegel dwells at some length over 
the last and most severe of these flaws, which clearly troubles him as someone who both 
admires the poem yet pledges allegiance to the Roman Church. He sums up his 
ambivalence in the following way: “Immer aber bleibt die gibellinische Härte, welche 
sich im Dante gewiß in einer nicht unedlen, und wohl erhabenen Gestalt darstellt, am 
Dichter ein Tadel, da sie nicht bloß auf die äußere Schönheit und Form, sondern auch auf 
die innere Schönheit und Gefühlsweise ihren rauhen Einfluß erstreckt.”532 With what 
rings like a begrudging acknowledgment of the need to reconcile orthodoxy and beauty, 
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Schlegel concludes that “Dies sind die Flecken, welche ich der verdienten Bewunderung 
unbeschadet, an diesem größten aller christlichen und aller florentinischen Dichter glaube 
bemerken zu müssen.”533  
 To the extent that Schlegel’s enumeration of Dante’s Flecken reads as an 
obligatory gesture, which I believe it does, it remains open to interpretation how deeply 
Dante’s theological idiosyncrasies truly altered the Catholic Schlegel’s appreciation of 
the poem. It is worth observing, for example, that the lectures were delivered before large 
crowds in the imperial city of Vienna, where Schlegel’s listeners included a cabal of 
Catholic nobles. On an entirely different occasion, however, when in 1818 his stepson 
Philipp Veit was commissioned to paint scenes from the Commedia in a Roman villa, 
Schlegel voiced tremendous enthusiasm at the prospect of once again donning the mantle 
of dantista that he had worn when teaching Italian to Philip’s mother some two decades 
earlier.534 On the other hand, in private notes from 1823, Schlegel contravenes the basic 
literary sensibility of early Romantic theory and groups the Commedia in the same series 
of failed Christian epics as Milton’s Paradise Lost and Klopstock’s Messias. Having 
conceived a plan for his own Christian epic, he writes that it will do what Dante, Milton, 
and Klopstock sought to do in vain. For “Dante ist nur ein Lehrgedicht in einer Reihe von 
Visionen, die zum Theil willkührlich sind und auf falschem Boden beruhen. Milton ist 
eine nachgemachte Mythologie von Paradies und Hölle; und Klopstock nebst dem 
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Nachhall von Milton — eine hexametrische Paraphrase des Evangeliums.”535 We can only 
say with certainty that in the years since the collapse of the Romantic circle in Jena, 
Schlegel’s views of Dante remained in flux. In any event, the notion of a new mythology 
was out of the question, and any grand poetic undertaking for the post-conversion 
Schlegel would be ordered by his own theological vision of the world.536   
———— 
 
Beginning in the pre-Romantic Studiumaufsatz and culminating in the Rede über die 
Mythologie, Friedrich Schlegel had characterized modern poetry as the accumulated 
expression of myriad subjects, the common ground of which lay only in its idiosyncratic 
difference. With the dissolution of the new mythology, and indeed of Romanticism itself, 
there would be little hope for the appearance of a new cultural-aesthetic system the likes 
of which the Romantics believed the Commedia had modeled. Hegel, who never shared 
the Romantics’ enthusiasm, surmised as much in his Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, when 
he famously declared that “Kein Homer, Sophokles usf., kein Dante, Ariost oder 
Shakespeare können in unserer Zeit hervortreten; was so groß besungen, was so frei 
ausgesprochen ist, ist ausgesprochen.”537 Borchardt himself imagined that, as the 
Romantic movement unraveled, its attempts to integrate Dante in contemporary cultural 
life migrated beyond German borders and gave rise to new artistic vigor in the work of 
English and French figures like the Rossettis, like Victor Hugo, or like the French 
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Symbolists.538 The Germans, it would seem, had repeated the blunder of Dante’s 
Florentine contemporaries, which is to say, they had banished him in exile.  
 Dante’s Commedia would in fact have a legacy in the remainder of the German 
nineteenth century, but this legacy became largely intertwined with the development of 
German philological scholarship and translation.539 It is no accident, for example, that the 
two most vocal proponents of a rehabililtation of the Commedia in the era of German 
modernism — Stefan George and Borchardt himself — were both translators of Dante. 
Borchardt, in fact, was a leading philologist trained professionally in Berlin, Bonn, and 
Göttingen, while George, true to Borchardt’s own theory, had studied poetry under the 
guidance of the French Symbolists. In their creative adaptations of the Commedia, 
however, and in what they designed to be cultural programs centered on the weight of the 
Commedia, both George and Borchardt understood themselves as the heirs of the German 
Romantic tradition. An examination of the Neo-Romantics’ renewal and transformation 
of the German Romantics’ Dantean mythology must be delayed, however, until this 
dissertation can be expanded.   
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